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On May 3rd 1991 the legislative framework of industrial relations in New Zealand
was revolutionised by the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act. This
legislation was opposed by an overwhelming majority of workers. The depth of
opposition to the Act was evident from the scale of the stop work meetings,
industrial action and street protests which were the largest held in New Zealand
since the 1981 Springbok Tour. Despite this, the proposed legislation was enacted
virtually unchanged. This thesis describes and analyses the historical process
through which the Employment Contracts Act came to be introduced. The
historical formation of this legislation was shaped by a range of complex and
interrelated social, economic and political forces including, inter alia, a prolonged
economic crisis, a shift in the balance of power between employers and workers,
the decline of Keynesianism and rise of neoclassicism as the prevailing economic
orthodoxy, the influence of 'new realist' ideology within the union movement,
and the centralized institutional character of the state in New Zealand. While
these forces played a crucial role in shaping the overall historical context within
which the struggle for and against the ECA took place, this thesis argues that the
key conjunctural factor which enabled the Government to prevail against mass
working class opposition was the failure of the New Zealand Council of Trade
Unions to call and lead a general strike in order to defeat the Act.
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The past decade has witnessed a radical shift in the policy-making of
governments in New Zealand. Such a shift has not occured in isolation but rather
is the product of a particular set of historical circumstances. The golden years of
post-war New Zealand, a time of low inflation, low unemployment and a
favourable balance of trade, were succeeded by an economic crisis which began in
the mid 1970s.The world economy slumped as recession gripped the international
community in 1974 (in the aftermath of the 1973 oil shocks) and again in 1977-
1978. New Zealand's terms of trade dropped dramatically since the impact of the
world recession was exacerbated by the reliance of New Zealand upon traditional
products (namely farm produce) to make up the majority of its exports.'
The prolonged economic crisis which eventuated had devastating
consequences for the .then economic orthodoxy of Keynesianism. The rise of
economic difficulties in the 1970s brought into question the validity of Keynesian
economics and this was exacerbated by the apparent inability of Keynesian theory
to reverse or even explain the economic decline which gripped the country.s In
contrast, monetarism claimed to furnish those explanations which Keynesianism
lacked. High levels of welfare benefits and the strength of trade unions were
blamed for the twin devils of unemployment and inflation} Therefore, from 1984
onwards policy in New Zealand was formulated within the economic framework
developed by neoclassical economic theory. The Fourth Labour Government,
which came to power in 1984, embarked upon an extensive programme of
deregulation of most spheres of the nation's economic activity. The National
Government of 1990 was committed to maintaining and extended these policy
initiatives.
New Zealand society has always been characterised by inequalities of class,
gender and ethnicity. During the long boom of the 1950s and the 1960s many
argued that New Zealand society was becoming increasingly egalitarian; some
even claimed that New Zealand was a 'classless society'. Any pretence that New
Zealand was egalitarian was shattered as the industrial militancy of the working
class and the political activism of social movements increased dramatically from
1 B. Roper, "From the Welfare State to the Free Market - Explaining the Transition", New Zealand
Sociology, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 5-6.
2 Ibid., pp. 38-42.
3 S. Clarke, Keynesianism, Monetarism and the Crisis of the State, pp. 329, 334.
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the late 1960s to the late 1970s. The distribution of income and wealth became
increasingly unequal throughout the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. The social and
economic polarisation of New Zealand has been accompanied by a closely related
polarisation of New Zealand politics. The ruling capitalist class, farming middle
class and affluent sections of the new middle class supporting New Right
neoclassicism, workers, Maori, the unemployed and the majority of women
opposing it.
The National Government's 1991 budget highlighted the extent of the class
divisions which had emerged in New Zealand society by this time. The
Government cut welfare benefits and at the same time introduced the
Employment Contracts Bill which was clearly designed to effectively eliminate
trade unions as an effective force in both industrial relations and politics. These
measures were both clearly opposed by the majority of the population,
particularly by the working class but also by significant sections of the middle
classes. National became the most unpopular governing party in New Zealand's
history. However, business, farmers and affluent professionals continued to
vigorously support the fourth National Government throughout its first term in
office.
In the aftermath of the enactment of the Employment Contracts Act many
New Zealanders were bitter and confused as to how such a fundamentally anti-
union piece of legislation, opposed by a majority of the population, came to be
introduced. This thesis represents an attempt to address that issue. It is argued
that it was the capitulation of the trade union leadership to the wishes of
employers and the National Government that led to the enactment of the
legislation. Specifically, the failure of the Council of Trade Unions (C.T.V.)
leadership to call for and lead a general strike is cited as a major factor in the
passage of the Bill.
It is not sufficient to merely focus on how the Employment Contracts Act came
to be introduced. It is important also to examine why the C.T.V. leadership
neglected to respond to the wishes of their members. This is explained with
reference to the theory of bureaucratic conservatism. Also important was the
increased employer militancy of the period and, commensurate with this
militancy, a weakened union movement.
As the question of why the C.T.V. failed to lead a general strike has not been
addressed elsewhere, a variety of sources were used in order to establish the facts
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of the struggle against the Employment Contracts Bill. A key source of
information was interviews conducted in Wellington in 1993. These include
interviews with various unions that were involved in the struggle with
representation from both the traditionally militant unions, such as the Seafarers,
and the traditionally moderate unions such as the Engineers Union. Also
interviewed were representatives from the Business Roundtable and the
Employers Federation.
Interview evidence was supplemented by information gleaned from
newspapers during the period in which the struggle took place. These newspapers
included most of the daily papers as well as the newspaper of the Communist
Party, the Peoples Voice. This newpaper provides the only detailed account of the
union movement's campaign against the Employment Contracts Bill. The
Chronicle, a month by month account of industrial relations in the New Zealand
Journal of Industrial Relations also proved invaluable in the construction of the
historical narrative of the period.
The final type of primary source that was consulted was that of official reports.
This included a variety of union pamphlets and leaflets as well as documents
provided by the C.T.U. The policy orientations of the Business Roundtable and the
Employers Federation were established through reference to the many
publications released by these organisations. Finally, the report of the select
committee appointed to consider the Employment Contracts Act provided an
insight into the concerns of many individuals and organisations which have an
interest in the industrial relations environment in New Zealand.
This thesis aims to address a specific question, that of how the Employment
Contracts Act came to be introduced. In order to understand such an event it is
necessary to explain as well as to describe the process through which it came to
occur. This explanation was furnished in general by reference to classical Marxist
theory and specifically by reference to the theory of bureaucratic conservatism.
Classical Marxist theory provides many useful and generalisable insights into the
the actions of employers and workers in capitalist society. Therefore, this theory
was used to guide the empirical research and to develop some conclusions about
the struggle over the Employment Contracts Act.
It is important to appreciate that the industrial relations environment of a
society does not exist in isolation from the other aspects of that society. This thesis
therefore provides a brief analysis of the historical, economic and legislative
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context within which industrial relations in New Zealand exist and attempts to
describe briefly the interrelationships which are present.
The dominant theory of politics in New Zealand is that of pluralism. The
guiding principle of pluralism is that"all citizens are to have an equal share in
determining the political decisions in which they have a legitimate interest."4
While pluralist theory is addressed in some detail in Chapter One it is necessary
here to identify some of the key problems of pluralist theory. Pluralists are unable
to explain the fact that power is evidently cumulative. The cumulative nature of
power is based upon the primary importance of money in a capitalist society.
Classical pluralist theory assumes that the public is able to influence decision-
making yet fails to take into account the barriers to the full exercise of this
influence (these are discussed in more detail in Chapter One). Furthermore,
pluralist state theory does not account for the unequal distribution of power
which is a feature of capitalist societies. The state is constrained by its very
dependence upon capital and therefore must maintain and promote conditions
which favour capital accumulation. It is for these key reasons that classical
pluralism is rejected as a tool for analysing the struggle over the Employment
Contracts Act.
Associated with classical pluralism is a behaviourist or empiricist research
methodology. In practice this often does not rise above a naive empiricism which
purports to be free of theoretical bias. However, this is never the case as the writer
always brings to the work his or her own value judgements. As liberalism is the
dominant ideology in New Zealand politics it is likely that to a greater or lesser
extent these value judgements will have been shaped implicitly by classical
pluralism. Furthermore, such methodology attempts only to explain the surface
manifestations of phenomena. It fails to identify underlying causes and as such
"ignores the role of theory in actively organising and critically reorganising the
data provided by such appearances".5 Like classical pluralism, naive empiricism
should be rejected. This study therefore adopts a realist methodology."
4 R. Mulgan, Democracy andPower in New Zealand, 1st edition, p. 34.
5 R. Bhaskar in T. Bottomore et. al., A Dictionary of Marxist Thought, 2nd edition, pp.175-176; C.
Wright Mills, "Abstracted Empiricism" in The Sociological Imagination, pp.60-86.
6 See R. Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science; A. Keat & J. Urry, "Realist Philosophy of Science" in
Social Theory as Science, pp. 27-45; D. Sayer, Marx's Method; R. Bhaskar, "On the Possibility of Social
Scientific Knowledge and the Limits of Naturalism" in Reclaiming Reality, pp.66-88.
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Chapter One establishes the theoretical framework within which the empirical
evidence was considered. It draws on Classical Marxist thought, with an emphasis
on industrial relations issues. The chapter commences with a discussion of class
relations in capitalist society. Attention is focused on the conflict between
capitalists and workers which characterises capitalism and on the way in which
this inherent conflict shapes industrial relations. This is followed by a discussion
of the role which trade unions play in capitalist society. The thesis of bureaucratic
conservatism is explained and distinctions are drawn between full-time union
officials, workplace delegates and rank-and-file union members. This is followed
by a discussion of employer associations - their role, membership and avenues for
influence. Finally the role of the state is considered. It is argued that classical
pluralism cannot adequately explain the inequalities and conflict generated by
capitalism. Instead, it is argued that there is a close relationship between capital
and the state and hence that the state in capitalist society is inherently class based.
Chapter Two establishes the historical context within which to view industrial
relations in New Zealand. The focus is primarily on the post-war period of New
Zealand's economic history. The Long Boom of 1945-73 is discussed, as is the
subsequent crisis (1974-the present). The implications for industrial relations of
these two distinct stages in New Zealand's economic history are considered.
Chapter Two outlines the emergence and development of the key actors in the
struggle for and against the Employment Contracts Act. Finally, a brief overview
of industrial relations legislation in New Zealand is provided.
Chapters Three, Four and Five are devoted to the case study which forms the
core of the thesis. Chapter Three outlines the industrial relations environment
within which the Employment Contracts Bill emerged. This environment was
shaped primarily by the Labour Relations Act and so considerable emphasis is
given to this legislation. There is a discussion of the response of both employers
and of unions to this legislation. It is argued that the Business Roundtable and the
Employers Federation believed that the Labour Relations Act did not provide for
the sufficient deregulation of the labour market which they stated was both
necessary and desirable. The nature of industrial relations under the Labour
Relations Act is examined. It is shown that employers became increasingly
militant in this period. It is also shown that the C.T.V. response to this militancy
was one of increased compliance with employers' wishes. This was epitomised in
the manoeuvring that occurred around the Compact and this is discussed in the
final section of Chapter Three.
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Chapter Four examines the period immediately prior to the introduction of the
Employment Contracts Bill. It is argued that the militant mood of employers
continued throughout 1990 and that this took the form both of political activity
and of industrial militancy. The introduction and nature of the Employment
Contracts Bill is discussed. The trade union response is then considered both with
reference to increased employer militancy and with reference to the Employment
Contracts Bill itself.
The case study is then completed in Chapter Five. This chapter considers the
actions of the Government, unions and employers in the period' between the
introduction of the bill and its enactment. Particular attention is paid to the
complex union debate which evolved over the nature of appropriate action to take
in opposition to the bill. The public response of unions and employers is examined
and the steps taken by the Government to support the legislation are outlined.
Attention then turns to the union campaign against the Employment Contracts
Bill. This is examined in detail. By the time of the Week of Action divisions within
the union movement were apparent. Concurrent with this was the emergence of
rank-and-file militancy across the nation. The historic C.T.V. Special Affiliates
Conference held on 18 April 1991 is discussed. It is shown that the C.T.V.
leadership was instrumental in the decision not to call a general strike and that
they were supported in this by the leadership of some of New Zealand's key
unions. Finally, the Nationwide Day of Action is discussed which demonstrated
the widespread opposition of the majority of New Zealanders to the Employment
Contracts Bill.
Chapter Six synthesises the empirical evidence of the case study and the
theoretical framework of Chapters One and Two in a discussion of the failure of
the CT.V. to call for a general strike. The significance of strike action is considered
and then discussion moves to the specific issue of the role of the C.T.V. leadership
in the call for a general strike. Some conclusions are then drawn about the validity
of the work as a whole.
This thesis shows that the call for a general strike was a feasible one and that
the presence of the Employment Contracts Act today is, in large part, a result of
the failure of the union leadership to rise to the challenge.
Chapter One
The Political Economy of Industrial Relations
Introduction
This chapter draws upon Marxist economic theory, class analysis and analyses
of industrial relations and state theory in order to construct a theoretical
framework which is capable of guiding a systematic historical investigation of the
major changes in New Zealand's system of industrial relations which occurred
between 1987 and 1991. It is argued in the first section that capitalist societies are
essentially stratified by class. Furthermore, these divisions according to class are
based upon the way in which production is organised, and surplus product is
appropriated, in capitalist societies. Thus industrial relations is located within this
historically specific socio-economic context. The second and third sections address
the roles played by trade unions and employer associations respectively in
capitalist societies. The final section considers the role that is played by the state in
capitalist societies. It is argued that classical pluralist theory ignores the unequal
distribution of power in society. Instead, it is suggested that the state in capitalist
society is class-based.
1.1. Class Relations in Capitalist Society
Before considering class relations in capitalist society it is necessary to
understand what is meant by the term 'capitalism'. The key distinguishing aspect
of capitalist society is that those who produce do not have free access to their
means of production. That is, the producers have been separated from their means
of production.' The means of production in capitalist society are concentrated in
the hands of a small minority or capitalist class. The majority, or working class,
have no means of survival other than to sell their labour power to the capitalist
class.? Marx explained the division of societies into classes by reference to what he
termed the forces and relations of production. The forces of production are the
ways in which people work with nature to satisfy their needs. This incorporates
specialisation, the division of labour and the use of tools. The social mode of
1 E. Mandel, An Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory, p. 31; D. McNally, Against the Market,
Chapter 1; R. Rowthom, "Neo-classicism, Neo-Ricardianism and Marxism", in New Left Review, no.
86, 1974, pp. 75-87; B. Fine, Marx's Capital, Chapters 1,2,4,5,7; P. Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist
Development; E. Mandel, Introduction to Capital, Vo11, (Penguin Edition); R. Rosdolsky, The Making
ofMarx's Capital, Chapter 12 and 1. Rubin, Essays on Marx's Theory of Value,Part l.
2 E. Mandel, An Introduction to Marxist Economic Thought, pp. 31-34. See also sources listed above.
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production is the way "in which people co-operate to produce the things they
need."3 Social relations of production have both given rise to and perpetuated the
phenomenon of classes within society.s A minority of the population gain control
of the means of production. By virtue of this control of the means of production
they are able to force the rest of the population to play the role of the direct
producers. Thus a person's class is determined by the position which he or she
holds within society's relations of production.s
Capitalism is characterised by a specific social form of exploitation. In
ascertaining the nature of this exploitation it is useful to compare capitalism with
slavery and feudalism. In a slave society, slaves are owned by their masters and
hence so are the products of their labour. The slave is property in much the same
way as are tools and land - the slave owns nothing. Under feudalism, however,
the peasant may own the tools which he or she uses. He or she does not own the
land that they work. Therefore, the peasant spends part of his or her time working
the land in order to satisfy his or her needs and part of the time working the land
for the lord.v Under a capitalist system the worker is free. However, he or she is
under a socio-economic compulsion to sell his or her labour power. Whilst the
worker is not bound to the capitalist in any formal sense, he or she must work for
the capitalist in order to survive? Callinicos described briefly the way in which
the capitalist mode of production developed out of the feudal society of
nineteenth century Britain:
In England, the peasantry were separated from the land on which their
livelihoods depended between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries by
means of various stratagems - evictions, the enclosure of common land
and so on. It was only thus, through the creation of a working class
owning nothing but their labour power that the capitalist mode of
production could develop.8
There is a fundamental difference between the nature of exploitation under
capitalism and exploitation in a feudal or slave society. In a slave society, it is
obvious that the relationship between slave and master is one of exploitation. All
of the slave's labour apppears as unpaid labour. Similarly under feudalism there
is a clear distinction between the labour which the slave exerts for personal gain
3 A. Callinicos, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx p.83.
4 A. Callinicos inWhat is Politics?, pp. 127-128 and Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History, pp. 79-80.
S Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History, p. 73.
6 P. Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, p.147
7 A. Callinicos, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx, pp. 90-91; E. Mandel, Introduction to Capital, Vol
1, pp. 46-47 and D. McNally, Against the Market.
8 A. Callinicos, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx, p. 91.
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and that which he or she exerts for the lord. By contrast, under capitalism the
payment of wages conveys the impression that all the labour conducted is paid
for. Thus, exploitation is disguised through the payment of wages.? Geras states
that "what is actually social appears natural; an exploitative relationship seems to
be a just one. "10
In order to understand the way in which capitalism functions it is necessary to
have an understanding of Marx's theory of surplus value.U There are three key
aspects to this theory. Firstly, it recognises that the relationship between
capitalists and workers is unequal. The capitalist does not have to buy labour-
power continuously. The only reason which a capitalist has for purchasing labour
power is to enable him or her to make a profit. Where this is not possible the
capitalist will usually make workers redundant or even close down the factory. In
contrast, workers rely on wages on a continuous basis. Usually the worker will
have no other means for his or her survival.Thus the freedom of the worker in the
labour market has the status of formal freedom only, for the worker is subject to
his or her economic needs which can be met only through entering employment.l-
This reliance is not reciprocated by the capitalist, for capital, in the form of money,
can be easily transferred and factories and machines can be bought and sold. The
employer may also be able to live off his or her capital while disputes are being
resolved - workers tend not to have this security. Furthermore, each worker has to
attempt to sell his or her labour power in competition with other workers. Once
an employment contract has been entered into, the worker shifts from a position
of 'freedom' to one in which he or she relinquishes this freedom. By allowing
himself or herself to be employed by the capitalist the worker places himself or
herself under the control of the employer. Crouch writes that lithe relationship
ceases to be one of exchange and becomes one of authority."13
9 K. Marx, Capital, Voll, pp. 539-540, Chapter 1, Section 4 and J. Mepham, "The Theory of Ideology
in Capital" in J. Mephant & D.H. Rubens, Issues in Marxist Philosophy, Volume Ill.
10 N. Geras, Literature of Revolution: Essays on Marxism, p. 60; H. Braverman, Labour and Monopoly
Capital, Chapter 1; M. Burawoy "Towards a Marxist Theory of the Labour Process: Braverman and
Beyond in Politics and Society, vo1. 8, nos. 3-4, 1978; D. Harvey, The Limits to Capital, pp. 20-24; R.
Meek, Studies in the Labour Theory of Value, pp.177-186; R. Rosdolsky, The Makingof Marx's Capital,
Chapter 15, pp. 220-230 and P. Sweezy, The Theory ofCapitalist Development, Chapter IV.
11 For discussions of the theory of surplus value, see S. Himmelweit in T. Bottornore et a1. (eds.), A
Dictionary of Marxist Thought, pp. 472-475; E. Mandel, An Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory,
pp. 23-25; A. Callinicos, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx, pp. 111-118 and J. Russell, The Marx-
Engels Dictionary, p. 115.
12 H. Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital, p. 53.
13 C. Crouch, The Politics of Industrial Relations, p. 121.
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The second key aspect of Marx's theory of surplus value is that the minority of
the population have a monopoly over the means of production. Thus they can
exclude the direct producers from having unrestricted access to the means of
production. Workers are unable to use the means of production without the
agreement of the capitalist. The employer does need the worker for in order to
enlarge capital it is necessary to employ people to increase its value. However the
need of the employer is not as urgent as the need of the worker. Workers are
unable to increase their potential to reproduce their own labour power. In
contrast, capitalists are able to introduce measures (such as technology and
improved management techniques) which reduce this dependence upon labour
power. There are few opportunities for workers to exist outside the conventional
labour market. This produces an interesting irony as workers therefore have a
stake in the survival of the firm. Furthermore, workers are also part of a wider
environment which is affected both socially and politically by capitalist
industrialisers and they are often the consumers of the products of their own
labour power.H
Cohen states that non-Marxists believe that they can establish reciprocity in
the relationship between capitalists and workers. It is argued by non-Marxists that
the profits which the capitalist enjoys are a form of compensation for the risks
which he or she has taken. The worker is believed to be shielded from such risks
by the capitalist. Whilst there may be a certain degree of reciprocity in such a
situation this does not alter the fact that the relationship between the worker and
the capitalist is one of subordination. In order to exist the worker has little option
but to contract to the employer to use the means of production owned by the
employer. Thus the employer may dictate the terms of the contract.lf
Finally, the commodification of labour is a direct consequence of the capitalist
system.lv Hyman describes the treatment of workers within capitalist industry as
that of "dehumanised factors of production." He states that upbringing and
education are often tailored to suit the needs of the capitalist.l? The
commodification of labour does, however, present the capitalist with a problem.
Labour is a 'commodity' which is inseparable from its producer. Thus the
14 C. Offe, Disorganised Capitalism, pp. 180, 188.
15 Cohen, Karl Marx'sTheory ofHistory, pp. 69-70.
16 The commodification of labour is discussed in a variety of sources including: C. Offe,
Disorganised Capitalism, p. 177; H. Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital, p. 54; S. Himmelweit in
T. Bottomore et.al. (eds.), A Dictionary of Marxist Thought, pp. 472-475 and K. Marx, Capital, Vol.1,
pp. 167-176.
17 R. Hyman, Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction, p. 20.
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capitalist is able to purchase not labour but rather potential labour.If This
exacerbates the conflict which characterises industrial relations in capitalist
society since the quantity and quality of work cannot be clearly defined. Offe
states that this indeterminacy is rectified by means of managerial authority.
"Maintaining a certain indeterminancy of the employment contract is very much
in the interest of management itself, since otherwise each time the concrete work
task changed, a new work contract would have to be made."19 Therefore,
management can constantly redefine the amount or nature of the work required
according to the needs of the business.
Capitalist relations of production are unique in that the capitalist is able to
increase production by making the workers use their time more efficiently. In a
feudal society, the only means of increasing production is to make the serf work
longer hours. The effect of making people work more efficiently is that "the
labour process is increasingly socialised. Production now takes place in large units
organised around machines and involving a highly complex division of labour."20
The desire for profit inherent in the capitalist system ensures its dynamic nature.
Capitalists seek new ways of organising and exploiting labour in order to
maximise their gains. Similarly, new technology is eagerly sought as a means of
reducing the costs of production - often by virtue of its ability to replace labour
power.s! Thus capitalism is characterised by constant change. Furthermore the
dynamism of the capitalist system has implications for industrial relations in that
regular attempts to alter the labour process in an effort to reduce costs can
undermine many of the traditional forms of conflict resolution. Thus conflict may
accelerate, unchecked by institutional controls.s-
Closely related to the dynamism of the capitalist system is its unevenness of
development. Development may vary both within and between industries,
regions and nations. This is reflected in the various different strategies employed
by capitalists in dealing with situations at different organisational levels or in
dealing with the variety of problems encountered at a single level.23 In the latter
part of the twentieth century capitalism has acquired a transnational nature. There
exists a world market, facilitated by communications technology, transportation
18 C. Offe, Disorganised Capitalism, p. 177 and H. Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital, p. 54.
19 C. Offe, Disorganised Capitalism, p. 57.
20 A. Callinicos, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx, p. 118 and R. Rosdolsky, The Making of Marx's
Capital, pp. 224-225.
21 R. Hyman, Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction, p. 103.
22 R. Hyman, The Political Economy of Industrial Relations, p. 129.
23 Ibid., pp. 101, 129.
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advances and an international division of labour between the first and third
worlds.w International investment has many advantages for large firms - they
may be able to take advantage of lower taxation, cheaper labour costs, new
markets and the sanction of possibly shifting operations which can be used to
discipline the labour force in the home country.sf
Capitalist relations of production and the process of exploitation generate
distinct sets of class interests.s'' In capitalist society, production is for profit. The
wages of employees represent a cost to the employer, undermining his or her
potential profit, whilst the worker will act to improve his or her standard of
living. Both employer and employee will therefore try to improve their positions
relative to each other, thereby leading to conflict. Thus, to the capitalist, the
employment of workers is only viable insofar as it increases productivity to an
extent great enough to offset the costs incurred, namely wages. A reduction in the
demand for the commodity produced or the development of technology which
lessens the reliance of the industry on labour power will often result in
redundancies.V The drive to maintain and increase profitability in the context of
market competition drives employers to attack wages and conditions of
employment, to introduce 'restrictive work practices' and to enhance managerial
authority. Employers constantly attempt to raise the productivity of labour - not
just through increasing the intensity of work, but also through the introduction of
new technology - which displaces labour.
Workers also have a distinct set of interests. They want to increase wages,
maintain or improve conditions of employment and fight redundancies. Wage
increases or improvements in the conditions of employment increase labour costs
and reduce profit rates. Hence employers and workers have antagonistic sets of
interests.28 Offe observes that workers' interests are more complex than those of
capitalists. The worker is both the subject and the object of the exchanges of
labour power which occur in capitalist modes of production. As such the worker
24 H. Braverman, Labour andMonopoly Capital, p. 252.
25 R. Edwards, Contested Terrain, p. 8I.
26 For discussions of the concept of class see T. Bottomore in T. Bottomore et.al. (eds.), A Dictionary
of Marxist Thought, pp. 74-77; E.O. Wright, Class, Crisis and the State, Chapter 2; E.O. Wright, Class
Structure and Income Determination, Chapter 1; H. Draper, Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution, Vol.2:
The Politics of Social Classes, Chapters 2-3. The claim that the Marxist conception of the working
class is no longer relevant in the late twentieth century is rebutted in A. Callinicos and C. Harman,
TheChanging Working Class, Chapters 1-3.
27 R. Hyman, Industrial Relations: aMarxist Introduction, pp. 20-22.
28 For a more complex discussion of what is meant by 'interests' see A. Callinicos, Making History,
pp.122-133 in which Callinicos develops a qualified conception of interests.
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has "a broader range of interests" than "that of capitalists who can satisfy a large
part of their interests somewhat apart from their functioning as capitalists."
Workers interests include - in addition to wages and conditions of employment-
job satisfaction, health concerns, leisure time and employment security.s?
There is an inherent contradiction between the capitalist class and the working
class.30 Their very natures are defined in relation to each other. Capitalists exploit
workers and workers are exploited by capitalists. This antagonistic relationship
determines the class struggle which is inherent in all capitalist societies. Wright
states that "much of the history of the class struggle between capitalists and
workers, especially in the ninteenth century, can be seen as a struggle over the
terms of control of the labour process."31 While the capitalist class holds a
dominant position in the class struggle, the potential for workers to influence
situations exists by virtue of their ability to take collective action. This is discussed
in Section 1.2.
In considering industrial relations in capitalist society it is first necessary to
distinguish between labour and labour power. Whilst labour may be defined as
work, labour-power is the potential or capacity to work.32 Capitalist society is
characterised by the division of labour. The structure of industry and of wage
labour is determined by and reinforces the pattern of class division within society.
Wages in capitalist society tend to be determined by the relative control of a
worker over the means of production or over his or her co-workers.P Manual
work is separated from mental work affording increased productivity as workers
are freed from various time-consuming manual functions. Hence, the labour
process becomes divided among workers and even often among different
locations.w Society comes to be divided according to occupation with each worker
merely a cog in the wheel. Workers become incapable of the complete production
29 C. Gffe, Disorganised Capitalism, p. 179.
30 E.G. Wright distinguishes between conflict and contradiction. Conflict occurs when two groups
pursue opposing objectives. Contradiction describes a relationship in which such opposition is an
intrinsic part of the relationship which defines the two groups. See E.O. Wright, Ckass Structureand
Income Determination, pp. 21-22.
31 E.G. Wright, Class Structure and Income Determination, p. 28.
32 A discussion of the nature of labour-power is to be found in K. Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, pp .167-176.
This discussion focuses on labour-power as a commodity.
33 R. Hyman, Industrial Relations: A MarxistIntroduction, p. 2l.
34 Ibid., p. 124.
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of any commodity.35 Thus they are alienated from the process of production
thereby affording capitalists greater control and higher profits.36
In capitalist society, labour markets are a means of ensuring that the
productive system is supplied with labour and that workers are supplied with
financial support. "The important point is that the labour market organises
production and distribution as an exchange relationship of wages and labour
inputs and that here, as in all other markets, suppliers and buyers of 'labour' stand
opposed."37 However, the position of labour in the market differs from that of
other commodities. The provision of goods for a market tends to be determined
by their saleability. In contrast, the production of labour is not subject to any such
conditions. The reproduction of labour power is not determined by its position in
the labour market but by socially necessary labour required to produce labour
power.38
The commodification of labour gives rise to the need for managers in capitalist
society. An employer may purchase labour-power for a certain period of time. It is
then up to him or her to ensure that this potential labour is realised as actual
labour. Wright explains this concept simply:
...a capitalist may hire workers for eight hours, but unless the labour of
those workers is controlled within the production process (Le. unless
they are subordinated within authority relations) there is no way of
ensuring that they will perform anything near eight hours of actual
labour.39
Management is used as a mechanism of control, ensuring that maximum
productivity is achieved.s? Managers also fulfill the function of ensuring that the
tasks performed by each worker collectively produce a marketable commodity. At
this point it should be noted that the term 'manager' includes many different
gradations of management. Thus not all managers occupy identical positions
within the relations of production.U Many companies require an elaborate
managerial structure, the gradations of which signify increasing authority and
autonomy. However, all managers are subject to the directives of the upper
35 Ibid., pp. 72-73.
36 For a discussion of 'alienation' see G. Petrovic in T. Bottomore et. al.(eds.), A Dictionary of
Marxist Thought, pp.11-16.
37 C. Offe, Disorganised Capitalism, p. 14.
38 I bid., pp. 14-17.
39 E.O. Wright, Class Structureand Income Determination, pp. 16-17.
40 R Hyman, The Political Economy of Industrial Relations, pp. 22-23.
41 See A. Callinicos and C. Harman, TheChangingWorking Class, pp. 13-53.
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eschelons within the management hierarchy. Divergence from the accepted
policies is rarely tolerated.
Production in a capitalist society is therefore dependent upon an authoritarian
hierarchy of management. The maintenance of such hierarchies depends upon the
social conditioning which exists in advanced capitalist societies. It would be
inefficient for management to constantly monitor its employees and hence
emphasis is placed upon the concept of "a fair day's work for a fair day's pay".
Similarly the structure of the family and the education system instill in the young
an ethic of obedience to authority. This ethic is then used in the workplace by the
employer. The capitalist status quo is further reinforced by those who, whilst they
may not be capitalists, are nevertheless figures of authority and influence in
society, for example, politicians and prominent church members.F
The dominant liberal ideology plays a large part in the maintenance of the
status quo in industrial relations. This ideology enables capital to establish the
agenda for debate and thus prevents people from questioning the existing order.
Hyman believes that such circumstances, in which, "those subject to a particular
type of control do not question its legitimacy or can see no alternative" is a more
subtle yet more powerful manifestation of influence than the ability to overcome
opposition.43
The existence of a prevailing neoclassical economic orthodoxy is one way in
which opposition to capital is precluded. Neoclassical theory conceptualises the
production process in terms of inputs and outputs rather than as a social process
engaged in by people.v' It is believed that under a 'laissez-faire' or 'free market
system', equilibrium will be automatically achieved. Thus unemployment,
economic crises and inflation are portrayed as deviations from equilibrium and as
having no place in the capitalist system. Certain measures such as the
introduction of more competition are advocated as the cure for economic
imperfections.sf Neoclassical theory also argues that any attempts by workers to
organise in order to influence their conditions of employment will upset the
42 R. Hyman, Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction pp. 30-31.
43 R. Hyman, Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction, p. 26 and N. Geras, 'Essence and
Appearance: Aspects of Fetishism in Marx's Capital' in Literature of Revolution: Essays onMarxism,
pp. 63-84.
44 See E. Nell, 'Cracks in the Neo-Classical Mirror: on the breakup of a vision' in E. Nell (ed.),
Growth, Profits and Property.
45 R. Rowthom ' Neo-Classicism, Neo-Ricardianism and Marxism' in New LeftReview, pp. 64-66.
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precarious balance of the economy. The predicted result of such action is that
other workers will then be forced to accept lower wages or even lose their jobs.46
Industrial relations and conflict in advanced capitalist societies encompass a
broad range of interrelated and compex phenomena including: capital
accumulation and accumulation crises; class formation and the historical
emergence of union and employer organisations; class interests as the basis of
collective action; ideological representations of employer and worker interests;
shifts in the prevailing economic orthodoxy; the role of the state and changes to
the legislative framework governing industrial relation. Clearly it is not possible
to address all of these complex issues in this chapter or indeed in this thesis.
Therefore, the remainder of this chapter will focus on trade unions, employer
organisations and the role of the state.
1.2. Trade Unions in Capitalist Society
There are a number of related reasons why workers develop trade unions.V
Firstly, as was stated in the previous section, the relationship between capital and
labour is characterised by inequality. Hyman states that "because the economic
power of capital - reinforced by a battery of legal sanctions - is so great, the
amount of control which can be exercised by employees as individuals is
extremely limited.//48 Since production is dependent upon labour, workers can
exercise considerable influence when they collectively threaten to withold their
labour. The trade union is a vehicle for this collective action.
Secondly, the nature of the capitalist mode of production means that
employers are constantly trying to improve the productivity of their employees
either by the introduction of new technology or through making the employees
work harder. Such measures tend to bring employers and employees into conflict.
The trade union enables employees to defend their interests. In particular, trade
unions reduce the vulnerability of individual workers. Thirdly, unions lessen the
competition between workers in the market place thus enabling them to tap into
46 R. Hyman, Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction, p. 125.
47 There are a number of useful accounts of the role of trade unions in capitalist society. These
include: J. Kelly, Trade Unions and Socialist Politics; R. Hyman, Marxism and the Sociology of Trade
Unions; C. Offe, Disorganised Capitalism, Chapters 6-8; T. Clarke and L. elements (eds.), Trade
Unions under Capitalism and H. Draper, Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution, Vol.2: The Politics of Social
Classes, pp. 33-168.
48 R. Hyman, Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction, p.32.
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their collective strength more readily. Finally, unions enable workers to formalise
and generalise their opposition to capital.s?
Trade unions have various avenues of action available to them. They may
attempt to advance their opinions by means of action over wages, efforts to
influence company policy or involvement in politics by means of parties,
parliaments or governments.50 However, the extent to which unions can be
effective is limited by the constraints of the system within which they have to
operate.
Offe describes unions as "secondary organisers." Workers are first and
foremost part of the capitalist firm and it is only by virtue of this role that workers
are able, and indeed wish, to form unions. Thus capital is the 'primary' or 'initial'
organiser.51 Trade unions are a focal point for the worker in his or her conflict
with capital. They place the worker in a stronger position.
Unions can also have a role to play in controlling capital in the workplace and
can be used by employers to accelerate conflict resolution. The role ascribed by
employers to unions changes historically. When workers are in a strong position
employers advocate a centralised industrial relations system. Unions are viewed
as a legitimate vehicle for the voicing of worker concerns and can be seen as a way
in which stability may be maintained. In contrast, when employers are in a strong
position they will tend to advocate a decentralised system of industrial relations.
Such changes are reflected in the legal and institutional framework within which
unions are expected to operate. Offe describes rulings regarding the functionings
of unions as "an imposition of political forms upon workers' associations and a
limitation of either the types and objects of demands they are legitimately allowed
to make and/or the tactics they are permitted to employ in the struggle for these
demands."52
Unions increase the bargaining power of workers against capital yet they still
do not operate from a position of parity. Unions represent the only form of
collective action available to workers. Employers, however, have three avenues of
collective action available to them - the firm itself, informal co-operation and
business associations. Furthermore, the worker may experience an internal
49 R.Hyman, The Political Economy of Industrial Relations, p.37.
50 C. Offe, Disorganised Capitalism, p.160.
51 Ibid., p. 176.
52 Ibid., pp. 207-208.
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conflict as he or she has a wide range of interests. Thus, the union has to organise
in such a way that the widest range of workers' interests can be represented.P
Offe distinguishes between the attitudes of conservatives and social democrats
towards unions. Both believe that it is essential to minimise the ability of unions to
disrupt the production process but they place the responsibility for militancy in
different areas. Conservatives blame union leaders for militancy, believing them
to be arrogant and self-interested. It is often believed that unions betray their
members interests as well as encroaching upon the interests of capital. Social
democrats, however, view union members as the fount of militancy and believe
that all too often union leaders have to acquiesce to the demands of their
membership. Thus, union leaders are viewed almost as the tools of capital, as the
enforcers of industrial control.54
Unions are also subject to ideological attacks by the ruling class, on the
grounds that they are subversive and have aims contrary to the 'national interest'.
With reference to the British situation, Hyman states that "judges, hard-line
employers and right-wing politicians and newspapers have always been hostile
[towards unions] and anti-unionism now dominates Tory party policy".55 In New
Zealand, the Government, Business Roundtable and Employers Federation have
variously condemned the union movement as self-interested, incapable of
representing members' interests and redundant.
A further restriction on trade union effectiveness is to be found within the
unions themselves. Union officials tend to display a contingent conservatism.56
This conservatism centrally involves a commitment by union officials to the
established procedures of conflict resolution. This usually entails emphasising the
role of negotiation in order to successfully conclude disputes. For this reason
union officials are often concerned that industrial action does not accelerate to a
point where they no longer have control. Their conservatism is contingent because
53 Ibid.,p. 179.
54 Ibid., p.209.
55 R. Hyman, ThePolitical Economy of Industrial Relations p. 225.
56 The bureaucratic conservatism thesis is not universally accepted. For a discussion of criticisms
of this thesis see T. Bramble, "The Contingent Conservatism of Full-Time Trade Union Officials",
Phd. Thesis, Chapter 1 and J. Kelly, Trade Unions and Socialist Politics. Other discussions of the
thesis of bureaucratic conservatism include: T. Cliff & D. Gluckstein, Marxism and Trade Union
Struggle, pp. 21-34; J. Eldridge, "Trade Unions and Bureaucratic Control" in T. Clarke&L. Clements
(eds.), Trade Unions under Capitalism, pp. 175-183 and R. Hyman&R. Fryer, "Trade Unions:
Sociology and Political Economy" in T. Clarke&L. Clements (eds.), Trade Unions under Capitalism,
pp. 152-174.
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they are, to varying extents, under pressure to respond to their rank and file union
members.e? The ability of union officials to manipulate the workplace situation is
usually dependent upon the apathy or inexperience of most of their members.
Where there are militant members within a union these are often not numerous or
influential enough to sway the majority.58
There are two broad reasons for the conservatism of union bureaucrats. Firstly,
they have their own interests, distinct from those of the rank and file. Secondly the
concrete circumstances of trade union officialdom tend to cause conservatism.
Trade union bureaucrats act as intermediaries between capital and labour.
Usually, officials are aware of their own role and interests and recognise that they
are dependent on trade unionism for their livelihood. Thus they have no interest
in jeopardising the status quo.59
Trade union officials also develop conservative tendencies as a result of the
work that they do. The nature of their work requires that they be set apart from
the ordinary members of the union. They become isolated both geographically
and ideologically. It therefore becomes very difficult for officials to reflect the
views of their members.s" Often they enjoy greater job security and higher wages
than rank-and-file union members.O Callinicos discusses the unique set of
interests possessed by the trade union bureaucrat:
The effect...is to isolate him[sic] from those he represents. He is removed
from the discipline of the shop floor, from its dirt and dangers, from the
immediate conflicts with the foreman and manager, from the fellowship
of his workmates, to the very different environment of an office. Even if
he is not paid more than his members, his earnings no longer depend on
the ups and downs of capitalist production - they no longer involve
working overtime, nor are they vulnerable to short-time or lay-offs. If a
plant is closed, the official who negotiates the redundancies will not get
the sack. Constantly closeted with management, he comes to see
negotiation, compromise, the reconciliation of capital and labour as the
very stuff of trade unionism. Struggle appears as a disruption of the
bargaining process, a nuisance and an inconvenience, which may
threaten the accumulated funds of the union. Organisation becomes an
end in itself, threatening even the limited goal of inmproving the terms
on which the worker is exploited.62




60 T. Cliff & D. Gluckstein, Marxism and Trade Union Struggle: The General Strike0/1926, p. 27.
61 J. Kelly, Trade Unions and Socialist Politics, p. 151.
62 A. Callinicos quoted in T. Cliff &D. Gluckstein, Marxism and Trade Union Struggle, p. 27.
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The trade union official will not usually agree to tactics that will weaken his or her
position within the trade union bureaucracy. Thus strike action is often opposed
where it threatens the existence of the union or the maintenance of .union funds.
Whilst the union official may wish to use the threat of strike action as a tool to
influence an employer, he or she often does not wish to see this power actually
unleashed.63
In order to strengthen his or her position union officials emphasise negotiation
and compromise. Rank-and-file members easily become dependent upon what
they perceive to be the experience and expertise of their officials.64 Cliff and
Gluckstein deny that a militant past may be able to save a union official from
conservative tendencies. They state that:
Whatever militant past a union official may have, if he or she acts as a
guardian of the union apparatus and mediator between the workers and
bosses for a prolonged period, the habits of bureaucratic thinking must
inevitably creep in. Indeed, a militant past may provide just the
credibility needed to make a bureaucrat's control of the union all the
more effective.65
Finally, there is usually a lack of accountability where trade union officials are
concerned. Many union officials are appointed rather than elected. Furthermore, it
is common for union bureaucrats not to be subject to any regular, effective
accountability. This limits the extent to which it is possible to keep their
conservatism in check.66
Shop stewards differ from full-time union officials in one major respect - they
are employed by a company and secondary to this role they represent the interests
of their fellow workers. This serves to enhance their accountability to those whom
they represent as they are easily accessible.s? Hyman states that there are three
aspects of shop steward organisation and action:
1. Unionism within the workplace - as at national level - was
predominantly economistic in orientation; yet because of the direct
engagement at the point of production, it was necessarily involved in
struggles against managerial control of labour power.
2. The very intimacy of the links between shop stewards and the small
groups of workers they represented could accentuate the problem of
trade union sectionalism.
63 J. Kelly, Trade Unions and Socialist Politics, P: 153.
64 R. Hyman, The Political Economy of Industrial Relations, P: 247.
65 T. Cliff & D. Gluckstein, Marxism and Trade Union Struggle, p. 29.
66 J. Kelly, Trade Unions andSocialist Politics, p. 151.
67 R. Hyman, The Political Economy of Industrial Relations, pp. 19-20.
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3. The proximity of shop steward organisation to the shop floor
inhibited bureaucratic tendencies and corporatist developments.68
Within the workplace, union meetings provide members with an opportunity to
voice their grievances. These can then be relayed to the union officials. Therefore,
there will often be a relationship of interdependency between shop stewards and
full-time officials particularly where stewards favour a process of bargaining to
deal with shop-floor grievances.s?
Finally it is important to consider the rank-and-file union members. Militancy
among these workers tends to be sectional in nature and often remains that way.
Union membership is divided along a number of lines, notably by skill, gender
and ethnicity. Some workers may feel they have more to gain by pursuing their
sectional interests.Z" Where militancy becomes coordinated the effects can be
severe. However, all too often this is sabotaged by a lack of effective leadership.
On occasion rank-and-file militancy may be such that conservative trade union
bureaucrats are forced to capitulate to the wishes of their members or face public
disgrace or removal from office. It is through co-ordinated and generalised rank-
and-file militancy that conservative officials can be forced to take action.
Trade unions, therefore, are formed by workers in order to protect their
interests. Trade unions gain their power from the collective strength of their
members. They are thereby able to take action which will benefit the workers.
However, there are limits to trade union effectiveness: they have to operate within
a framework of action defined by capitalism; they are subject to ideological attacks
by the ruling class; and trade union officials display conservative tendencies in the
performance of their jobs. It is not just workers who can be advantaged by
collective power. Employers also gain from organising collectively.
1.3. The Role of Employer Associations in Capitalist Society?'
Employer associations predate trade union organisation.Zs Before discussing
employer organisations per se it is necessary to distinguish between employer
associations and sectoral business associations. The key role of employer
68 R. Hyman, The Political Economy ofIndustrial Relations, p. 151.
69 T. Bramble, The Contingent Conservatism of Full-Time Trade Union Officials, Phd. Thesis, p.24.
70 Ibid., p. 17.
71 Key sources for the discussion of employer assoiations include M. Poole, Industrial relations:
Origins and Patterns of National Diversity; P. Brosnan et.al., The Dynamics of New Zealand Industrial
Relations and R. Rudman in Labour and Industrial Relations in New Zealand.
72 P. Brosnan, D. Smith & P. Walsh, The Dynamics ofNew Zealand Industrial Relations, p. 129.
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associations is to unite employers in their negotiations with workers over wages
and conditions. This stems from the nature of capitalism where production is for
profit. Because surplus value is the ultimate source of profit, conflict between
employers and workers centres around the production and appropriation of this
surplus value. Therefore, capitalists tend to more united on industrial relations
issues than on other issues. In order for companies to be run at a profit, the
capitalist needs to ensure that the behaviour of his or her work-force is predictable
and that labour costs are kept to a minimum.73 These twin aims often require a
concerted effort on the part of employers as a whole. It is difficult for one
employer to resist wage demands if another employer is conceding pay rises.
While capitalists tend to be united on industrial relations issues, since they
share a common interest in the production and appropriation of surplus value,
individual capitalists have distinctive sets of interests which arise from the
process of market competition and profit distribution. As Roper observes
"...various fractions of capital emerge from the process of circulation (industrial or
manufacturing capital, commercial or merchant capital and financial or banking
capital) which have distinct and often conflicting interests."74 In New Zealand,
the agricultural, financial and commercial fractions of capital are represented by a
number of sectoral business associations: Federated Farmers, Bankers'
Association, Manufacturer's Federation etc. A division of labour operates
whereby the sectoral business associations confine their lobbying to activities of
direct concern to their members while leaving industrial relations issues to the
Employers Federation.
Trade unions provide the strongest incentive for employers to form
associations. Whilst individual capitalists might be in competition with one
another, the virtue of combining in order to resist trade union demands is usually
recognised. This is particularly true in countries which have "strong, centralised
and independent" trade unions.75 Employer associations are also a consequence of
a desire to counter the growth of socialistic ideas.Z'' Thus employer associations
often seek to influence public opinion.
73 P. Brosnan, D. Smith & P. Walsh, The Dynamics ofNew Zealand Industrial Relations, P: 57.
74 B. Roper in State and Economy in New Zealand, p.153.
75 M. Poole, Industrial Relations: Origins andPatterns ofNational Diversity, p. 56.
76 R. Rudman in Labour andIndustrial Relations in NewZealand, p. 63
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Employer associations also attempt to influence government policy in their
favour.Z? Where the state exercises a strong influence in industrial relations the
pressure for employer opinions to be heard will be great.78 Employer associations
often advocate legislation which limits the power of unions. They act as a
powerful lobby group promoting their own interests. The effectiveness of this role
is enhanced by research, commissioned by the associations, which supports their
point of view.
Employer associations perform many more functions than those which justify
their initial existence. They provide their members with a wide range of advice
and information pertaining to industrial relations. Employer associations will
often perform a negotiating role for their members. In many cases they will
provide some form of mediation services. Finally, employer associations provide
employers with a forum for the exchange of industrial relations ideas and
strategies.79
1.4. The Role of the State in Capitalist Societyw
The state tends to define the boundaries within which trade unions and
employer associations can operate. Thus it is necessary to assess the role that the
state plays in capitalist society and thereby ascertain in whose interests it acts. It
will then be possible to gain an understanding of the implications for industrial
relations.
Before attempting to describe the role that is played by the state in capitalist
societies it is necessary to define the term 'the state'. 'The State' is a term used to
denote the collective sum of the various branches of government. Thus it includes:
77 For a discussion of business influence on the formation of public policy see B.S. Roper,"The
Policy-Making of Business Associations: From Keynesianism to Neoclassicism", Paper presented to
the NZPSA Conference, University of Otago,May 1990, pp. 1-18; T. Bilton et.al, Introductory
Sociology, pp. 178-221; C. Offe, Disorganised Capitalism, pp. 170-220;W. Grant, Business and Politics
in Great Britain, pp. 11-31 and pp. 36-69 and K. van der Pijl, TheMaking ofan AtlanticRuling Class,
~j.I-8.
M. Poole, Industrial Relations: Origins and Patterns ofNational Diversity, p. 59.
79 P. Brosnan, D. Smith & P. Walsh, The Dynamics ofNew Zealand Industrial Relations, p. 147.
80 There is an extensive body of literature which deals with theories of the state. It is not
appropriate to review this literature here. However, for interested readers, key sources include, M.
Carnoy, The State and Political Theory; D. Held, States and Societies; B. Iessop, State Theory; R.
Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society; S. Clarke, The State Debate; and T. Skocpol, Bringing the
State Back In.
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the administration (or executive), the military and the police, the judiciary, sub-
central government and parliamentary assemblies.s!
In New Zealand, and indeed in most advanced capitalist societies, the
dominant theory regarding the role of the state in society has been that of
pluralism. Pluralism rests on the assumption that the state is a neutral actor being
responsive to the needs and desires of the general population. It is believed that
there are three key ways in which the state may be influenced: namely, through
the voting system, through the interest group system and through local
government.82 By virtue of these three mechanisms for influence iris argued by
pluralists that policy-making is inherently unbiased and that it is situated on a
'level playing field'.
The key aspect of capitalist society which is ignored by pluralists is the
structural dependence of the state on capital accumulation. Economic growth is
essential in order for the state to function fully. This is because the state is funded
largely by taxation. The amount of revenue that can be raised by taxation depends
on the economic situation of a country. Thus policy-making tends to promote
capital accumulation and the measures perceived as capable of doing this are
defined by business.
Pluralist theory does not explain the fact that policy-making tends to occur to
the benefit of business. It will be argued that the nature of the state is intrinsically
class based. The origins of the state are to be found in the need for certain
functions to be carried out within a society. These specifically capitalist functions
arise as a result of the division of labour which requires, for the smooth running of
a society, the separation of the power of forcible coercion from the general body of
the society.83 State action and policy formulation takes place within the
historically specific socio-economic context of advanced capitalism. This means
that the ensemble of state institutions is, inter alia, influenced and shaped by the
capitalist economic system, shifts in the balance of power between employers and
workers organisations and prevailing ideologies. In an interesting discussion of
these issues, Draper has argued that:
81 R. Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, pp. 49-54 The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political
Thought suggests that "the most common use is to equate 'state' with the body politic or political
community as such."
82 R. Mulgan, Democracy andPower in New Zealand, pp. 34-37. See also R. Mulgan, Politics in New
Zealand.
83 H. Draper, Karl Marx's Theory ofRevolution, pp. 245-250.
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The needs of society, no matter how class neutral in origin or intention
cannot be met without passing through the political institutions set up by
a class conditioned society, and it is in the course of being processed
through these channels that they are shaped, sifted, skewed, moulded,
modeled and modulated to fit within the framework established by the
ruling interests and ideas. This is how the class nature of the state and
the society asserts itself, even without malevolent purposes or sinister
plots.84
Whilst it may not be immediately apparent that all policy is made
predominantly in the interests of the ruling class the reality is that the interests of
others are subordinated regularly to the interests of those who represent the
ruling class.8s The bureaucracy within the state administration represents one way
in which decision-making is largely controlled by a ruling elite.86 Evidence
suggests that bureaucrats share in common with capitalists many aspects of
education, class and background. Thus, it is likely that their interests are very
similar. As they are overwhelmingly drawn from the spheres ,of business,
property and the professions, they represent the desires of the ruling class. These
bureaucrats have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.
A substantial proportion of the state bureaucracy is made up of businessmen.
Miliband states that "business has been invited by governments, whatever their
political coloration to assume a major role in the management and control of the
public sector. In comparison, representatives of labour have appeared as very
poor parents indeed."87 Within the actual executive too, the presence of business is
tangible. The state regulates behaviour through the use of both the positive and
negative sanctions available to it. Bureaucracies are responsible for the
administration of such sanctions. This therefore puts considerable power in the
hands of the men and women who make up the bureaucracy as they, can use their
influence to help steer the direction of the society.88
People exercise a limited degree of influence through voting at elections.
However, such power is counteracted by other features of the political system.
Voting occurs once every three years, yet business decides whether or not to
invest in the economy daily. This is indicated by the fluctuations of capital
markets. Given the dependence of government on capital, this effectively gives
business a greater influence than may be initially imagined. Furthermore, in order
84I bid., p. 262.
85 Ibid., p. 262.
86 R. Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, p. 66.
87 Ibid., p.5S.
88 C. Offe, Disorganised Capitalism, p. 137.
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for voting to be considered to be truly a means by which the public can determine
policy, it is necessary for parties to stand which represent a broad spectrum of
political views.89 The public must be able to choose to vote for a party whose
policies they support rather than to vote for the lesser of two evils.
Pluralists suggest that through the formation of interest groups the public can
lobby parliament to have its view on particular issues considered in the policy-
making process. The problem is that the position of business as the purveyor of
capital accumulation places it in an intrinsically strong position. Business may be
able to persuade the government that its interests are indeed the interests of the
country. It may, for example, be able to provide persuasive arguments regarding
the liberalisation of the labour market, the reduction of company tax or the
potential economic damage of environmental controls. Furthermore, business has
a number of advantages by virtue of the financial resources which it possesses.
Business often makes donations to both of the major political parties. It is able to
spend large sums of money on propaganda. Business often invests in policy
research and it may even be in a position to offer incentives to bureaucrats in
terms of employment opportunities available in the private sector. Very few other
interest groups have such means of influence at their disposal.P?
The final means of influence on which pluralists base their theory is that of
participation in local government. Yet, overall interest in local government tends
to be relatively low. Voter turnout is very poor and media coverage virtually non-
existent - it is hard to say which is a consequence of the other or indeed which has
prime importance.Pl Local government tends to be dominated by well-educated
and financially secure people.92 It is therefore likely that the decisions made by
local government will reflect the preconceptions and desires of this group of
people. Thus, local government, like elections and the existence of interest groups,
is inadequate in ensuring that policy is responsive to the wishes of the populous.
Roper argues that pluralists "reject the view that there is a dominant ruling
elite or class in these [advanced capitalist] societies, with a high degree of social
cohesion and shared interests opposed to the majority".93 Pluralists reject analyses
89 B. Roper, The Policy-Making ofBusiness Associations, pp. 5-9.
90 Ibid., pp. 6&12.
91 R. Mulgan, Democracy and Power in New Zealand, p. 123.
92 Ibid.,pp.129-13.0
93 B. Roper, State and Economy in NewZealand, P: 149.
The Political Economy of Industrial Relations Page -- 27-
of society as divided according to class, their theory reflecting on the diversity
which exists within society.
The state uses its power to encourage the increase of capital upon which its
position is so dependent.94 Braverman writes that "...state power has everywhere
been used by governments to enrich the capitalist class and by groups of
individuals to enrich themselves." Moreover the mere absence of state
intervention in certain areas may represent a positive move by a government to
foster increased capital accumulation.95
State spending on the infrastructure of a society also serves to benefit capital.
For example, the provision of roads and railways is used by capital for the
transportation of goods. The state provides a court system which is used by
capital for the enforcement of commercial contracts. The state also legislates in
many areas of the labour market. The state funds much research which, whilst it
may be of benefit to capital, may be too costly or complex for capital to finance.
Furthermore, the state also facilitates the process of the reproduction of labour
power through the provision of education and medical care.96
The state has at its command a vast coercive apparatus which it can use to
enforce its desires. The military, the police and the security forces can all be used
by the state to maintain conditions favourable for the accumulation of capitaL It is
both expensive and inefficient, however, for the state to rely solely on the use of
force to maintain control. Rather, efforts are made to find alternatives to the use of
force, for example, falsification of information, concessions and reforms,
nationalism, the division of the ruled into more and less favoured groups and the
facilitation of inertia and apathy. It is through these means that the role of force
may be used as either a last resort or as an additional or supplementary means of
control.P? The judicial system too is of benefit to capital. Like bureaucrats, the
dominant members of the judicial system are drawn from the ruling elite. This
gives capital an insidious advantage in disputes involving industrial relations."
The close relationship between capital and the state has a number of
implications for industrial relations. It influences the position and aspiration of
94 H. Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital, p. 254. See also R. Miliband in T. Bottomore et.al.
~eds.), A Dictionary ofMarxist Thought, pp. 464-468.
5 H. Braverman, Labour andMonopoly Capital, P: 254.
96 R. Hyman, The Political Economy ofIndustrial Relations, p. 134.
97 H. Draper, Karl Marx's Theory ofRevolution, p. 264.
98 R. Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, p. 52.
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unions, it is reflected in the policies pursued by government and it shapes the
ideology and rhetoric used by the state to legitimise its actions.
Unions are often used by the state to promote stability. Unions may be
incorporated into the state system. This leads them to channel their resources into
the control and discipline of their rank-and-file members. In return, unions are
often promised a consultative role in decision making.P? Furthermore, unions
provide a means by which the state can incorporate the working class into society
and thereby maintain social stability. Hyman describes this process as follows:
... if unions are assigned legitimacy - through legal protection,
consultation, representation on government committees, 'honours' for
individual leaders- they are likely to form a means of integrating the
working class into capitalist society, thus serving as a mechanism of
social control. The state has come to depend on collaborative relations
with trade unionism; and this dependence is particularly great when the
working class is strongly orBtnised yet is adversely affected by
government economic policies.!
The pre-eminence of goals of economic stability in government policies is
reflected in the arena of industrial relations. Private profit is encouraged and
legislation enacted which will facilitate this,lOl As described earlier, capitalists
increase profits by making employees work more efficiently. Thus, it is common
for laws to be introduced which regulate the labour force in the interests of
capital.
Finally, industrial relations rhetoric reflects and legitimises the prevailing
inequality between capital and labour, characteristic of capitalist society. The
'national interest' tends to be synonymous with the interests of business. Thus,
trade union activity is portrayed as disruptive and unconstructive. Furthermore,
intervention by the state against a trade union, for example, the use of the police
to break up a picket, reflects badly on the union. The union is then portrayed as
contravening democratic processes and as presenting a challenge to the law and
order of the nation,l02
It has, therefore, been established that the classical pluralist concept of the state
is fundamentally flawed and that the nature of the state in capitalist society is
intrinsically class-based. If it is accepted that the form and function of the state is
99 R. Hyman,The Political Economy ofIndustrial Relations, pp. 218-219.
100 R. Hyman, Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction, P: 143.
101 Ibid., p. 125.
102 I bid., p. 148.
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class-based then it follows that there will be a number of implications for
industrial relations. These have been outlined in the above section.
Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the theoretical assumptions which have guided
the empirical research of this study. The key points that have been made can be
summarised as follows:
i) Capitalism is characterised by conflict. There is an unequal structural
relationship between capital and labour. Workers are subject to a socio-economic
compulsion to sell their labour power because the minority control the means of
production. The inherent drive within capitalism for increased profit causes this
minority to attack the pay and conditions of workers in order to reduce labour
costs. This generates conflict. Thus emphasis is placed on increasing the
productive capacity of labour power. This is done through the use of management
structure, the involvement of unions and the use of ideology.
ii) Industrial relations are shaped by the conflict in capitalism between capitalists
and workers.
iii) Trade unions are a key actor in industrial relations. They both help to defend
workers interests and at the same time help to maintain the existing capitalist
system. A highly significant limit on effective collective action is the conservatism
of full-time trade union officials.
iv) Employer associations are a key actor in industrial relations. They are a
response to trade unionism and a means by which employers can further their
class interests. They provide employers with a source of collective strength.
v) The state is a key actor in industrial relations. It is not a neutral arbiter but
rather is firmly embedded in the overall pattern of capitalist class relations. Thus,
the role of the state in industrial relations will tend to favour employers. When
faced with mass working class struggle, the state may make major concessions to
workers in order to preserve the capitalist system as a whole.
The following chapter explores these theoretical assumptions with specific
reference to New Zealand. Thus, a context is created which takes into account the
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relevant historical, economic, industrial, political and legislative f~ctors within
which to consider the empirical research.
Chapter Two
Industrial Relations in New Zealand
Introduction
This chapter provides a background to the current state of industrial relations
in New Zealand. In particular, it establishes the broader historical context within
which the struggle for and against the Employment Contracts Act unfolded. This
context embraces a number of spheres. It is historical, economic and legislative. It
also incorporates an analysis of the key players in the struggle over the
Employment Contracts Act. This chapter builds on the theoretical assumptions
outlined in Chapter One. In Chapter One the nature of capitalist society in general
was discussed. Chapter Two considers the capitalist political economy of New
Zealand, with specific reference to the post-war period. Chapter One discussed
the operation of unions, employer organisations and the state within capitalist
society generally. Chapter Two discusses these with specific reference to New
Zealand. Thus this chapter focuses on the economic and historical context of
industrial relations in New Zealand, the emergence of trade unions and the
Employers Federation, the role of state agencies in industrial relations and the
major changes in the legislative framework governing industrial relations.
2.1. The Economic and Historical Context
The period between 1945 and 1973 in New Zealand has been described as an
'economic miracle') The characteristics of this 'miracle' were full employment,
high profitability and productive investment, rising real wages, low inflation and
an absence of balance of payments problems. In contrast, the situation after 1973
was that of an ailing economy. Unemployment was rising and this was
accompanied by rising inflation. The general rate of profit had dropped
dramatically and this was exacerbated by rising costs of production and stagnant
aggregate demand.? This vast change in the economic climate was to have
dramatic effects on industrial relations. In order to explore these effects it is
necessary to explain why New Zealand enjoyed a long boom and why
subsequently it was plunged into a deep recession}
1 W. Rosenberg, The Magic Square.
2 B. Roper in State and Economy in New Zealand, p. 2.
3 For discussions of the Long Boom and subsequent economic crisis in New Zealand see B. Roper,
"The End of the Golden Weather" in B. Roper & C. Rudd (eds.), State and Economy in New Zealand,
Chapter 1; S. Birks, "Economic Growth in New Zealand" in S. Birks & S. Chatterjee, (eds.), The New
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Whilst a number of explanations have been advanced for this economic change
it is appropriate here to consider one grounded in Marxist economic theory. The
underlying theoretical propositions guiding the research are Marxist and hence
within this context the explanation afforded by Marxist theory is consistent with
the theoretical direction assumed in the rest of the study.t
As stated in Chapter One, the driving force in capitalist economies is the need
to remain profitable. This is manifested in two ways. Firstly in the labour process
in the struggle against labour over the production of surplus value. Secondly, in
the competition with other capitalists for markets. Two major methods are used to
increase profitability in the labour process - increased mechanisation and the
changing of work practices. It is within this system that capitalism contains the
seed of its own decline:
The attempt to increase the production of relative surplus value through
higher productivity and to increase market share through lower unit
costs involve investment decisions which result in greater quantities of
fixed and circulating constant capital per unit of output.5
Over a period of time the proportion of variable capital ( the level of wages
necessary for workers to reproduce their labour power) declines relative to the
constant capital used in production.v This is significant because:
The ratio of constant to variable capital thus rises in the long term. This
ratio is referred to as the organic composition of capital. Since variable
capital is the source of all new value, of surplus value and consequently
profit, then, other things being equal, as the organic composition of
capital rises, the general rate of profit will fall.?
It is now possible using Marxist crisis theory to explain the causes and
characteristics of New Zealand's Long Boom.f The years 1932 to 1945 saw a big
Zealand Economy: Issues and Policies, pp. 27-41; D. Bedggood, Richand Poor in New Zealand, Chapter
10; J. Gould, The Rake's Progress, Chapters 5 and 6; J. Gould, TheMuldoon Years, Chapters 1, 3 and 4
; G.R. Hawke, The Making ofNew Zealand, Chapter 16 and W.B. Sutch, The Questfor Security in New
Zealand, 1840-1966.
4 For a detailed explanation of Marxist, Monetarist and Keynesian explanations of New Zealand's
economic crisis see B. Roper, 'The End of the Golden Weather', in State and Economy in New
Zealand, pp. 1-30.
5 Ibid., pp. 13-14.
6 N. McConnell, 'Why the Employment Contracts Act?', B.A. (Hons)Dissertation, University of
Otago, 1991, p. 5.
7 B. Roper in Stateand Economy in New Zealand, p. 14.
8 For discussions of economic crisis and the falling rate of profit see A. Saikh in T. Bottomore et.al.
(eds.), The Dictionary of Marxist Thought, pp. 142-143, pp. 159-161; J.N. Devine, An Introduction to
Radical Theories of Economic Crises in R. Cheyne et.al.(eds.), The Imperiled Economy, Book One, pp.
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decline in the organic composition of capital. This resulted in a large rise in the
rate of profit. The rate of profit is simply "the ratio between surplus value and
total capital."9 Surplus value is "the monetary form of that part of the worker's
production which he surrenders to the owner of the means of production without
receiving anything in return."IO There was also a big increase in the rate of
surplus value between 1938 and 1951. This contributed to the high general rate of
profit. Roper suggests that the increase in the rate of surplus value may have been
due to government control of wages and conditions during the war years.
Furthermore, the potential militancy of labour was checked by the National
Government's defeat of the watersiders union in the 1951 waterfront lockout. II
Improvements in communications and technology helped support the high
rate of growth and New Zealand also benefited from the expansion of the world
econorny.t? Investment in fixed capital increased which led to greater labour
productivity and a sustained increase in of economic growth. Other causes of the
long boom identified by Roper include:
... the reductions in the turnover time of capital- the time during which
the value of capital is reconstituted - made possible by vast
improvements in communications and transportation during the 1950s
and 1960s, the impact of rapid expansion of the world economy on the
New Zealand economy, historically high prices for New Zealand's
agricultural exports, and sustained productivity increases in the
agricultural sector. Finally, the Keynesian macroeconomic policies of the
post-war era were significant, particularly government expenditure on
state housing and public works combined with expansionary monetary
policy and regulatory control of the financial sector which helped to keep
real interest rates low. 13
The post-war period was characterised by the increased involvement of
overseas companies in the New Zealand economy. The areas of overseas influence
extended from the traditional fields of agriculture, finance, transport and
marketing to that of manufacturing. Pearson and Thorns state that by the mid
19-32;P. Dunne, Quantitative Marxism, Chapters 1,5 and 9; C. Harman, Explaining theCrisis and
A. Callinicos, The Revolutionary Ideas ofKarl Marx, pp. 128-139.
9 E. Mandel, An Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory, p. 49. See also A. Callinicos, The
Revolutionary Ideas ofKarl Marx, pp. 121-3,147-8.
10 E. Mandel, An Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory, pp. 23-24. See also A. Callinicos, The
Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx, pp. 111-118 and S. Himmelweit in T. Bottomore et.al. (eds.), A
Dictionary ofMarxist Thought, pp. 472-475.
11 B. Roper in State andEconomy in NewZealand, pp. 17-18.
12 B. Roper in NewZealand Sociology, Vol.6, No.2, p. 30.
13 B. Roper in State andEconomy in New Zealand, p. 19.
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1960s approximately thirty-five percent of New Zealand's manufacturing was
foreign owned.Is By the late 1960s, the pattern of capital ownership within New
Zealand was beginning to change. Protection for local firms in the form of import
controls were removed and attempts were made to 're-emphasise the traditional
primary production base of the economy albeit with a much more substantial
manufacturing sector than in the 1920s'.15 Increase in competition as a result of the
removal of import controls forced capital to restructure in order to maintain
profitability. Thus, the period between 1968 and 1974 saw a rapid increase in
merger and takeover activity.lv
By the mid-1960s, the rate of surplus value was starting to level out and
eventually to fall. There was a large increase in strike activity during the late 1960s
and early 1970s resulting in significant rises in real wages. The number of people
employed in the service sector increased greatly in the postwar period. This
'unproductive' labour acted as a drain on aggregate surplus value. These
conditions created a climate poised for crisis because of the impact that falling
profits have on investment, growth and employment - unemployment soared and
growth rates dropped. Such crisis was to have dramatic effects for New Zealand
industrial relations particularly as it contrasted so drastically with a long period of
prosperity)7
New Zealand's industrial relations during the Long Boom can be broadly
described as 'harmonious'. Labour productivity growth was very high, enabling
employers to grant wage rises without jeopardising profitability. Between 1974
and 1984, however, labour productivity growth was minimal. This caused conflict
between employers and workers because it was no longer possible for employers
to increase wages without this threatening profitability. This conflict was to be
detrimental to the position of trade unions. From the late 1970s New Zealand's
trade unions experienced a decline in collective bargaining power in relation to
employers.
The economic crisis into which New Zealand was plunged in the mid 1970s
represents a conflict between competing groups within society, all anxious to
enhance their positions at the expense of others.lf In the 1980s, the Fourth Labour
14 D. Pearson & D. Thorns, Eclipse of Equality, p. 5I.
15 Ibid., p. 52.
16B. Roper, "The Dynamics of Capital in Crisis", Phd Thesis, Griffith University, 1990, p. 89.
17 Ibid., pp.19-20.
18 J. Gould, The Rakes Progress, p. 149.
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Government introduced labour market reforms aimed at improving growth.
These were introduced at the expense of traditional goals such as wage equity and
full employment. Indeed, Rosenberg argues that the attempts to restructure the
economy were directed mostly at New Zealand's working class and that it was the
wage and salary earner who bore the brunt of restructuring.t? In order to assess
the role of the major actors in New Zealand's industrial relations it is necessary to
consider their emergence and development within the context of New Zealand's
economic development.
2.2. The Emergence of Trade Unions
Beginnings
When the British settlers brought capitalism to New Zealand, they also
brought a by-product of this system - trade unions.s" The first New Zealand
unions were small and craft-based but they were soon to be subject to many
changes. By the early 1860s, trade unions were operating from a position of
strength.U In 1878, the Trade Union Act was passed which provided for the
registration of trade unions. However, it was not until the mid to late 1880s that
this had any significant effect. The number of unionists rose dramatically between
1885 and 1890 - from three thousand to more than forty thousand.22
In 1885 the first Trades and Labour Congress was organised which served to
promote unity within the fledgling union movement. The issue of female sweated
labour was discussed and this, coupled with the findings of the Sweating
Commission helped to convince parliament of the need for some protective
measures. Hence, in 1891 the Factories Act was passed.P In the past century, this
act has been subject to many amendments.
The new unions were bolstered by their growing membership but this was
unable to compensate for a lack of experience and resources. This was evidenced
by the defeat of the Maritime Strike in 1890 despite the earlier, smaller scale
successes of the Maritime Council. Richardson suggests that this defeat destroyed
19W. Rosenberg, The Magic Square, p. 27.
20 For discussions of the development of trade unions in New Zealand see H. Roth "The Historical
Framework" in J. Deeks et.al. (eds.), Industrial Relations in New Zealand; P. Brosnan et.al., The
Dynamics ofNew Zealand Industrial Relations, Chapter 6; H. Roth in Labour andIndustrial Relations in
New Zealand, Chapter 1 and B. Roth and J. Hammond, Toil andTrouble: TheStruggle for a Better Life
in New Zealand. .
21 Brosnan et.al., The Dynamics ofNewZealand Industrial Relations, pp. 97-98.
22 J. Deeks and P. Boxall, Labour Relations in New Zealand, p. 29.
23 Ibid., pp. 27-29.
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the Maritime Council and almost led to the disintegration of those unions which
had supported the action. However, he believes that the Maritime Strike also
produced positive results in the area of political action. It created a new awareness
among wage earners of the conflict inherent in their society and thus led to
increased participation among unionists in the political arena. Furthermore, the
Strike accelerated the division of society according to party and to class rather
than according to locality and faction and this was to determine political
allegiances.24
New Zealand's first labour party was formed in Dunedin in 1890 and it greatly
enhanced the political influence of labour. Leaders of the new party agreed that it
would be beneficial to identify their interests with those of the Opposition who
had supported labour during the Maritime Strike and who had a vested interest in
labour supporting them. It is important to note that despite some agitation in
Christchurch, for the most part New Zealand lacked similar organisation in the
other main centres at this time. 25
So, despite the defeat of the Maritime Strike, the Liberals were elected in 1891
with the support of the trade union movement. Furthermore, whilst the new
labour members were unable to form a separate party their support did assist in
the passage of some progressive legislation.w In 1894 the Industrial Conciliation
and Arbitration Act was passed which provided for registered unions to acquire
'exclusive jurisdiction' in their particular industries - Deeks and Boxall describe
this legislation as the beginning of New Zealand's "distinctive industrial
experiment" and they explain it as follows:
...a state-imposed system of conciliation and arbitration, a system
providing registered trade unions with rights to call employers to the
conference table under a neutral chairperson (conciliation) and refer
unresolved disputes to a judicial tribunal with power to make binding
settlements (the Arbitration Court) in exchange for restraints on
industrial action. Alongside this system, the legislature enacted a
number of provisions for protecting working conditions, particularly in
factories. 27
The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act represents a trade-off on the
part of employers and workers. It was also supported by farmers who wanted to
24 L. Richardson in The Oxford History of New Zealand, pp. 197-198.
25 Ibid., p. 199.
26 H. Roth in Labour and Industrial Relations in New Zealand, p. 7.
27 J. Deeks and P. Boxall, Labour Relations in New Zealand, p. 25. See also j.Holt, Compulsive
Arbitration in New Zealand: the First Forty Years.
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minimise the likelihood of industrial action which would disrupt the ports. In
exchange for a means of settling wage disputes, unions were subject to restrictions
on direct action. Workers were to provide the Court with evidence of the highest
wages paid in a particular industry and the Court was then required to set award
wages at that level. By the 1900s, however, this procedure had become inadequate
for there was no mechanism for deciding future wage levels.28 The Act was also
disliked because the new arbitration system contributed to the growth of small
unions - according to Richardson, by 1907, of the 290 registered unions, almost
half had fewer than fifty members.s? This made it harder for the union leaders to
coordinate the labour movement.
At the turn of the century serious industrial agitation began in New Zealand.
In 1906 Auckland tramwaymen went on strike as did freezing-workers in 1907. In
1908 the country experienced several instances of strike action. The Auckland
tramwaymen went on strike again as did Wellington bakers and, most
significantly, the Blackball Miners. The Miners were led by P.C. Webb and P.H.
Hickey. The success of the strike culminated in the establishment of the National
Miners Federation by Webb, Hickey and the president of the Runanga Miners
Union, R. Semple. By 1909 this had become the New Zealand Federation of
Labour otherwise known as the Red Fed.30 The membership of this new
organisation grew quickly. At the end of 1910 membership had stood at 6,724 and
by mid 1912 there were almost 15,000 members. This represented more than one-
fifth of New Zealand's total union membership.U The Miners had been joined by
shearers, watersiders, labourers, tramwaymen and many others.V The Red Feds
were successful in securing the first nation-wide agreement for the waterfront
industry and managed to persuade the Auckland City Council to concede to the
demands of the Tramways Union.
The growth of the Red Feds was, however, shortlived. In 1912 some men broke
away from the unregistered Waihi Miners Union and formed their own engine
drivers union. This resulted in strike action by goldminers which lasted from May
to December 1912 and ended in defeat for the Waihi miners. In early 1913, the Red
Fed held a conference to which it invited unions and political labour bodies. This
28 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
29 L. Richardson in The OxfordHistory of New Zealand, p. 207.
30 For a detailed discussion of the New Zealand Federation of Labour see E. Olssen, The Red Feds:
Revolutionary Industrial Unionismand theNew Zealand Federation of Labour.
31 H. Roth in Labour and IndustrialRelations in New Zealand, pp. 8-9.
32 H. Roth in Industrial Relations in New Zealand, p. 26.
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Democratic Party. In October 1913, two strikes broke out in New Zealand - at the
Huntly coalmines and on the Wellington waterfront. Within two months the
Federation was forced to order a return to work after the strike was smashed.33
The impact of the brief existence of the Red Fed should not be underestimated.
Olssen identifies a number of the positive outcomes of this short but volatile
period in New Zealand's labour history:
Throughout the years 1908-1913 a more profound process had been at
work. Its most public expression was undoubtedly the emergence of
such a powerful impulse to unity, to independent political action as a
class, and to the formation of New Zealand-wide federations seeking
collective bargaining and dominion awards. Underlying that, however,
was the rapid growth of unions, especially among the unskilled and the
recognisation that organisation and solidarity were more important to
workers than anything else.34
In 1916 the Labour Party was formed and it spent the next four years
consolidating its position. It gradually tried to assume the middle ground in
politics. New Zealand's first Labour Government came to power in 1935. Deeks
and Boxall suggest that with the advent of a Labour government "capitalism in
New Zealand was significantly humanised, and under the cloak of a sympathetic
government, trade unions thrived."35 These circumstances prompted New
Zealand's two remaining political parties to re-examine their positions and thus
they combined to form the National Party in 1936.36 In general the Labour and
National parties draw their support from different social classes. Labour
supporters tend to be located in central city areas and lower income suburbs. They
are also more likely to be skilled and unskilled manual workers than National
Party supporters. Traditionally the Labour Party is supported by the trade union
movement. In contrast, National Party voters tend to be located in rural areas and
in small towns. They are often professionals, businesspeople and farmers.
Traditionally the National Party draws its support from farming and employer
groups.V
In 1936, union membership was made compulsory through amendments to the
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act. Union membership rose with 46% of
the workforce members of a registered trade union. In 1937 the Federation of
33 H. Roth in Labour and Industrial Relations in New Zealand, pp. 9-10. See also, E.Olssen, The Red
Feds, pp. 133-134, pp. 180-181.
34E. Olssen, The RedFeds, p. 223.
35 L. Richardson in The Oxford History ofNew Zealand p. 38.
36 /bidp. 207.
370 . Pearson & O. Thorns, Eclipse of Equality, pp. 142-143.
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Labour was established to act as a centralising body. Union activity was soon put
on hold, however, with the advent of World War Two.38
After the War
The postwar era saw a new situation in industrial relations. The inflationary
pressures of the time led to increased conflict between workers and employers.
By 1951, New Zealand was facing another major industrial relations dispute.
Deeks and Boxall attribute the 1951 Waterfront Lockout to two main factors: very
poor working conditions on the wharves and the emergence of a militant sector
within the union movement who had become disenchanted with the type of
conflict resolution provided for in the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act.
The defeat of the militant wing of the union movement in the Waterfront Lockout
heralded an end to significant industrial action for over a decade. New Zealand's
postwar prosperity led to many unions being able to secure for their workers pay
which was well above award rates and this contributed to the absence of
conflict.39
Yet, the arbitration system was still not looked upon favourably by the union
movement. In June 1968, the Arbitration Court prescribed a zero wage increase
which was successfully disputed shortly afterwards. However, this incident had
done irreparable damage to the status enjoyed by the Court. Unions resorted to
direct action in large numbers. "Working days lost through strikes rose from
99095 in 1966 to 162,563 in 1971 and 488,441 in 1976."40
Despite the many shortcomings of the arbitration system it has provided one
of the two key models of union organisation and behaviour in New Zealand.
Brosnan, Smith and Walsh describe both of these two models:
One is an arbitrationist model of union organisation which reflects a
reliance on the protections and regulations of the arbitration system. The
second is a mobilisational model of union organisation reflecting a
preference for reliance on strategic location in the economy, membership
solidarity and commitment, and effective leadership and analysis at the
centre.41
Since the 1960s, New Zealand has witnessed a significant shift towards the
mobilisational model.s- This reflects the pre-eminence of bargaining in the years
following the 1960s which has been reflected in certain industrial relations
38J. Deeks and P. Boxall, Labour Relations in NewZealand, p. 38.
39 Ibid., p. 39.
40 Ibid., p. 40.
41 P. Brosnan et.al., The Dynamics ofNew Zealand Industrial Relations, p. 99.
42 Ibid., p. 99.
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reforms. Since the 1970s, the orientation of many unions has changed
dramatically. White-collar workers have become increasingly militant. These
include members of unions such as the Public Service Association, Nurses Union
(now part of the Nurses Organisation), Post Office Union (now part of the
Communication and Energy Workers Union) and the Post Primary Teachers
Association. The traditionally militant unions in New Zealand have been those
covering seamen, miners and watersiders. However, the size of such unions at the
time of the introduction of the Employment Contracts Bill was very small
compared to that of many of the white-collar unions. For example, after an
amalgamation with the Cooks and Stewards Union, the Seafarers Union currently
has a membership of about 12,000. In contrast, the P.S.A has 75,000 members and
the Nurses Organisation has 28,000 members. Other large unions include the
Engineers Union, the P.P.T.A. , the C.E.W.U. and the New Zealand Education
Institute. Many unions, since the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act
have been subject to some form of amalgamation and thus, often, cover a wider
range of occupations than they did prior to the Act. For example, the Service
Workers Federation is the result of an amalgamation just prior to the passage of
the Employment Contracts Act. This amalgamation involved a number of small
unions.P
A number of factors have undermined the ability of the working class to
organise effective opposition to capital in the period since the late 1970s. Firstly, a
characteristic of the recession, unprecedentedly high levels of unemployment,
placed labour in a weaker position than in the 1950s and in the 1960s.
Traditionally militant unions came under threat as the occupations from which
they had drawn their membership - mining, manufacturing, meat processing and
transport - underwent restructuring. These changes were exacerbated by a trade
union leadership which adopted the policies of the 'New Realism'. These policies
stressed the importance of negotiation and conciliation and down played the
ability of the working class to organise in defence of its interests.44 This created a
climate In which employers had a need and the ability to push an agenda of
decentralisation and flexibility. This they began to do, bolstered by New Right
economic theory which provided a justification for the pursuance of their own
goals.
43 See H. Roth in Labour and Industrial Relations in NewZealand, pp.16-20 and interviews with: Colin
Davies, P.S.A., 16/08/93; John Ryall, S.W.F., 16/08/93; Steph Breen, Nurses Organisation,
17/08/93; Malcolm Blair, C.E.W.U., 18/08/93; Dave Morgan, Seafarers Union, 18/08/93; Ashley
Russ, RT.U., 19/08/93 and John McKeefry, Engineers Union, 19/08/93.
44B. Roper in New Zealand Sociology, Vol. 6 No.2, pp. 37-38.
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At the time that the Employment Contracts Bill was introduced many unions
were affiliated to the Council of Trade Unions which was formed in 1988. This
was the consequence of the dissolution of two central organisations, one covering
private sector unions and one covering state sector unions - the Federation of
Labour and the Combined State Unions respectively. The C.T.U., therefore, acts as
an umbrella organisation for many unions.s> The National Executive and National
Officers exercise considerable discretion in decision-making. The National
Council is selected on a regional basis with provision being made for the
representation of women and Maori members. Delegates from affiliated unions
elect the National Officers and vote for representatives from six industry
groupings of unions. These industry groupings tend to be dominated by one or
two large unions. Figure 1 sets out the representative structure of the C.T.U.46
The C.T.U. is responsible for the development of general union policies on
various issues. It represents affiliates on a wide range of general policy issues and
as such maintains a presence on many committees. The C.T.U. will, where
appropriate, provide its affiliates with secretarial and advocacy services. It also
provides a legal service which is in constant demand. It is interesting to note that
those unions which are not affiliated to the C.T.U. tend to be the more militant
unions such as the Seafarers Union and the Building Trades Union. Workers are
not alone in forming organisations to defend their interests. Employers have also
seen a need to combine in order to promote their common interests.
45Por a detailed discussion of the formation of the CT.U. see P. Brosnan et al., The Dynamics ofNew
Zealand Industrial Relations, pp. 122-125 and A. Wilson, "The New Zealand Council of Trade
Unions: History, Structure and Role", B.A.(Hons) dissertation, University of Otago, 1990.
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2.3. The Emergence of the Employers Federation
In Chapter One, it was shown why employers form organisations to defend
their interests. The first employer organisations were formed in the United
Kingdom to regulate competition. At the same time as these organisations were
developing in the United Kingdom the British were settling New Zealand. It was
not long before employer organisations were formed in this country, although it is
not known precisely when the first employer organisation was created. However,
by 1856 a Chamber of Commerce had been established in Auckland and it was
concerned with trade matters,"? In general though, the development of employer
associations in New Zealand was a response to the growth of worker groups.48
As the New Zealand economy developed so too did the growth of employer
organisations. Brosnan, Smith and Walsh suggest that although the main focus of
these groups was to advance manufacturing, the members were also concerned by
the rapidly developing trade unions. As these unions became better developed,
employers responded by forming larger and more specialised organisations.t?
The perceived threat from unions was intensified by two key events that
occurred at a similar time. In October 1889 New Zealand's first federation of
labour was established and in 1890 the Maritime Strike erupted. Employers
countered these twin developments by forming organisations specialising in
industrial relations in Otago and Canterbury in 1890. By the turn of the century,
regional employers associations had also been formed in Auckland and in
Wellington. In 1902 a conference of employers was also held in Wellington and
was attended by delegates from employers' associations in Auckland, Canterbury,
Otago and Southland. It was decided at this meeting that the New Zealand
Employers Federation should be formed.>? It was not until 1905, however, that a
constitution was formally accepted.f
47 Ibidl " pp, 129-130.
48 R. Rudman in Labour and Industrial Relations inNew Zealand, P:53.
49 P. Brosnan et. al., The Dynamics ofNew Zealand Industrial Relations, P: 130.
50 The history, role and structure of the New Zealand Employers Federation is discussed in P.
Brosnan et.al., The Dynamics ofNew Zealand Industrial Relations, Chapter 7; R. Rudman in Labour and
Industrial Relations in New Zealand, Chapter 3; B. Roper, "A Level Playing Field? Business Political
Activism and State Policy Formation", in B. Roper and C. Rudd (eds.), State and Economy in New
Zealand, Chapter 10; J. Boston, Incomes Policy in New Zealand 1968-1984; Chapter 3 and B. Roper,
'The Policy-Making of Business Associations: From Keynesianism to Neoclassicism', pp. 31-46.
51 R. Rudman in Labour and Industrial Relations inNew Zealand, pp. 57-60.
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The development of employer associations continued to keep pace with the
growth of trade unions unti11936. In 1936, compulsory unionism was introduced
which served to strengthen trade unions. More unions were able to obtain awards
from the Arbitration Court and this made many employers realise the benefits of
employer associations.V Furthermore, employers were concerned that there
would be a rapid increase in regional pay rates as unions attempted to negotiate
with employers for wages and conditions better than those in other regions. These
factors provided an incentive for employers to join employer organisations.53
In the 1950s and 1960s the Employers Federation was involved in the General
Wage Order hearings which raised its profile. Employer associations again grew
when the 1973 Industrial Relations Act was passed which allowed for the
registration of voluntary settlements.P In 1976 the Business Roundtable was
established although initially in an informal sense only. It was initially comprised
of a small number of chief executives from some of the country's largest firms. In
1985 its structure became formalised and membership was extended to include
those chief executives of the fifty largest companies who wished to belong. In 1986
Roger Kerr, previously Assistant Secretary to the Treasury was appointed
Executive Director and the Business Roundtable has since established a reputation
for the prolific publication of reports dealing with public policy issues. It has also
been involved in numerous submissions to the Government, the establishment of
the centre for independent studies and the funding of visits by right-wing
academics.55 Despite having a smaller membership than the Employers
Federation, the Business Roundtable is influential in industrial relations matters.
The Employers Federation is the main organisation for employers in New
Zealand. Brosnan, Smith and Walsh describe its position as follows:
The pre-eminence of the Employers Association and its regional
associations in New Zealand industrial relations has been largely
unchallenged. The position of the Employers Federation owes much to
52 Ibid., p. 70.
53 P. Brosnan et.al., The Dynamics ofNew Zealand Industrial Relations, p. 131.
54 Ibid., p. 132.
55There are a number of articles which deal with the membership and organisation of the Business
Roundtable These include: C. Cromie, "Business heavies join forces in club with clout" in National
Business Review, October 3, !983, pp. 1, 12; B. Jesson et.al., Revival of the Right, pp. 48-52; C. Trotter,
"The Business Roundtable" in The Equalizer July 1988, pp 6-7; D. Venables, "Our Old Boy Network
in New Zealand Listener, April 16 1988, pp 35-37 and J. Wanna, "Centralisation without
Corporatism: the politics of New Zealand business in the recession, New Zealand Journal of
Industrial Relations, vo1.14,1989, pp 1-15.
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the small scale of activities in New Zealand and to the effect of the
arbitration system.56
The post-war period has witnessed a shift in the balance of power between
employers and workers and this has been reflected in the changing policy
orientation of the Employers Federation. During the Long Boom the Employers
Federation supported centralised wage bargaining, the award system and
compulsory unionism. By the mid 1980s this position had been reversed. The
reason for this dramatic shift is to be found in the changing economic and
industrial climates in New Zealand.
From 1957 to 1969 the rate of surplus value had climbed steadily. The increase
in productivity failed to be reflected in real wages and in 1969 a strike wave broke
out. It is significant that both this strike wave and the subsequent strike waves of
1976-1977 were the direct result of rank-and-file militancy. The response of the
Employers Federation to these strike waves was to urge increased government
intervention in the arena of industrial relations. However, the newfound strength
of rank-and-file militants blocked many of the efforts of the Muldoon government
to maintain wages at existing levels and between 1977 and 1980 real wages rose.57
Internationally, the political situation was changing. In the wake of the
elections of Thatcher in Britain and Reagan in America the capitalist class was
becoming increasingly militant. Roper argues that although strike activity in New
Zealand remained high from the late 1970s to the late 1980s strike actions were
characterised by: "the general demoralisation of the rank-and-file, a pervasive
acquiescence to the wage and price freeze and defensiveness (e.g. many disputes
during this period related to redundancy payments)"58 Concurrently the
Employers Federation began advocating a system of industrial relations based
around voluntary unionism and decentralised wage bargalning.S? However, it
should be noted that the position of the Employers Federation on industrial
relations reform does not just involve abstract ideological commitments. Rather, it
is dependent upon the balance of power. The shift from the policy orientation of
the Employers Federation from the policies advocated during the Long Boom to
those of the present day is, therefore, unsurprising.
56P. Brosnan et.al., The Dynamics a/New Zealand Industrial Relations, p.132.
57 B. Roper in New Zealand Monthly Review, No. 325, 1990, pp. 6-8.
58 Ibid., p.9.
59 Ibid., p. 10.
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The size and strength of the membership of the Employers Federation has
made it very influential in New Zealand industrial relations.s" The New Zealand
Employers Federation have four regional divisions - Auckland, Wellington,
Canterbury and Otago-Southland - to which individual firms may affiliate. Trade
associations may also join one of the regional divisions provided sufficient
members of the association are also members of the regional division. The
National Executive of the New Zealand Employers Federation is comprised of the
presidents of the Chamber of Commerce, Manufacturers Federation, Federated
Farmers, Retailers Federation, Tourist Industry Federation and one representative
from each affiliate or trade association. The National Executive is responsible for
the election of the president and vice-president. The executive meets four times a
year and it decides the policy of the Employers Federation. Figures Two and
Three detail the structure of the New Zealand Employers Pederation.v!
The New Zealand Employers Federation involves itself in a number of
industrial relations areas. Its primary goal is to unite employers. It also involves
itself with the development of research and training. The dissemination of
information to the public is a similar area which occupies the resources of the
Employers Federation. As such, it provides speakers for conferences and
publishes material detailing its industrial relations standpoint. The Employers
Fedration has put considerable resources into lobbying the government on
industrial relations. Along with the unions and certain state agencies the
Employers Federation was a key actor in the struggle over the Employment
Contracts Bill.
60 For discussions of the structure of the Employers Federation see B. Roper, "The Policy-Making
of Business Associations", p. 32; R. Rudman in Labour and Industrial Relations in New Zealand,
Chapter 3 and P. Brosnan et.al., The Dynamics of New Zealand Industrial Relations, Chapter 7.
61 P. Brosnan et.al., The Dynamics of New Zealand Industrial Relations" p. 143.
























































Figure 2: Structure of the New Zealand Employers Federation
Source: P.Brosnan et. al. The Dynamics of Neui Zealand Industrial Relations, p.139
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Figure 3: National Council of the New Zealand Employers Federation
Source: P.Brosnan et. al., The Dynamics ofNew Zealand Industrial Relations, p.144
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The key state agencies that have historically been involved in industrial
relations are the Department of Labour, the State Services Commission and, most
recently, Treasury.62 The most influential of these has been the Department of
Labour which was established in 1892.Two years later the arbitration system was
set up through the passing of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act. It is,
therefore, unsurprising that historically there has been a close relationship
between the Department of Labour and the arbitration system.63
Brosnan, Smith and Walsh state that the Department of Labour and the State
Services Commission have two key roles in industrial relations. They both act as
policy advisers to the government - for the private sector and state sector
respectively. The second role of the Department of Labour has been to administer
the arbitration system while the second role of the State Services Commission has
been as an industrial advocate for the government.64
Until the late 1920s the arbitration system was supported by government.
Employers and unions only complained if they thought they could do better
unrestrained by the fetters of the system. However, by the 1920s most employers
and farmers were united in agitating for the abolition of arbitration. With the
economy in a depression they perceived that their interests would be better
served by the market. The wage policies of the arbitration court and the
arbitration system in general were successful in protecting workers from "the full
impact of market forces".65 The farmers and employers were, however, able to
persuade the government to abolish compulsory arbitration and so they were able
to pursue their interests, less restricted by the system than they had been in the
past.66
62 For discussions of the role of Treasury in the formation of public policy see S. Goldfinch & B.
Roper, "Treasury's role in state policy formulation during the post-war era" in B.Roper & C.Rudd
(eds.), State and Economy in New Zealand, Chapter 3; J. Boston, "The Treasury and the organisation
of economic advice.some international comparisons." in B. Easton (ed.), TheMaking of Rogernomics,
Chapter 3; J. Boston, The Fourth Labour Government, Chapter 4; R. Douglas and L. Callen, Towards
Prosperity, pp. 127-135.
63 P. Brosnan et.al., The Dynamics ofNew Zealand Industrial Relations" p. 173.
64 Ibid., p. 17l.
65 P. Walsh 'The State and Industrial Relations in New Zealand' in B. Roper and C. Rudd (eds.),
Stateand Economy in New Zealand, pp. 179.
66 Ibid., p. 180.
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In the 1950s, the situation again changed with economic prosperity allowing
both unions and employers to bypass the system. This was tacitly supported by
the Department of Labour. The development of second-tier bargaining caused
employers to again put pressure on the government regarding the arbitration
system. Second-tier bargaining tended to be supported by strike action. The
government was urged to take legal action against unlawful strikes and thus
restore the arbitration system. This was opposed by the Department of Labour
which instructed the Government that changes to the arbitration system would be
"unnecessary and unwise".67
The role of the Arbitration Court was dealt a severe blow in 1968. As described
above, the decision of the Arbitration Court to issue a nil general wage order
caused a crisis for the institution. This led to disorder in the realm of industrial
relations which lasted for several years. The successful challenge of the Court's
decision resulted in its loss of authority.
With the introduction of the Industrial Relations Act of 1973 state agencies
again assumed a more active role in industrial relations. The Department of
Labour supported collective bargaining and to this end it expressed a liking for
the Industrial Relations Act. By the end of the 1970s Department of Labour
officials "supported the revival of tripartism and the search for a consensus
solution to wage-fixing problems".68
It was in the debate over the Industrial Relations Act that the Department of
Labour first found itself to be significantly opposed to Treasury which was less
convinced of the merits of collective bargaining. By 1984 the opposition of the two
departments over industrial relations issues was clearly demarcated. Treasury
advocated a limited role for the state in industrial relations which was in stark
contrast to the goals to which the Department of Labour had been committed
since the turn of the century.s? The policy orientation adopted by Treasury was in
keeping with the new economic orthodoxy that was developing internationally -
that of New Right economic theory. This may also be contrasted with the State
Services Commission which represents the government as an employer and thus
shapes its policy advice accordingly.70
67 Ibid., p. 181.
68 P. Brosnan et al., The Dynamics of New Zealand Industrial Relations, p. 175.
69Ibid., p. 175.
70 Ibid.., p. 172.
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It is not possible to provide a detailed discussion of New Right economic
theory here. However, it is necessary that the key tenets of this theory be outlined
in order that the arguments of employers and government agencies described in
the following chapters may be understood. New Right economic theory emerged
from the ashes of Keynesianism. Keynesianism had dominated post-war
economics until it was discredited by its inability to explain the coincidence of
rising unemployment with rising inflation. The central focus of New Right
economic policy is faith in the market. It is believed that market mechanisms
ensure efficiency, prosperity and a better choice for the consumer - markets, if
unregulated, behave as if they are perfectly competitive. Thus all unemployment
is voluntary and is due to the failure of workers to offer their labour at the right
price. A key proponent of such theory is Treasury."!
Controls on the market have been criticised on the grounds that whilst initially
they appear to be of value over a long period of time they actually destroy both
freedom and prosperity. Similarly, state intervention in the economy is opposed.
The involvement of the state is deemed to be inherently inefficient and thus the
private provision of services such as health, education and welfare. A further key
belief of the New Right is that the freedom of the individual is paramount. The
self-maximising tendencies of individuals is believed to lead to a closer
approximation to equilibrium in the market. Thus, it follows that interest groups
and unions have no legitimacy when they attempt to influence policy.P It will be
shown that proponents of New Right economic theory have attempted to
demonstrate that this should be the case in New Zealand. Economic crisis has
provided both the incentive and the climate for these groups to advocate changes
in keeping with New Right theory.
The role played by the key state agencies in industrial relations is, therefore
dependent on the role prescribed for them by government within the current
industrial relations system. In general though, the Department of Labour has
adopted a stance more in favour of collective bargaining than have the State
Services Commission and Treasury. In recent years Treasury officials have
become more involved in industrial relations and this is reflected in the
71 See Treasury, Government Management and Treasury, Economic Management for evidence of this.
For a detailed discussion of the relationship between Treasury and New Right economic theory see
S. Goldfinch, The Ideology of Treasury Economic Advice, B.A.(Hons) dissertation, University of
Otago, 1990.
72 For detailed analyses of New Right economic theory see D. King, The New Right: Politics, Markets
and Citizenship,; A. Gamble, TheFree Economy and theStrong State, and D. Green, TheNew Right.
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deregulatory industrial relations policies pursued by New Zealand governments
since 1984. A key factor in determining the nature of industrial relations in a
particular country is the legislation which governs it. The following section
considers this legislation.
2.5. Industrial Relations Legislation in New Zealand: A Brief
Historical Overview
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894
For much of the twentieth century industrial relations in New Zealand has
been dominated by the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1894. This
Act was introduced in the wake of the 1890 Maritime Strike. The proponents of
the legislation promised that it meant the end of strike action. Although this was
its main purpose, the Act had an impact on a number of other areas. A state
controlled wage-fixing system developed and the workings of the act in its strike
prevention role created various bureaucratic and legalistic procedures.T'
The Act had a big impact on the position of unions within the industrial
relations system. So far as unions were concerned this legislation was a double-
edged sword. Firstly, it helped to revive unionism by providing for the
registration of unions and offering an incentive for new unions to be formed.
However, the trade union movement which it did create was "weak and
fragmented".74 Roth explains why the legislation had this effect:
A union could register only within one of eight industrial districts, and
there was no provision for national organisations. Each local union had
to apply separately for an award which covered its area only. To obtain
an award by pleading before the Arbitration Court or Conciliation Board,
came to be the only legal purpose of registered unions.75
The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act established a number of
structures to facilitate its aims, the most significant of which was the Arbitration
Court. The decision of this court was final and binding and then formed the
award covering the groups of employers against whom the union had submitted
claims. The Act also created conciliation councils which attempted to resolve
disputes through negotiation. Finally, the Court provided a system of union
registration.76
73 Ibid., p. 27.
74 Ibid.
75H. Roth in Labour and IndustrialRelations in New Zealand, p. 8.
76 P. Brosnan et al., The Dynamicsof New Zealand IndustrialRelations, p. 27.
Industrial Relations in New Zealand Page-53-
When the Arbitration Court was successfully challenged over the Nil Wage
order of 1968 the whole arbitration system was brought into question. Free-wage
bargaining mushroomed after 1968 and the Industrial Relations Act 1973
represented, in part, an attempt at regulating this. Furthermore, the new
legislation provided for the improvement of personal grievance procedures. It is
now necessary to consider the Industrial Relations Act in its own right and not
merely with reference to the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act.77
Industrial Relations Act 1973
In 1973, industrial relations legislation in New Zealand underwent a radical
transformation with the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act. The new
legislation was aimed at centralising industrial relations particularly with regard
to wage negotiations. The hoped for result was a return to the stability of the
postwar years.i" Furthermore, this measure was also designed to prevent
premature government intervention in setting wage levels.
The Industrial Relations Act had several key features: it allowed for voluntary
settlements and composite agreements to be registered and it provided personal
grievances procedures. Many conditions contained in the Industrial Conciliation
and Arbitration Act were retained, namely, the award system, compulsory
unionism, conciliation and arbitration. Deeks and Boxall suggest that a key theme
of this legislation was one of flexibility.F? However, this 'free' bargaining failed to
prevent more stoppages and thus changes were made rapidly. In 1979, the
Remuneration Act was passed which permitted government intervention and,
indeed, the setting of wages and conditions by the government.80
Unions were allowed substantial input into the drafting of this legislation. The
Federation of Labour, in conjunction with the Employers Federation prepared the
draft bill which was adopted by the government, more or less in its entirety. One
consequence of this new legislation was a growth in employer organisations.
Brosnan, Smith and Walsh state that the reason for this was that "the Employers
Federation was concerned that industry wage structures would fragment and, in
77 For a more detailed discussion of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act see N. Wood in
Labour and Industrial Relations in New Zealand and H. Roth in Labour and Industrial Relations in New
Zealand.
78 P. Brosnan et. al. , The Dynamics of New Zealand Industrial Relations, p. 193.
79J. Deeks and P. Boxall, Labour Relations in New Zealand, pp. 40-41.
80 P. Brosnan et.al., TheDynamics of New Zealand Industrial Relations, p. 34.
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order to hold companies together, new employer unions were required to
incorporate employers into the bargaining structure of each industry." 81
The National Government's Industrial Relations Law Reform Bill of 1983
introduced voluntary unionism. However this industrial relations change was to
be short-lived as the National Government were removed from office in the 1984
elections. Shortly after Labour came to power the Industrial Relations Act was
amended in preparation for lifting the wage freeze implemented by Muldoon's
National Government. The two key changes embodied in the Act were a switch to
voluntary arbitration and the introduction of a set of criteria to be considered by
the Arbitration Court when it was deciding awards - these included an emphasis
on market conditions.s- However, the Industrial Relations Act was soon to be
replaced with a new set of rules governing industrial relations.
Labour Relations Act 1987
In 1987 the Industrial Relations Act was replaced with the Labour Relations
Act. This Act provided for three organisations to facilitate the resolution of
industrial disputes. The Arbitration Commission was responsible for the majority
of the required administration. This encompassed the registration of awards and
agreements, responsibility for legal matters and other functions. The Mediation
Service was concerned with the negotiation process, providing mediators where
required to help resolve formal and informal negotiations and personal
grievances. The Labour Court was responsible for settling all legal questions,
particularly those of interpretation.P
The Labour Relations Act included a number of provisions which affected
union membership. It required all unions to have at least one thousand members,
although it did stipulate that it was unnecessary for these members to all be from
the same or similar industries. The rationale behind this change was that unions
need a substantial membership base in order for them to be efficient. This ruling
resulted in many unions amalgamating.84 Provision was also made in the Labour
Relations Act for a certain amount of competition between unions for members.
This competition was to occur on the basis of ballots - of a union's own members
and of the workers it wants to represent. Brosnan, Smith and Walsh suggest that
this introduction of limited competition was much less than that advocated by
81 Ibid., p. 132.
82 Ibid.,p. 36.
83 Ibid., p. 2.
84 J. Deeks and P. Boxall, Labour Relations in New Zealand, p. 49.
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some business leaders.8s The potential activities of unions were also made more
flexible under the Labour Relations Act. The Industrial Relations Act had made
unions subject to the ruling that they existed for 'protecting and furthering the
interests of their members'. Under the Labour Relations Act this restriction was
removed and unions were granted the 'rights, powers and privileges of a natural
person'Jv
The Labour Relations Act removed 'second-tier bargaining' by ruling that
workers may be covered either by an award or by an enterprise agreement.
According to Deeks and Boxall this encouraged "the development of settlements
that relate more closely to ability to pay in specific industries and enterprises."87
They view this as in some part desirable because "it should make the system more
decentralised, less obsessed with occupational relativities and more flexible."88
The Labour Relations Act did not require unions to register although most did
so. Registration imposed both advantages and constraints upon unions.
Registered unions were allowed to lodge any agreements or awards which they
negotiated with the Arbitration Commission thus making them legally binding on
all employers. Under the Labour Relations Act only registered unions were
allowed to take part in strikes, thus exempting them from civil action on the part
of employers. However, the restrictions on registered unions were notable.
Registration made unions liable for fines should they contravene certain rulings of
the Act. Registered unions also had to surrender the right of veto over their
membership. They were required to admit any worker from their particular
industry to the union. Finally, the rules of registered unions were required to
comply with "standards of fairness and accountability to members."89
Under the Labour Relations Act most strikes were deemed to be unlawful. The
only circumstances under which strike action was permitted was if no current
award or agreement existed or if the award or agreement was due to expire
within sixty days.P? While there was no definite ruling within the Labour
Relations Act detailing the consequences of unlawful strike activity, registered
unions who committed such an act were unprotected from civil action by an
8SP. Brosnan et. al., The Dynamics of New Zealand Industrial Relations, p. 103.
86 J. Deeks and P. Boxall, Labour Relations in New Zealand, p. 48.
87 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
88 Ibid.
89 P. Brosnan et.al., The Dynamics of New Zealand Industrial Relations, p. 3.
90 Ibid., p. 3.
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employer. A final feature of the Labour Relations Act which should be noted was
that it provided for procedures against sexual harassment and discrimination for
involvement in trade union activity.
Brosnan, Smith and Walsh have identified two major consequences of the
Labour Relations Act. The removal of compulsory arbitration made it harder for
one party to force another to reach some agreement on issues which were in
dispute; 91and the Labour Relations Act facilitated a shift towards an enterprise
bargaining system, whilst retaining some of the protections embodied in the
arbitration system.v- It was not long, however, before the Labour Relations Act
was replaced.
Conclusion
The New Zealand economy has enjoyed both boom times and the onset of
crisis. This change in fortunes has had a number of implications for industrial
relations and these have been outlined in this chapter. A number of key points
have been made which are relevant to the struggle over the Employment
Contracts Act.
(1) It has been established that the mid-1970s heralded a time of international
economic crisis. This has been explained with reference to Marxist crisis theory.
By the 1970s the rate of profit had begun to fall and this, coupled with the growth
of service industries, precipitated crisis.93 Falling profits increased pressure on
employers to cut labour costs.The nature of New Zealand's economic crisis has
been contrasted with the Long Boom of previous years.
(2) The nature of New Zealand's economic crisis explains the position in which
the major players in the struggle over the Employment Contracts Act found
themselves in 1987. The decline in the strength of trade unions was explained
earlier. Most importantly, the weakened union movement had already shifted its
emphasis from action on the ground level to negotiation and conciliation.
Employer's organisations had, in contrast, become more militant with regard to
industrial relations issues. A degree of coordination between the Employers
91 Ibid., p. 116.
92 Ibid., p. 196.
93 For discussions of economic crisis and the falling rate of profit see A. Saikh in T. Bottomore et.al.
(eds.), The Dictionary of Marxist Thought, pp. 142-143, pp. 159-161; J.N. Devine, An Introduction to
Radical Theories of Economic Crises in R. Cheyne et.al.(eds.), The Imperiled Economy, Book One, pp.
19-32; P. Dunne, Quantitative Marxism, Chapters1, 5 and 9 and C. Harman, Explaining the Crisis.
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Federation and the Business Roundtable had begun to develop (this is explained
in Chapter Three). Finally, employer organisations were taking advantage of their
strong membership base to lobby government. Government was more receptive to
employer wishes by the mid 1980s. This was due, in part, to the more prominent
role played by Treasury in industrial relations policy advice. This role expanded
from 1984 onwards.
(3) It is important to note that the positions occupied by employers and unions
at the time at which the empirical study begins represents a fundamental shift in
the balance of power between the two groups. During the Long Boom unions
were able to build up their membership and with near-full employment the threat
of industrial action carried great weight. The arrival of a recession characterised
by high levels of unemployment turned the table and since the late 1970s
employers have been in a stronger position to advance their interests.
(4) Economic crisis precipitated the rebirth of an old ideology. Keynesian
economics had been unable to explain the new phenomenon of stagflation - the
coincidence of rising inflation coupled with rising unemployment. This left a
vacuum which was filled by the ideology of the New Right. This ideology has
been used, both by employers and by Treasury, to provide some economic
justification for the policies which they advocate. Briefly, central tenets of New
Right theory relevant to industrial relations includes a belief in the primacy of the
market, the belief that the interests of the individual (as opposed to the collective)
are paramount and a declining role for the state in areas of social policy. Thus,
New Right economic theory has been used by the Employers Federation, the
Business Roundtable and Treasury in their advocacy of fundamental labour
market reform.
(5) The general direction of industrial relations reform has, therefore, been in
keeping with New Right thinking. There has been the removal of special status for
unions, increasing restrictions on the ability of workers to undertake collective
action such as strikes and a reliance on the unfettered operation of the labour
market as a means of solving unemployment.
The following chapters demonstrate that workers were under threat from this
ideological and political onslaught in the form of the Employment Contracts Bill.
They show that there has been an upsurge in employer militancy which has
focused on industrial relations reform and that the union leadership has been
unwilling to provide the leadership necessary to mount an effective fightback.
Chapter Three
Employer and Union Responses to the Labour
Relations Act 1987 - 1989
This chapter provides an account of the major changes in industrial relations
during the period from 1987-1989. It is important to establish the ~ature of the
industrial relations environment into which the Employment Contracts Act was
introduced. This will enable an analysis of the impact of the various actors upon
the development and eventual enactment of this legislation to be provided and
thus determine how such a controversial piece of legislation came to be
introduced despite widespread opposition. The Labour Relations Act was a
significant influence upon industrial relations during this period as it determined
the legal boundaries within which the various key actors could operate. The
objectives of the Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation with regard
to industrial relations are examined with reference to the Labour Relations Act-
both in terms of those items on their agendas that had been addressed by this
legislation and in terms of those issues which, in their view, remained unsatisfied.
The effect of the Labour Relations Act upon the policies of the mo~e significant
unions is also examined.
On a smaller scale, the increasing militancy of individual employers and the
relative weakness of unions is examined. This is done both with reference to the
significant industrial relations disputes which occurred during this period and
with reference to the 1987/1988 wage round and the 1988/1989 wage round.
Finally the attempts to conclude a "Compact" between, initially, employers, the
Government and unions and later, the Government and the unions are described.
It is argued that the Compact represents an attempt by the C.T.V. leadership to
gain more legitimacy at the national policy-making level at the expense of
defending workers interests. It will be shown in further chapters that this is
indicative of the way in which the CT.V. was to deal with those issues raised by
the Employment Contracts Bill
Responses to the Labour Relations Act
3.1. The Labour Relations Act
Page --59-
Employers
By 1987 the positions of the Business Roundtable and the Employers
Federation with regard to labour market reform were essentially very similar. It is
to be expected therefore that their responses to the Labour Relations Act would
identify common concerns. In a speech at the Northern Club in Auckland, M.
Horton of the Business Roundtable, discussed the objections of the Employers
Federation to the Act:
- it entrenches monopoly powers of large unions and gives them unfair
protection, with privileges for existing unions over new unions and big
unions over small ones;
- it preserves the automatic linkage between union registration and
exclusive bargaining rights;
- it entrenches compulsory unionism by making a union ticket a key to
workers rights under the Act.
- it maintains a multiplicity of awards per workplace and denies
employers any possibility of rationalising labour conditions;
- a theme of pro-union and anti-employer bias runs throughout the Act.l
The magazine of the Employers Federation, The Employer, supports the Business
Roundtable account of the Employers Federation position on the Labour Relations
Act. The Employer summarises the Employers Federation submission to the Royal
Commission on Social Policy. It is stated that whilst the Labour Relations Act
appears to be an attempt, albeit half hearted, at decentralisation, the legislation
has allowed 'the worst of the traditional central structures to remain'.?
The Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation identified a number
of areas in which they believed the Labour Relations Act was deficient. Firstly,
they opposed compulsory unionism for a number of reasons. It was argued that
voluntary unionism would promote greater worker freedom and improve union
services. Also, voluntary unionism is viewed by the Business Roundtable and the
Employers Federation as an integral part of labour market reform.> The Business
Roundtable opposed the one thousand member minimum rule on the grounds
that it "has meant the suppression of many small, relatively democratic unions, at
the expense of the workers that they represented'vt Regarding union membership
generally it was stated that "unions face little pressure to respond to the interests
of workers with special needs or circumstances" and that "individual workers or
1 M. Horton, in New Zealand Business Roundtable, Labour Markets andEmployment.
2 The Employer, February 1988.
3 J. Dannin in NewYork Law School Journal ofInternational andComparative Law, pp. 12-13.
4 New Zealand Business Roundtable, Choice in the Workplace, p. 7.
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groups of workers who want to negotiate a change in their conditions of
employment or form an enterprise or workplace union, are strictly limited in their
ability to do so."5 Despite the fact that the Business Roundtable and Employers
Federation documents emphasise worker individuality and freedom, it is
apparent from the tone of much of their literature that there is an anti-union
agenda. The unions are portrayed as being outdated and irrelevant.v
The Business Roundtable and Employers Federation continued to argue for
voluntary representation on the grounds that it would promote individual
freedoms and encourage responsiveness by unions to the needs of their members
and promote loyalty among members to their unions. It is argued in Choice in the
Workplace that: "It is possible and desirable, to design a system of labour law that
promotes workers by giving them freedom in their workplaces and union
relationships and by making that freedom meaningful."7 The abolition of national
awards was advocated by the Employers Federation and the Business
Roundtable. Furthermore, it was suggested that once awards expire employers
should be permitted to "offer individual contracts to workers in competition with
the union. "8 After the passing of the Labour Relations Act the Business
Roundtable and the Employers Federation argued for the abolition of the Labour
Court. Even after 1991 and the radical reforms of the Employment Contracts Act
the Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation continued to favour the
abolition of the Employment Court. It was argued that the functions of this court
could be taken over by the judges of the High Court.9
Roger Kerr, Executive Director of the Business Roundtable, considers that one
of the major disadvantages of the Labour Relations Act was the inclusion of
restrictions on trade union size. He argues that whilst the Labour Relations Act
represents an attempt to introduce contestability (opportunities for people to
change their union coverage) this was hamstrung by the union membership
clause. The overall effect was, therefore, that while the Labour Relations Act
provided for a process by which changes to union coverage could be effected, it
placed obstacles in the way of those changes. A further disadvantage of the
Labour Relations Act, identified by the Business Roundtable, was the absence of
any moves towards voluntary unionism. However, at the time it was argued by
5 Ibid,
6J. Dannin in NewYork Law School Journal ofInternational andComparative Law, p. 14.
7 New Zealand Business Roundtable, Choice in theWorkplace, P: 9.
8 J. Dannin in NewYork Law School Journal ofInternational andComparative Law, p. 28.
9 New Zealand Business Roundtable and New Zealand Employers Federation, A Study of the
Labour Employment Court, p. 43.
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some employers that the Roundtable's preference for voluntary unionism was an
unrealistic one given that the Labour Government had reintroduced compulsory
unionism. The Business Roundtable was conscious of this situation but continued
to propose voluntary unionism and watched with interest whilst some in the
Labour Government did the same.l"
Like the Business Roundtable, the Employers Federation voiced some serious
concerns about the Labour Relations Act. Even before the legislation had been
passed the Employers Federation was announcing its opposition to the principles
embodied in it. In March of 1987, the Employers Federation'denounced the Bill as
biased and repressive and claimed that it perpetuated old ideas of class instead of
recognising the community of interest between employers and workers in the
workplace.U Like the Business Roundtable, the Employers Federation opposed
compulsory union membership, an aspect of industrial relations which the Labour
Relations Act did not aim to remove.
Roger Kerr does identify one major advantage of the Labour Relations Act. He
states that the Act served to strengthen the sanctity of contract aspects of New
Zealand's labour law at that particular time. Overall then, the Business
Roundtable perception of the Labour Relations Act was that it represented
'modest progress'. Kerr sees as positive the fact that the necessity for reforms had
been accepted but the limited nature of this reform was the essential drawback for
the Business Roundtable of the Labour Relations Act.12 Anne Knowles, Labour
Market Manager of the Employers Federation, also identifies the sanctity of
contract aspect of the Labour Relations Act as being the key advantage of the
legislation on the grounds that it prevented second and third tier bargaining.
Knowles states that this was theoretically aimed at bringing industrial relations
closer to enterprise bargaining. However, she argues that in reality this did not
occur as unions were the only ones who could cite out, the end result being that
there were only four or five enterprise agreements during the period that the
Labour Relations Act was in force.P
Shortly after the Labour Relations Act was passed on the 15th of May 1987 the
Business Roundtable began a coordinated campaign of opposition to the Act.l4
10 Interview with Roger Kerr, Executive Director of the Business Roundtable, 16 August 1993.
11 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal ofIndustrial Relations, March 1987.
12Interview with Roger Kerr, Executive Director of the Business Roundtable, 16 August 1993.
13 Interview with Anne Knowles, Labour Market Manager, New Zealand Employers Federation,
17th August 1993.
14P. Walsh in B. Easton(ed.) The Making ofRogernomics, p. 150.
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They urged increased flexibility in the labour market - a freeing up of the rules
governing the negotiation of wages and conditions - and attempted to influence
public perceptions of the new industrial relations legislation. The previous month,
the Employers Federation campaign against the Labour Relations Act had begun
in earnest. A pamphlet was released, in conjunction with the Federated Farmers,
the Manufacturers Federation, the Retailers Federation and the Tourist Industry
Federation. Furthermore, the Employers Federation took out large scale
newspaper advertisements.lf
The Employers Federation publications of the time were blunt in their
condemnation of the Labour Relations Act. In The Benefits of Bargaining Reform, the
Employers Federation describes the Labour Relations Act as a "paternalistic and
outmoded law that causes the imbalance the employers view as the root cause of
their industrial relations problems". Also in the same document, the Labour
Relations Act is described as "sinister'Uf On the basis of their own. publications
and statements there can be no doubt that the Employers Federation disliked the
Labour Relations Act primarily on the grounds of the 'power' it allegedly gave to
unions.
The agenda of the Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation with
regard to industrial relations change was not based solely on a response to the
Labour Relations Act. They had their own ideas of the type of industrial relations
system that was needed in New Zealand. The Business Roundtable continued to
emphasise after 1987 that there was a connection between labour market reform,
unemployment and social welfare policies. They suggest that there is a connection
between real wages and unemployment. It is stated that: "It follows that if we
want to restore high levels of employment in New Zealand we must permit free
employment contracting in a competitive labour market so that pay rates and
other rewards continuously reflect prevailing conditions of labour supply and
demand."17
Social welfare benefits are believed to act as a disincentive, preventing people
from entering the workforce.lf Minimum wages are also condemned by the
Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation on the grounds that they limit
15 Ibid., March 1987.
16 New Zealand Employers Federation, TheBenefits ofBargaining Reform, P: 7.
17 New Zealand Business Roundtable, Unemployment: Realities and Illusions, p. 8.
18 For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between social welfare benefits and the labour
market see S. Heal, B.A.(Hons) dissertation, "Redesigning the Welfare State? The National
Government's Welfare Benefit Cuts: A Critical Assessment", University of Otago, 1992
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the number of jobs that employers are willing or able to offer. Similarly,
redundancy agreements are believed to increase the costs or risks of taking on
new staff and hence redundancy agreements are also believed to contribute to
rising unemployment.l? Regarding unemployment the Business Roundtable states
that: "The essence of the unemployment problem is the misalignment of labour
costs and productivity levels. An increasing proportion of New Zealand's labour
force has simply been priced out of work."20 In terms of the policies which could
be pursued in order to rectify New Zealand's unemployment problem it is stated
that: "The main contribution the government could make would be to liberalise
wage bargaining and reform the social welfare system so that the unemployed are
able - and have an incentive - to bargain for training wages."21
The Business Roundtable publicly proclaimed its disappointment with the
Labour Relations Act. In a speech to the Nelson Provincial Chamber of
Commerce, RLoach of the Business Roundtable quoted from the Reserve Bank's
post-election briefing papers:
Reform has been inadequate. Little has been achieved in the past three
years to increase labour market flexibility. Indeed, the reintroduction of
the unqualified preference clause and the proposal for a minimum
union size of a thousand members are both likely to increase institutional
rigidities. These ... appear to be part of a trade-off in order to gain union
acceptance of certain reform proposals such as limited contestability
provisions within unions and the restructuring of the national award
system.22
A speech by A.R Hutton of the Business Roundtable in Christchurch earlier in
the year voiced similar concerns. He argued for the need for vastly increased
flexibility in industrial relations, stating that the Labour Relations Act had failed
to provide this. Hutton attacked the then current nature of trade unionism in New
Zealand, suggesting that there was a need to move away from craft-based
unionism and towards "a decentralised system of voluntary contracting on a
collective or individual basis."23
With regard to labour market reform in isolation, there were four key areas
which were believed by the Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation to
require fundamental changes. The first of these was the need for enterprise
19New Zealand Business Roundtable,The Benefits ofBargaining Reform P: 17.
20 Ibid., p. 27.
21 Ibid., p. 26. .
22R. Loach in New Zealand Business Roundtable, Labour Markets and Employment.
23A.R. Hutton in New Zealand Business Roundtable,Labour Markets and Employment.
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bargaining as opposed to craft-based bargaining as had existed in New Zealand
prior to the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act. Thus, it was argued
that industrial relations should be organised according to industry rather than
according to occupation. This requires freedom to negotiate outside the award
structure. National awards were also criticised on the grounds that they did not
allow for different circumstances between companies and regions and amongst
workers. Therefore, it was argued that the removal of awards would lead to more
responsive and cooperative employer-employee relations. This was expected to
have beneficial effects upon unemployment.e'
As might be expected, given the specific criticisms by the Business Roundtable
and the Employers Federation of the Labour Relations Act, voluntary unionism
was a change strongly advocated by these groups. This was done with reference
to the rights of the individual and the restrictions compulsory unionism places on
the use of incentives in industrial relations. Similarly, it was also argued that those
workers who wished to join a union should have totally free choice. In reality, this
would entail competition between unions for membership, which may lead to the
style of business unionism witnessed in America.P
Finally, it was argued that the nature of the relationship between employers
and workers should be determined by negotiated contracts rather than by awards
or industrial relations legislation. Again, reference is made to the individual rights
of both employers and workers.w However, such arguments presuppose the
existence of an equal relationship between these two groups. As shown in Chapter
One, the reality is very different as ownership of the means of production conveys
vast power to employers. In the context of New Zealand in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, it has been established that this power imbalance has been
accentuated by a variety of factors including high unemployment and the 'new
realism' of the union bureaucracy.F
Industrial relations under the Labour Relations Act was, therefore, influenced
by the desire of the Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation to
promote their agenda for labour market reform. It was in the light of this that they
criticised the Labour Relations Act and with these goals in mind that they would
24 New Zealand Business Roundtable, Freedom in Employment, pp. 5-7.
25 For a discussion of business unionism see K. Moody, An Injury to All, especially Chapter 3.
26 New Zealand Business Roundtable, Freedom in Employment, p. 8.
27 These issues are discussed in detail in Chapter Two.
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attempt to influence government, unions and the public to adopt their way of
thinking or, at least, to lend some credence to it.
Unions
Just prior to the passing of the Labour Relations Act the annual conference of
the Federation of Labour was held. President Knox praised the Labour
Government's policies on compulsory trade union membership and trade union
education. 28 Many incoming officials felt the Labour Relations Act was not
significantly different from the Industrial Relations Act. Certainly, when viewing
the Labour Relations Act from a post-Employment Contracts Act perspective the
opinions of union officials interviewed seemed favourable.s?
The Communication and Energy Workers Union identified the bargaining
framework contained within the Labour Relations Act as a major advantage on
the grounds that it gave security both to employers and to workers. The Seafarers
Union also view the bargaining aspects of the Labour Relations Act as having
been its major advantage, as well as the fact that it gave the right to strike. The
Seafarers Union, the Communication and Energy Workers Union and the
Engineers Union were unable to see many disadvantages to the Labour Relations
Act.
Both the Building Trades Union and the Service Workers Federation view the
biggest advantage of the Labour Relations Act as having been the fact that it gave
recognition to unions and protection to workers. Steph Breen of the Nurses
Organisation states that the Labour Relations Act provided for a better balance
between employers and employees. However, she feels that it could have been
improved by the inclusion of mechanisms enabling the increase of wages and the
enhancement of conditions without unions having to resort to strike action.
The major advantage of the Labour Relations Act identified by John McKeefry
of the Engineers Union was the fact that it provided the union with the incentive
to formalise a lot of what had been done informally when the Industrial Relations
Act of 1973 was in place. He also regards the inclusion of provisions regarding
union size as having been beneficial in that it forced smaller unions to
amalgamate. Other aspects of the Labour Relations Act that John McKeefry views
as having been advantageous was that it persuaded the Engineers Union to
28H. Roth, Chronicle, NewZealand Journal of Industrial Relations, May 1987.
29 See Chapter Two for a brief discussion of the key unions in New Zealand.
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become more focused, it encouraged them to address the issue of what services
the membership actually wanted and directed them towards paying more
attention to education. It should be noted that the Engineers Union has advocated
and adopted a 'business unionism' model derived from unions in America. This
tends to involve bargaining over benefits which supplant or supplement those
provided by the welfare state. Moody states that "income maintenance was
modern business unionism's substitute for job or employment security."30
Negotiations over the social wage provide the union bureaucracy with an
alternative to negotiating for greater job control and participation which is likely
to be strongly opposed by management.U Hence, the Engineers Union have
introduced a membership package which includes free SKY, cheap domestic and
international travel, special rates with Telecom and new insurance deals.t?
The Communication and Energy Workers Union did not find the unqualified
preference clause contained in the Labour Relations Act to be a major advantage
as they draw their membership largely from two main areas - Telecom and New
Zealand Post - and have traditionally been well-organised in those areas.
The loss of the right to arbitration was a disadvantage that was identified by
the Service Workers Federation. This is due, in part, to the nature of their
membership. Workers employed in the tearooms and restaurant sector are usually
dispersed among a substantial number of employers. Thus, arbitration was a
useful mechanism for enabling workers in this sector to establish 'certain basic
rates for themselves.
The P.S.A. were the most negative, with regard to the Labour Relations Act, of
all the unions contacted. It was felt that the Act did not suit their needs, primarily
because it was designed for the private sector. Colin Davies of the PS.A. stated
that:
There is always a problem with having legislation which applies to both
the public and the private sector because there are, we believe, clear
differences in the state which have to be identified and clarified. You've
got an employer who is also government and government can change
the employment relationship.
Overall, with the exception of the PS.A., the perception of the Labour
Relations Act by union officials was essentially a favourable one as they believed
30 K. Moody, An Injury toAll, p. 66.
31 For evidence of a business unionism style of approach by the Engineers Union see: New
Zealand Engineers Union, Strategies for the Future.
32 See interview with John McKeefry, Engineers Union, 19 August 1993.
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it maintained the status quo while at the same time giving explicit recognition to
unions.P However, there is some difficulty here with the nature of the evidence
that was collected in support of this point. This section relied heavily on
interviews conducted in the middle of 1993. Thus all respondents were
commenting on the Labour Relations Act with knowledge of the legislation which
succeeded it. It is possible, therefore, that views of the Labour Relations Act from
a post Employment Contracts Act perspective may be more favourable than they
were at the time of the introduction of the Labour Relations Act.
According to the evidence that was collected, there are a number of key points
that can be made with regard to the union response to the Labour Relations Act.
Firstly, the bargaining aspects of the Labour Relations Act were viewed as
positive by a number of unions although the Service Workers Federation did
dislike the loss of arbitration. Secondly, the recognition that was given to unions
was believed to be beneficial. Finally, under the Labour Relations Act many
unions formalised those procedures and structures that had previously been in
place in an informal capacity. Furthermore, under the Act, financial assistance was
provided in order that this formalisation could be undertaken.
3.2 Industrial Relations under the Labour Relations Act 1987-1989
Most of the union representatives interviewed believed that the Labour
Relations Act caused minor modifications in terms of the way their union
operated or in terms of its objectives. Others believed that there had been no
change at all.
There was no change in the policies of the Nurses Union, with the emphasis
remaining on collective bargaining, improvements in wages and conditions and
concessional issues. The situation was similar in the old Post Office Union with no
change occurring due to the fact that the union perceived itself as having broad
policies. The nature of bargaining did alter for this union as they had been used to
bargaining under the state where commonly the pattern was to follow what
occurred in the private sector. After 1987, the Post Office Union was no longer
constrained by the State Services Commission. Thus because few changes were
identified by the Post Office Union as occurring under the Labour Relations Act
33Interviews with Colin Davies, P.S.A., 16th August 1993;John Ryle, Service Workers Federation,
16th August 1993; Steph Breen, Nurses Organisation, 17th August 1993; Malcolm Blair,
Communication and Energy Workers Union, 18th August 1993; Dave Morgan, Seafarers Union,
18th August 1993, John McKeefry, Engineers Union 19th August 1993, Ashley Russ, Building
Trades Union, 19th August 1993.
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the objectives of the union for the period are similar in nature to those of the
Nurses Union. Hence, the major objective of the union was to secure awards or
agreements for its members. Other objectives included monitoring restructuring
to ensure that it was productive and effective and to ensure that the State Owned
Enterprises covered by the union maintained their social objectives.
The Service Workers Federation's policies did change as a result of the Labour
Relations Act. This occurred mostly through improvements in administration
brought about as a result of the Union Incentives Fund which was an offshoot of
the Labour Relations Act. Prior to the Labour Relations Act, unions were funded
to attend conciliations. With the passing of the Labour Relations Act that funding
was removed and the money used to establish a union incentives fund. Through
this fund, the Service Workers Federation were able to obtain money for
computerising their files and records. In terms of the objectives of this union the
Labour Relations Act appeared to have had a limited effect. The Service Workers
Federation aimed primarily at increasing the wages of its members and at
preventing any further casualisation of the workplace in the hospitality sector.
Between 1987 and 1991 the Labour Relations Act largely determined the
objectives of the Engineers Union. Their focus was on adapting to the Labour
Relations Act in terms of amalgamation, bargaining and education. The emphasis
was increasingly on service to the members and on attracting new members,
particularly from white-collar occupations.
Like the Engineers, the P.S.A. identifies its primary objective between 1987 and
1991 as being one of adapting to the Labour Relations Act such that it would be in
a position to take advantage of opportunities as they presented themselves. The
policies of the P.S.A. did change as a result of the Labour Relations Act, most
noticeably in the area of negotiation. Colin Davies, identifies bargaining under the
Labour Relations Act as a 'mixed bag' for the P.S.A.34
Kerr states that the objectives of the Business Roundtable regarding labour
market reform changed little as a result of the Labour Relations Act. He comments
that while the Business Roundtable were pleased that the need for change had
34 Interviews with Colin Davies, P.S.A., 16th August 1993;John Ryle, Service Workers Federation,
16th August 1993; Steph Breen, Nurses Organisation, 17th August 1993; Malcolm Blair,
Communication and Energy Workers Union, 18th August 1993; Dave Morgan, Seafarers Union,
18th August 1993, John McKeefry, Engineers Union 19th August 1993, Ashley Russ, Building
Trades Union, 19th August 1993.
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been accepted, the nature of that change had been somewhat limited. Thus, the
energies of the Business Roundtable were directed towards making their
fundamental arguments more convincing. The Business Roundtable therefore
engaged in further studies related to labour market reform. Kerr states that 'what
we carried on doing was trying to broaden and deepen the debate about the
subject'.35
Like the Business Roundtable, the objectives of the Employers Federation
changed little as a result of the Labour Relations Act. Knowles perceives the
Labour Relations Act as merely 'tinkering' with the labour market and suggests
that, in fact, the passing of such legislation made people aware of the need for
fundamental reform. Thus, the Labour Relations Act was a mere hiccup in the
urgings of the Employers Federation for a deregulated labour market.36
The period between 1987 and 1989 saw a concerted effort on the part of the
Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation to publicise their positions on
the Labour Relations Act and to urge further labour market deregulation. The
vehicles for such publicisation included: speeches, reports, submissions, their own
publications and press releases.
In September 1987, the Auckland Employers Association produced a pamphlet
entitled Industrial Report which had two major objectives. Firstly, it urged
employers to make use of the provisions included in the Labour Relations Act
which provided new bargaining opportunities. Its other objective- was to urge
employers to attempt to 'keep wage expectations to a realistic level'.37 The same
month, C.R.Bidwell, Managing Director of Ceramco, spoke to shareholders about
the Labour Relations Act arguing that it was 'demonstrably the worst piece of
legislation enacted by the present [Labour] government'.38
In April the following year, in a speech to the Employers Federation Annual
Conference, Michael Fay called for an end to centralised bargaining and national
awards.39 In August of the same year two business conferences were held in
35 Interview with Roger Kerr, Executive Director, New Zealand Business Roundtable, 16th August
1993.
36 Interview with Anne Knowle, Labour Market Manager, New Zealand Employers Federation,
17th August 1993.
37 The Peoples Voice, 4th July 1987.
38 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, September 1987.
39 Ibid., April 1988.
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Rotorua and Christchurch. The theme of these conferences was the same - that
there should be a move towards increased workplace bargaining.40
Internally, the Employers Federation were making changes aimed at the more
effective communication of their message. Mike Clark became the special national
coordinator of the Employers Federation with responsibility for coordinating the
work of the thirty employers advocates around the country. Clark was to be
answerable only to the Director-General of the Employers Federation, Steve
Marshall.41
The Business Roundtable were also busy pushing the message of labour
market reform during this period. On 10th October the Business Roundtable
released a report arguing for changes to the dole and lower wages for recipients of
on-the-job training.42
The following year the Business Roundtable released 'Review of the Operation
of the Labour Relations Act in the 1988/1989 Wage Round'. This report was
generally unfavourable, arguing that the impact of the Labour Relations Act had
been limited and that there was a need for greater flexibility in the labour market.
It also called for 'the right of employers to opt out of awards, the right of workers
to choose their union, the elimination of the blanket clause and voluntary union
membership'.43
In June 1989 the Labour Government established a committee of inquiry into
industrial democracy to which both the Employers Federation and the Business
Roundtable made submissions. The president of the Institute of Directors attacked
the fact that the Government should find it necessary to hold an inquiry on such
an issue. The Business Roundtable continued to put its case for a deregulated
labour market, arguing that industrial democracy would be the natural byproduct
of such a system.H The Employers Federation took issue with the terms of the
inquiry, arguing against the phrase 'industrial democracy' in favour of 'employee
involvement'.45 It conducted its own survey of employers which indicated that
most employers opposed an 'imposed centralised industrial democracy package'.
Rather, they argued for increased emphasis on cooperation. Furthermore,
40The Peoples Voice, 4th July 1987.
41 Ibid., 1st August 1987.
42 Ibid., 24th October 1988.
43H.Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal ofIndustrial Relations, May 1989.
44Ibid., June 1989.
45 The Employer, August 1989.
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according to the survey, many had already initiated such an atmosphere with
involvement occurring at the workplace level.46
In November of 1989 the report of the inquiry into industrial democracy was
released. It recommended that 'awards and agreements registered after April 1990
include provisions for the establishment of site committees in all workplaces of
forty or more workers'. However, the Employers Federation disputed this
recommendation on the grounds that it is not possible to legislate for
cooperation.47
During the period 1987 to 1991 the Business Roundtable and the Employers
Federation worked closely together. The policies advocated by the two groups
were essentially identical from 1985/1986 according to Roger Kerr.48 This
assertion is supported by Anne Knowles who argues that all employers, no matter
the size of their business, were aware of the need for a deregulated labour market.
Indeed, she states that it was a 'policy of all business oriented groups' that the
labour market was the last stage in a programme of economic deregulation.
It is argued by the Employers Federation that the first area of significant
coordination was the 1989 campaign for waterfront reform. This was organised by
the Federated Farmers but incorporated Business Roundtable and Employers
Federation involvement as well. After the success of this campaign, argues
Knowles, it was natural that those groups that had been involved would continue
to work together.49
Roger Kerr suggests a number of ways in which the work of the Business
Roundtable and the Employers Federation became closely linked. He states that
during this period there was a 'continuing dialogue' between the organisations
regarding matters which were of interest to both. The overlap of membership
between the Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation is another reason
for the two groups being able to work closely together. It is most likely that the
membership of the Business Roundtable is also involved with the Employers
Federation. In the course of its research into labour market reform; the Business
Roundtable utilised the expertise of a number of people who were associated with
46 Ibid., October 1989.
47H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, November 1989.
48Interview with Roger Kerr, Executive Director, New Zealand Business Roundtable, 16th August
1993.
49 Interview with Anne Knowles, Labour Market Manager, New Zealand Employers
Federation,17th August 1993.
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the Employers Federation. Finally, during this period there was a continual
exchange of information between the two groups on matters related to industrial
relations reform.50
1987 saw the first effort by employers to move away from award coverage
under Section 152 of the Labour Relations Act. Otaki Abattoirs signed eleven of its
sixteen freezing workers to an in-house agreement.s- Approximately six months
later freight forwarders employed by Freightways were informed that they were
no longer covered by an award. Under the Labour Relations Act awards signed
prior to 1984 were not allowed to run for more than three days after their expiry
date. The threat of legal action by Freightways led to union compliance and the
company was able to make forty-seven workers redundant 'with a payment of
only about $2000 dollars each - to workers employed by the firm for up to 14
years.52 This was later withdrawn in the face of union opposition.53 A later
application under Section 152 of the Labour Relations Act by the Ventec Meat
Company in Tirau was also unsuccessful. It was rejected by the Labour Court on
the grounds that the union had not made an approach to the company in support
of a separate second tier agreement.54
A significant number of disputes during the 1987 to 1989 period involved
conflict over redundancy, often focused around an employers refusal to pay
redundancy at all. In 1988 industrial action occurred in Rotorua at Hallensteins,
and in Dunedin at the Stride Corporation over the absence of redundancy
payrnents.ff Again, in 1989 unions confronted employers over redundancy
notably at the Kauri Dairy Co-operative and at G.N.Hale and Son, Petone.56
Another notable area of conflict during this period was the 'work team'
concept being pioneered at the Nissan Plant in Auckland. However, this
represented a conflict between unions and workers as the Engineers Union
worked closely with management at the plant in an effort to introduce the 'Nissan
Way'. Indeed, during the 'Nissan Way' seminar held on the 14th April 1988 at the
Hamilton Trade Union Centre representatives of the Engineers Union had
50 Interview with Roger Kerr, Executive Director, New Zealand Business Roundtable, 16th August
1993.
51 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal ofIndustrial Relations, January 1988.
52The Peoples Voice, 6th June 1988.
53H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal ofIndustrial Relations, March 1988.
54 Ibid., July 1988.
55 The Peoples Voice, 18th July 1988 and 12th September 1988.
56 tu«, 21st July 1989.
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difficulty defending the agreement. One stated 'I wouldn't have signed the
contract myself' and the other said 'The individual merit system obviously stinks'.
They also admitted to having reservations about the quality control circles and
performance payments included in the agreement.V
The first wage round held under the Labour Relations Act was the 1987/1988
wage round. This gave employers the opportunity to the flex the muscles they
had been given under the new legislation. During the wage rourid employers
used compliance order applications to end 'some very serious illegal strikes'
under the Labour Relations Act.58 Harbridge and McCaw suggest that there were
three main areas of employer success during the wage round:
First they achieved changes to twenty-five per cent of hours of work
clauses in settlements. They achieved this without conceding additional
wage payments in compensation for those changes as had been
necessary in the 1986/1987 wage round. Second, employers were
successful in holding the 'wage path' for the duration of the wage round
rather than allowing settlements to drift upwards as the round
progressed. Third, employers were able to resist the back-dating of
settlements in an increasing number of cases.59
Brook, however, presents a different view. She argues that while there were
some prominent events, the overall theme of both the 1987/1988 wage round and
the 1988/1989 wage round was continued union resistance to employer attempts
to introduce greater flexibility and decentralised wage bargaining. The successes
identified by Brook in the 1987/1988 wage round were the Nissan Way agreement
and a similar one obtained by Mitsubishi, an agreement between the Engineers
Union and employers to transform the Metal Trades Award into narrower
agreements that could form the basis for enterprise bargaining and the
introduction of three separate agreements to replace the Drivers Award.v?
It is therefore likely that from both a union and an employer perspective the
wage rounds under the Labour Relations Act were a disappointment, but for
different reasons. Employers were unable to increase flexibility and
decentralisation as much as they would have liked during the wage round. In
contrast, unions viewed even the supposedly 'limited' success of employers in this
area as a threat to both the wages and the conditions of their members. Thus, it is
57 Ibid., 12th October 1987;29th February 1988;25th April 1988.
58 New Zealand Herald, 9th October 1987cited in ThePeoples Voice 9th November 1987.
59 R. Harbridge and S. McCaw, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, Vo1.14, No.2, 1989, p.
161.
60 P. Brook in S. Walker (ed.), Rogemomics: Reshaping New Zealand's Economy, pp. 190-191.
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unlikely that the 1987/1988 wage round and the 1988/1989 wage round found
favour with anybody.
Between 1987 and 1989 there were increased efforts on the part of union
officials and the union leadership to compromise with employers. This is
evidenced in both public statements and certain actions. As early as August 1987,
CT.U. president, Ken Douglas embarked upon what was to be a series of high
profile engagements at employer conferences. The first of these was a lecture on
the trade union movement at the Industrial Relations Conference at the Auckland
Hyatt Kingsgate Hotel. Other speakers at the conference included Stan Rodger,
Steve Marshall, Margaret Wilson and Rob Campbell.v!
The following year, Ken Douglas was prominent at the employers wage
planning conference. In his address Ken Douglas offered'a stable wage outcome
in a trouble-free award round, based on an agreed wage rise, agreed union rights
provisions and joint approach to the government to set up committees to revamp
bargaining in each sector of industry'. Douglas argued for industry agreements
which had room for workplace bargaining.62 In his speech to the annual
convention of the Manufacturers Federation on 12th October, Douglas called for a
managed wage round, stressing the theme of cooperation. This was received
positively by the Employers Federation retiring president. Furthermore, this
speech prompted Prime Minister, David Lange, to condemn employers for failing
to respond to the efforts of the CT.U.63 In a television address in July 1988, Vice-
President of the C.T.U. Angela Foulkes again stressed the need for cooperation.
She urged workers not to engage in any unnecessary conflict with employers.64
It was not just verbally that the union leadership showed its willingness to
compromise with employers. Their actions supported their statements. In July
1988 a demonstration of workers in Westport were remonstrated with by Douglas
who told them to get off the streets and into the community where, through
cooperation, they could create local employment opportunities.65
In November of 1989 the CT.U. stepped in to resolve a conflict between the
Dairy Industry Employers Union and members of the Dairy Workers Union.
61 The Peoples Voice,3rd August 1987.
62 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, August 1988.
63 Ibid.,October 1988.
64 The Peoples Voice, 4th July 1988.
65 Ibid.
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Douglas and the president of the Dairy Industry Employers Union agreed upon a
settlement and this was subsequently accepted by the Dairy Workers Union. The
agreement covered dairy workers, engineers and electricians. Although the
national secretary of the Engineers Union Rex [ones had participated in the
negotiations there had been no such representation of the Electrical Workers
Union who were not affiliated to the C.T.U.. Thus, the Electrical Workers Union
objected strongly to the agreement, signed behind their backs but covering their
members.w
On a more regional level, there were some serious attempts at compromise
between the leadership of the Meatworkers Union and employers in the South
Island and Wanganui. The Peoples Voice states that:
...between 10 May and 13 May, secret deals were struck between
employers and union officials in the Otago-Southland, Canterbury and
Wanganui branches of the Meatworkers Union. These deals went against
the unanimous vote of 6 May on the load-out ban. The three branch
secretaries signed undertakings in which they agreed to shift to company
bargaining and to ban industrial action against their employers.67
3.3 The Compact
Probably the most obvious attempt at union-employer cooperation under the
Labour Relations Act was the manoeuvring that occurred around the Compact. In
a speech on September 4 1989, Ken Douglas made clear the willingness of the
CT.U. to work with both the government and employers. The following week the
Labour Government responded with an offer to 'negotiate a compact with the
CT.U.'68 Two months later the proposed compact was endorsed by the Socialist
Unity Party of which Ken Douglas was a leading member.s?
The last few months of 1988 saw continuing discussion between the C.T.U.
and Labour's Deputy Minister of Finance, Mike Moore, on the nature of a compact
between the Government and the union movement. Moore promised that such a
compact would provide for union influence in housing, education, health and
welfare.T
66 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, November 1989.
67 ThePeoples Voice 4th July 1988.
68 O. Harvey in J. Deeks and N. Perry (eds.), Controlling Interests, p. 68.
69 ThePeoples Voice, 21st November 1988.
70 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, November 1988.
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By this time opposition to the Compact had mobilised in the form of the Trade
Union Solidarity Committee. In December of 1988 they released a discussion
paper and made a public statement that 'What is lacking is the will to fight not the
ability to fight'.71
In January the following year a Government commissioned Heylen poll was
released. The overwhelming majority of respondents favoured a compact between
the Government, employers and unions. Moore set the expected date for the
Compact as September 1989.72 However, opposition within the' trade union
movement to the Compact continued. The Canterbury C.T.V. council passed a
resolution 'expressing serious reservations about the Compact and requesting
more information'}3 In February 1989 opposition to the Compact continued. The
first meeting of the National Women's Conference of the Council of Trade Unions
expressed some serious reservations about the Compact.P The National Executive
of the CT.V. r however, attempted to maintain the forward momentum of the pro-
Compact movement by producing a pamphlet entitled 'Towards a Compact'
which was sent to trade union officials."
Moves towards a compact continued during the early months of 1989. On
March 15, Mike Moore and Ken Douglas "announced a Government-union
agreement on a negotiated stance for a compact and released letters setting out
their respective aims. "76 By this stage business ambivalence about the Compact
was clearly visible. Steve Marshall of the Employers Federation made a public
statement to the effect that business was not interested in centralised industrial
decision-making.F?
The Government, however, continued in its efforts to organise a compact. In
June, the CT.V. National Executive was told of government plans to set up
working parties to help shape the Compact agreements. In response, the CT.V.
abandoned the working party of union representatives that it had set up in order
to join the Government organised discussion.Zf
71 Ibid., December 1988.
72 Ibid., January 1989.
73 ThePeoples Voice, 6th March 1989.
74 Ibid., 17th April 1989.
75 Ibid., 6th March 1989.
76 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, March 1989.
77 Ibid., March 1989.
78 ThePeoples Voice, 24th July 1989.
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On December 20th 1989 the 'final' Compact document was released in a press
conference held by Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer, Ken Douglas and Mike
Moore.Z? However, elation was short-lived and in the new year the Compact
proposal was discarded. On the 17th September 1990, the new Compact, the
,Agreement for Growth' was released, the conditions of which were:
...a two percent ceiling on wages settlements, unless justified by higher
productivity; government spending cuts to reduce next year's budget
deficit; a hoped-for cut in interest rates with Reserve Bank cooperation
and a promise of domestic summit talks of government, union and
business leaders starting on 1 November i.e. after the October 27 general
election.SO
Condemned by the National Party and the New Labour Party, the Compact
gained a positive response from former finance minister Roger Douglas and from
the Employers Federation.
Harvey identifies the objectives of both the Government and the C.T.V. in
signing the Compact. He suggests that within Cabinet there were three different
streams of opinion. Lange and a group of others believed that the Compact had a
useful contribution to make in terms of assisting the so-called economic recovery
and also felt that it might help them resist the urging of the more fervent
monetarists. Others believed that the Compact could deliver in terms of restoring
some popularity to or faith in the Government. Finally, the group led by Roger
Douglas hoped that the Compact might act as a placebo to the union movement
and enable them to push through labour-market deregulation relatively easily.s!
The eT.V. hoped to introduce mechanisms by which to influence government
policy. Thus, they did not have any concrete demands to be incorporated within
the Compact. Rather the emphasis was on 'developing appropriate structures and
processes' .82
Of the unions who were interviewed for this study and who were affiliated to
the eT.V. all stated that they supported the Compact but for different reasons.
The Engineers Union said that their major reason for supporting the Compact was
that they saw in the Compact the opportunity to get involved with and to
influence policy. They felt that it would be counter-productive to condemn the
Compact on the basis of the Labour Government's policies and that rather it
79 Ibid., 5th February 1990.
80 H. Roth, Chronicle,New Zealand Journal ofIndus trial Relations, September 1990.
81 0 . Harvey in J. Deeks and N. Perry (eds.), Controlling Interests, P: 69.
82 Ibid., p. 70.
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would be more effective to attempt to influence these policies. Furthermore, the
Engineers Union believes that economic change should be negotiated between
unions, employers and government. Similarly, the PS.A. stated that their reason
for supporting the Compact was that they saw a need for planning which would
take into account all the approaches and that ultimately the union was
disappointed that the Compact which was finally signed was only bipartite. The
Nurses Union and the Communication and Energy Workers Union gave different
reasons for supporting the Compact. Steph Breen of the Nurses Union stated that
they supported the Compact on the grounds that it might help support the Labour
Party thus blocking the National Party from power. The unions which make up
the current Communication and Energy Workers Union supported the Compact
in the interests of unity. In terms of benefits it was not felt that it would produce
much of interest to the union as they had always supported productivity
bargaining, by virtue of the nature of their major employers. However, the
Compact was C.T.U. policy and for this reason they felt that it deserved their
support.
The Service Workers Federation also supported the Compact but John Ryle
stressed that this decision was by no means unanimous. The majority of the union
were unconcerned about making deals with the government over wage increases.
This group was drawn heavily from the strongest organised sector of the union,
the public hospital workers who had operated under a regulated system for a
number of years. Opponents of the Compact within the Service Workers
Federation distrusted the Government and felt that the Compact would
compromise union independence.
There was, in fact, significant opposition to the Compact within the trade
union movement for similar reasons to those stated by John Ryall of the Service
Workers Federation. Harvey suggests that opposition to the Compact had two
main focuses. Firstly some opponents of the Compact believed that such an
agreement represented class collaboration. Secondly, as stated by John Ryle, there
was a fairly widespread distrust of the Labour Government based on the policies
that it had implemented. There were also fears that such an alliance would result
in a softening of the trade union movement.S'
83 Interviews with Colin Davies, P.S.A., 16th August 1993;John Ryle, Service Workers Federation,
16th August 1993; Steph Breen, Nurses Organisation, 17th August 1993; Malcolm Blair,
Communication and Energy Workers Union, 18th August 1993, John McKeefry, Engineers Union,
19th August 1993.
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Harvey also suggests that the Communist Party were critical of the C.T.D.
leadership for 'conducting negotiations behind closed doors, clearly implying that
some dirty, sell-out deal was in the making'. The tone of Harvey's writing
suggests scepticism about the prospect of 'dirty deals'. However, at the very least
it is apparent that the lack of communication on the part of the C.T.D. lent fuel to
the fires of opposition. At the most, the charges are indeed ones of collaboration
and corruptionfs
The first obviously apparent problem area was the fact that the C.T.D.
pamphlet 'Towards a Compact' was distributed only among trade union officials
and not the rank-and-file. Thus, as early as March 1988 there was an absence of
communication between the CT.V.leadership and its members.si At a meeting in
Christchurch on May 24 eighty union officials and job delegates requested that
there should be more information available about the Compact plus the
opportunity for open debate about the subject. In Waikato, Bill Andersen and
other officials from the Drivers Union refused the local anti-Compact group the
opportunity to address stop-work meetings. This is evidence of the unwillingness
of the CT.U.leadership to allow open debate.86
In mid-1989, the Northern Distribution Union held stop-work meetings at
which the Compact was discussed. A resolution of limited support for the
Compact, which had been passed at the N.D.V. delegates conference, was put to
these stop work meetings The resolution was carried on a show of hands.
However, there is some doubt as to whether the chairman's decision was, in fact,
accurate as a number of people who were present believe that the majority of
those who voted were actually opposed to the Compactf?
The refusal of the C.T.V. to allow open debate continued with the ruling of the
CT.V. vice-president, Angela Foulkes, that the group, Trade Unionists Against
the Compact, would not be permitted to present a petition to the C.T.D.
conference. It was argued by the CT.U. National Executive that such a petition
would 'fall outside the CT.U. constitution'J"
The decision to discard the December 20th Compact proposal occurred
without consultation with the union movement. The CT.U. National Council
84O. Harvey in J. Deeks and N. Perry, Controlling Interests, p. 72.
85 ThePeoples Voice, 6th March 1989.
86 Ibid., 29th May 1989.
87 ThePeoples Voice, 18th September 1989.
88 Ibid., 18th September 1989.
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meetings on March 14 and March 15 did not endorse these changes which had
been decided upon by the C.T.V. leadership.s? On April 3, the C.T.D. conference
was held at which two resolutions were put to the meeting. The first was
proposed by the CT.V. national executive which called for cooperation between
the C.T.V. and the Government. The second was proposed by the Service Workers
Federation. It favoured a campaign aimed at defeating the economic agenda of the
Business Roundtable. During the conference lunch-break it was arranged that the
CT.V. National Executive would support the Service Workers Federation
proposal in return for the Service Workers Federation support for the National
Executive's compact resolution.f"
In July 1990 five officials from the C.T.V. National Executive began meeting
regularly with Helen Clark, the Labour Government's Minister of Labour. Of the
five officials, Ken Douglas, Angela Foulkes and Ron Burgess were to be
permanently involved in negotiations with the Compact Council. The remaining
two officials were to be chosen by the first three from the C.T.V. National
Executive. Furthermore, the identity of these officials were not disclosed to the
C.T.V. National Council, nor did the delegation report back to the National
Council regarding what matters were discussed.f"
It can therefore be seen that the evidence points to there having been a
measure of secrecy in the approach of the CT.V. leadership to the Compact.
Similarly, it seems likely that truly open debate was discouraged in favour of
statements that merely supported the Compact. There can be no doubt that the
CT.V. leadership was negligent in its failure to communicate effectively with its
members. The importance placed by the CT.V. on the Compact is indicative of
bureaucratic conservatism. They declined to fight the right wing policies of the
Labour Government preferring instead an offer of minimal consultation in the
policy-making process. In fact Sandlant states that "the decision has been taken to
continue to work to change the direction of the present Labour Government rather
than to leave it and attempt to create an independent political force".92 In its move
to promote the Compact the CT.V. stressed only the positive aspects of the
Australian Accord:
89 Ibid., 19th March 1990.
90 Ibid., 16th April 1990.
91 Ibid., 23rd July 1990.
92R.Sandlant, "The Political Economy of Wage Restraint: The Australian Accord and Trade Union
Strategy in New Zealand", M.A. Thesis, University of Auckland, p.139
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...greater consultation and input from the unions over economic policy,
industry policy and planned investment objectives, active labour market
policy and employment policy, and the improved position of the
A.C.T.u.93
The reality of the Accord was very different. There was no significant
reduction in the degree of inequality in rates of pay, rather the Accord served to
maintain the status quo. Furthermore, while supporters of both the Accord and
the Compact argued that these agreements would offer greater con~ol to unions
over the economy, they neglected to state that those groups that were pivotal in
economic decision-making - the Reserve Bank and Treasury - were beyond the
reach of the union movement.v- The CT.V. made no effort to promote discussion
of these issues preferring instead to relentlessly pursue its own agenda.
Conclusion
The period between 1987 and 1989 was a time of steadily increasing turmoil in
the industrial relations arena. There are a number of key points that have been
made with regard to industrial relations at this time. Firstly, it was clear that the
Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation were dissatisfied with the
Labour Relations Act. Furthermore, they both undertook very public campaigns
aimed at promoting their own industrial relations agendas. In their pursuit of
these objectives the two groups worked closely together. This created a climate in
which the need for industrial relations reform came to be perceived as a legitimate
and necessary area of concern for both the Government and employer groups.
Secondly, the strong position of employers in the late 1980s is reflected in the
increasing attempts by many employers to gain significant clawbacks, particularly
in the field of redundancy agreements. The already weakened union movement
was relatively unsuccessful in its attempts to resist this upsurge in militancy.
Finally, this lack of success for the union movement is, in many cases, due to the
conciliatory approach to industrial relations adopted by the union leadership. The
CT.V. took action aimed at resolving various disputes at little cost to employers
and Ken Douglas publicly announced the CT.Vo's agenda of compromise. This
compromise is epitomised by the negotiations over the Compact. This mood of
employer militancy and union capitulation continued during 1990 with the unions
struggling to merely maintain the status quo.
93 Ibid., p. 144.
94 T.Bramble & J.Minns, "The Australian Accord: Why It's a Fraud" in New Zealand Monthly Review,
Jan/Feb 1989, pp. 6-11.
Chapter Four
Opening Salvoes: Employer Militancy, the
Employment Contracts Bill and the Initial
Trade Union Response
The Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation continued to advocate
fundamental changes to the industrial relations system during 1990. This took the
form of attacks both on unions and on the Fourth Labour Government's legislative
initiatives in the area of industrial relations, such as Pay Equity and the Labour
Relations Act Amendment Bill (No.I.). These attacks were strengthened by a
continued publicity campaign on the part of the Business Roundtable and the
Employers Federation. Again, a variety of vehicles were used including the
media, speeches, submissions and reports. The Business Roundtable and the
Employers Federation extended their already extensive list of publications on
labour market isssues. Such actions indicate the presence of a conscious, concerted
campaign against the Labour Relations Act and in favour of legislation
deregulating the labour market.
There were many significant similarities between the industrial relations
policies of the National Government, which came to power in late 1990, and the
labour market agendas of the Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation.
This was epitomised by the introduction of the Employment Contracts Bill on 19
December 1990. The Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation then
took various measures aimed at supporting the legislation. As would be expected
from the upsurge in employer militancy, the position of the union movement
during 1990 was an extremely weak one. The union movement was largely unable
to protect the wages and conditions of its members. The conclusion of the growth
agreement made this problem even more acute. The final section details this union
weakness and considers the response of various unions to the Employment
Contracts Bill.
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4.1. Employer Militancy
Political Militancy ofEmployers
1990 saw a continuation of the attacks on the union movement by employers
that were so evident in the 1987 to 1989 period. In January 1990 the Employer's
Federation criticised the government part-funding of a new Maori services officer
for the CT.U.. The C.T.U. response was that such an officer would have a broader
scope of responsibilities than an ordinary trade union official as he or she would
be charged with encouraging and maintaining Maori participation in the union
movement.1
Employers also condemned the establishment by the distribution workers
unions of a Second Sweating Commission. This was to travel around the country
hearing submissions on the wages and conditions of retail workers. Phillida
Bunkle of Victoria University chaired the Commission which had historical
relevance as it was established exactly one hundred years after the original
Sweating Commission. However, employer representatives expressed a lack of
interest in the Commission describing it as a 'publicity stunt' and an 'emotive
attempt to constrict Sunday trading Iegislation?
When the report of the Second Sweating Commission was released on 25
February 1990 it was also dismissed by the Employers Federation. The
Commission found that sweated labour still existed in New Zealand and it argued
for a government sponsored committee of inquiry. The Employers Federation
argued that only a minority of employers and workers were responsible for such
conditions and it called upon the Government to ignore the result.3
The Tripartite Wage Conference held in August 1990 was another occasion for
employers to attack unions. The CT.V. approach to the conference was to call for
'a wide-ranging policy review after the election' whilst the Government opposed
higher wage claims based upon rising petrol prices as a result of the Gulf War. In
contrast, the Employers Federation dismissed the need for a conference at all,
arguing that direct talks would be more beneficial than 'formalised procedure
enshrined in legislation'. The National Party concurred, stating that a National
government would 'review the future of formal tripartite structures together with
1 H. Roth, Chronicle, Neto Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, January 1990.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., February 1990.
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that of other institutions such as the Labour Court'< In its own publication, The
Employer, the Employers Federation described the Tripartite Wage Conference as
'ritualistic'. It argued that the economic situation determined wages and
conditions rather than 'wishful thinking' by government, employers or unions.
Furthermore, the Employers Federation used the Conference to advance its own
concerns over the minimum wage. These concerns were threefold:
1. that increasing the minimum wage leads to increases in award rates.
2. that increased wage costs lead to job losses "as employers (a) substitute
capital equipment for labour or (b) reduce output in response to
rising costs".
3. that increasing the minimum wage leads to reduced opportunities for
the young and unskilledP
InThe Employer, the Federation continued to advocate labour market reform
during 1990. It argued that an obstacle to the growth of jobs in New Zealand was
the inflexibility of the labour market. Rather, it should be possible for labour costs
to be adjusted by companies according to their needs. The Employer provides a
number of ways in which job growth could occur if the labour market was
deregulated:
A reduction in non-wage labour costs and relaxation of employment
protection legislation is also necessary to improve the chances of job
creation for employers.
Other factors such as hours and conditions of work need to be changed.
They restrict both employers and workers and discourage unemployed
people from job opportunities.f
Another factor which is mentioned twice in the February edition of The
Employer as having a part to play in job creation is the elimination of redundancy
payments:
Redundancy payments because of the risks and costs restrict employers
from employing.?
Redundancy costs discourage employers from employing. With the
possibility of future lessening of demand the thought of redundancy
makes many employers reluctant to employ when they need to.8
4 Ibid., August 1990.
5The Employer, September 1990, p.2. See also S. Heal, "Redesigning the Wellfare State? The National
Government's Welfare Benefit Cuts: A Critical Assessment", B.A.(Hons) dissertation, University of
Otago,1992.
6 The Employer, February 1990, p. 2.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., p. 5.
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In its own literature, the Employers Federation also continued its attack on
unions. In The Benefits of Bargaining Reform it argued that unions could not accept
that there was a necessity for differing wages and conditions in different
organisations for employees doing the same job. Yet, the Employers Federation
argued, this was the very nature of free market competition and as such would be
something with which unions themselves would have to deal.? Furthermore, the
Employers Federation recognised that employers were becoming more aggressive
in their demands. Mike Clark, Labour Market Manager for the Employers
Federation in 1990 stated that:
Employers have argued that the industrial awards under which they
must operate are no longer appropriate and do not allow them the
flexibility they need to compete and become efficient. Gone are the days
when employers simply responded to union claims and tried to escape
from the negotiating table as quickly as possible having given away as
little as possible. Now employers are making their own claims and
demanding concessions from unions.U'
The Employers Federation also attacked the possibility that the new National
Government in late 1990 should continue the growth agreement signed by the
previous Labour Government and the C.T.D.. The Employers Federation argued
that its members could not afford two percent wage increases. This was directly
opposed to the approach of the Manufacturers Federation which favoured a
continuation of the growth agreement.'!
In addition, the Employers Federation also argued that the growth agreement
was inevitably an agreement in which employers would fail to play a part. This is
confirmed in the opinion of the Employers Federation by the fact that it was put
together very quickly (according to the Employers Federation) and the very
political nature of its timing (just before a general election). The Employers
Federation argued that the agreement was only a short-term fix which failed to
address the need for fundamental industrial relations reform. Furthermore, the
Employers Federation warned that employers should be wary of reintroducing
second-tier bargaining in the guise of productivity bargaining and that employers
should continue to make decisions based upon their needs rather than the
"political needs of two off-site parties with no direct involvement")2
9 New Zealand Employers Federation, The Benefits ofBargaining Reform, p. 7.
10 Address by Mike Clark, Labour Market Manager, New Zealand Employers Federation to the
Planning Council, 31 May 1990.
11 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, November 1990.
12 New Zealand Employers Federation (Inc.), AnnualReport andPolicy 1990., pp. 4-5.
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On March 15 1990, the C.T.V. organised protests against expected tariff cuts.
The implication of this focus of C.T.V. strategy was that foreign competition and
import controls were the cause of unemployment rather than capitalism or even
the monetarist policies of the Labour Government. These protests were supported
by the Manufacturers Federation but, once again, the Employers Federation took
an anti-union stance, arguing against employers encouraging their workers to
attend. Steve Marshall, Director-General of the Employers Federation, stated that
this would be 'against the interests of all involved'J>
The Employers Federation did not confine its attacks solely to unions during
1990. It also attacked certain legislative initiatives by the Labour Government. On
March 20, the Government released a report detailing its future economic
direction. This incorporated plans for a changed Labour Relations Act the nature
of which included allowing:
...employers with more than fifty workers to ballot their staff in support
of a separate workplace agreement, changes in the definition of
redundancy to prevent workers claiming compensation when businesses
were sold without affecting terms and conditions of employment and
access to arbitration where either employers or workers had failed to
bargain in good faith.
These proposals were attacked by both the Employers Federation and the
Business Roundtable. They argued that the inclusion of a size limitation on those
employers who would be given the option to ballot staff would exclude most
businesses. They also condemned the proposal to reintroduce compulsory
bargaining.t" In The Employer, the Employers Federation describes the Labour
Relations Act Amendment Bill as merely 'tinkering'. Instead, the Employers
Federation favoured very limited government involvement and voluntary union
membership.15
In response to the employer attacks on the proposed changes, Helen Clark
stated that almost forty percent of New Zealand workers were employed in
companies with fifty or more employees. Rick Barker of the Service Workers
Federation claimed that the failure to settle the tearoom and restaurant workers
award was due to the employers refusal to negotiate in favour of dictating
terms. 16 In such instances access to arbitration may be crucial in settling a dispute.
13 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, March 1990.
14 Ibid., March 1990.
15 TheEmployer, July 1990,p. 7.
16 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, March 1990.
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Employers also attacked the introduction of Pay Equity legislation by the Labour
Government. On 17 July the third reading of the Employment Equity Bill was
passed. This was described by Steve Marshall as 'gruesome'. The National Party
responded to the legislation by promising to repeal it if they were successful in the
election.t? After the legislation came into force on October 1 there were a number
of claims for the review of wages. These included the Nurses Union which wanted
parity with the police and with environmental health officers. The Distribution
Workers Federation also lodged a number of claims on the basis of the legislation.
The National Party opposition reiterated the pledge to repeal the legislation if it
became the government.J"
During 1990 both the Employers Federation and the Business Roundtable
maintained their links with the Department of Labour and with Treasury. Both
organisations believe that they have a good working relationship with these
government departments. Anne Knowles states that it is in both the Employers
Federation's and the departments' interests to maintain this relationship.l? Roger
Kerr states that during the course of the labour relations debate the Business
Roundtable talked extensively to the Department of Labour and to Treasury. He
states that discussions also occurred with other departments that had an interest
in labour relations. This included departments such as the Ministry of
Commerce.20
The Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation continued to advocate
labour market reform during this period. In a speech to business economists in
Dunedin in May 1990, Steve Marshall argued in favour of enterprise agreements
rather than national awards. A Business Roundtable conference on 29 May in
Wellington was addressed by speakers who argued that 'employers should be free
to make membership of their company union a condition of employment'<t In the
same month, the Employers Federation wrote to all Members of Parliament
regarding the workers' protection clauses in the Shop Trading Hours Act Repeal
Bill. It wanted those clauses removed.P
17 Ibid., July 1990.
18 Ibid., October 1990.
19 Interview with Anne Knowles, 17th August 1993.
20 Interview with Roger Kerr, 16th August 1993.
21 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, May 1990.
22 Ibid., May 1990.
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Industrial Militancy ofEmployers
A significant number of industrial disputes which occurred during 1990 were
the result of issues relating to redundancy. This continued the prevalent theme of
the years 1987-1989, with a high proportion of industrial action being directly
attributable to redundancy agreements. Other notable disputes included the
police, prison officers and fire-fighters disputes over superannuation and the
Auckland bus drivers dispute over electronic ticketing machines.
March 15 1990 saw a widespread national strike after the owners of the
Auckland Star notified staff that one hundred and twenty-nine of them were to
receive redundancy notices that day. Staff responded by walking out and they
were supported by other employees of the 1NL chain in Wellington, Christchurch,
Southland, Manawatu and New Plymouth. On 21 March staff of the Auckland
Star accepted a redundancy offer which was an improvement on that originally
offered by INL.23
Earlier in the year Alliance meatworkers and Auckland timber workers were
involved in disputes with their employers over redundancies.t'' In the South
Island the strike by the meatworkers had closed six freezing works. In South
Auckland workers at the VANZ car assembly plant went on strike for four weeks
over the eight plus two redundancy package which had been offered by the
company (eight weeks pay for the first years work and two weeks pay for every
subsequent year). The company also attempted to retain the right of compulsory
transfers. On 21 May the company suspended sixty storeworkers and staff were
also suspended by companies associated with Ford and Mazda. Ford threatened
to close the plant entirely arguing that it could import cars from Australia and
Japan. On 31 May informal talks resolved the dispute with the union accepting the
eight plus two offer but persuading the company to remove the mandatory
transfer clause. A few weeks later one of the strike leaders was sacked on the
grounds that he had failed to declare on his job application that he held a B.A.
from Auckland University.P
General Motors in Wellington was also the target of industrial action due to
redundancies. The company offered and eight plus two agreement but the union
23 The Peoples Voice, 19th March 1990, p.32 and H.Roth, Chronicle,New Zealand Journal of Industrial
Relations, March 1990.
24 The Peoples Voice, 16th April 1990, p. 1.
25 The Peoples Voice, 11 June 1990, p.2 and 23 July 1990, pAO and H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand
Journal of Industrial Relations, May 1990 and July 1990.
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favoured and eight plus four agreement. Redundancy disputes also occurred at
the Hamilton and Wellington branches of Arthur Barnetts. Other disputes over
redundancies occurred in Auckland against the Farrow Company and at the
Auckland Hydra Bacon company.w
On 7 March fire-fighters went on strike over their superannuation fund which
was 'the first ever national fire-fighters strike'. Similarly on 12 March prison
officers gave notice of their intention to work to rule, also over superannuation.
Police officers voted to support the prison officers and marched on Parliament on
the 30 March. Roth states that the march was 'believed to be without precedent in
the Commonwealth'<?
The other major area of conflict during 1990 involved the Auckland bus
drivers. The management of the Auckland City Council introduced into the bus
drivers award a demand for the use of electronic ticketing machines by the drivers
without any extra, compensatory, pay. The bus drivers wished to share in the
gains from increased productivity as a result of the machines. It also argued that
negotiations governing the introduction of the electronic ticketing machines
should occur outside the award talks. When the Auckland Regional Council
refused these demands the bus drivers went on strike (April 1st). Eight days later
the drivers voted to continue the strike but the union brought in Brian Gray, the
chief industrial mediator in Wellington to assist in settling the dispute. On April
11 the drivers decided to end the strike and agreed to the use of an industrial
mediator to determine the fate of the electronic ticketing machines.P'
4.2. The Employment Contracts Bill
During the course of 1990 it became apparent that the National Party's stance
on industrial relations was closely related to the arguments advanced by the New
Zealand Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation regarding labour
market reform.I? It is significant that the National Party chose to announce its
labour relations policy at an Employers Federation conference in Auckland on the
8th May. Jim Bolger pledged the reintroduction of voluntary unionism and to
make bargaining more flexible by breaking "the stranglehold that entrenched
26 The Peoples Voice, 9 July 1990, p. 1 and P: 36;The Peoples Voice 6 August 1990, p. 22; The Peoples
Voice 29 October 1990, p. 31 and H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations,
June 1990 and July 1990.
27 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, March 1990.
28 Ibid., April 1990.
29 These arguments are discussed in Chapter Three.
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union executives currently have on the negotiating process in too many sectors of
industry".30
As mentioned above, the National Party responded to the passing of Pay
Equity legislation by promising to repeal it if it became government. This would
have been looked upon very favourably by the Employers Federation who also
publicly denounced the legislation. Similarly, the fact that the National Party
promised a review of the formal tripartite structure if it became" government
represents a significant concurrence with the views of the Employers Federation.
When the C.T.V. approached the new National Government in late 1990
regarding the prospect of a continued growth agreement this was dismissed by
Minister of Labour, Bill Birch, on the grounds that it represented the centralised
wage fixing that the new government planned to abolish. This too is in accordance
with Employers Federation criticisms of the growth agreement. It should be noted
however that on 31 October, Bolger expressed an interest in maintaining the
growth agreement until such time as the Government's new industrial relations
legislation was introduced.U
Roger Kerr argues that the impact of the Business Roundtable on the National
Government's industrial relations policies was indirect. He states that the Business
Roundtable communicated with both the Labour Government and the National
Party opposition from 1987 onwards on matters pertaining to labour market
reform such as: shop trading hours, pay equity and independent contract Iaws.t?
The impact of the Employers Federation upon the National Government's
industrial relations policy was of a very similar nature to that of the Business
Roundtable. Knowles argues that the government in New Zealand listens to the
various interested parties in the country when determining a particular piece of
legislation. So Anne Knowles argues that the Employment Contracts Bill was part
of an evolutionary procedure in terms of labour market reform and during the
course of that evolution the Employers Federation was lobbying whichever
government was in power.33
On 6 December the new National Government introduced the Labour
Relations Act Amendment Bill (No.2). This was essentially a prelude to the
30 H. Roth, NewZealand Journal ofIndustrial Relations, May 1990.
31 Ibid., October 1990.
32 Interview with Roger Kerr, 16th August 1993.
33 Interview with Anne Knowles, 17th August 1993.
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Employment Contracts Bill. The importance of the legislation introduced on 6
December is evidenced by the fact that it was the first bill brought before
parliament by the new National Government. The Bill repealed Pay Equity and
also repealed the provision for 'backstop arbitration' of awards unsettled after two
years.34
The impact of the legislation (passed on 21 December 1991) was severely
limited by the introduction of the Employment Contracts Bill two days earlier.
The Employment Contracts Bill legislated for a general deregulation of the labour
market. The negative aspects of the Employment Contracts Bill were many:35
1. The Employment Contracts Bill provided for the conclusion of individual
contracts in the place of collective agreements. Individual contracts effectively
divide workplaces, thereby weakening the bargaining position of employees. In
addition, individuals have the right to abstain from concluding a collective
contract with an employer even when the majority of the employees have agreed
upon that contract.
2. Under the Employment Contracts Bill workers may nominate the person,
group or organisation of their choice (with the exception of a person who has been
committed, within the last ten years, of a crime carrying a prison sentence of five
years or more) as their bargaining agent. However, the stipulations regarding
bargaining are strangely uneven. Walsh states that:
It remains a curious anomaly in the Act that, although it goes to
remarkable lengths to ensure that bargaining agents are properly
authorised and accountable to their constituents, there is no guarantee
that the other party will in fact bargain with the duly authorised agent. 36
3. The provisions of the Employment Contracts Bill pertaining to bargaining
agents is made possible by the reintroduction of voluntary membership.
Furthermore, the legislation outlaws closed shops even where these have been
agreed upon by a majority of workers.
34 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, December 1990. .
35 For more detailed discussions of the following points see P. Walsh, "The Employment Contracts
Act" in J. Boston & P. Dalziel (eds.) The Decent Society?, and R. Harbridge (ed.), Employment
Contracts: New Zealand Experiences.
36P. Walsh in The Decent Society?, p. 65.
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4. The Employment Contracts Bill places limits on strike activity. Under this
legislation strikes would be permitted only over proposed wages and conditions
once an old contract had expired or over health and safety issues.
The sole positive aspect for workers of the Employment Contracts Bill is that it
does not contain attacks on the "range of statutory rights enjoyed by New Zealand
workers, which are substantially inferior to those available to workers in most
other a.E.C.D. countries".37 It is unsurprising that the bill was perceived to place
the position of unions under threat. The return to voluntary unionism heralded by
the bill was expected to cause a decline in union membership. This, in turn, would
create divisions within the labour force between unionised and non-unionised
companies.
In an effort by unions to combat declining membership two strategies could be
expected. Firstly, there would be increasing amalgamations within the union
movement. Secondly, attempts may be made to poach the members of other
unions. Unions' structure were also under direct attack from the Employment
Contracts Bill. The bill made no provision for compulsory internal democracy, as
had been the case under the Labour Relations Act. The status of unions was also
to be altered. Technically incorporated societies, unions were to lose their tax-
exempt status. Thus the implications for unions of the proposed legislation were
quite far-reaching. 38
Most employers saw the bill as heralding new opportunities. The general
manager of the Auckland Employers Federation described it as "a very liberating
piece of legislation".39 It is not surprising that the Bill was welcomed warmly by
employers. In the Employers Federation policy statement released on 15
November five key demands were articulated:
- the removal of automatic bargaining and representation rights.
- the removal of legal restrictions preventing employers and their
employees "developing contractual relationships best suited to their
own mutual and specific needs".
- voluntary union membership.
-"elimination of the subsequent party blanket coverage concept" whereby
an award covers all employees in that industry or sector.
37Ibid., p. 66.
38 Ibid., pp. 72-73.
39 H. Roth, New Zealand Journal of Industrial RelationsDecember 1990.
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-"freedom for bargaining parties to establish their own negotiating
structures, forms, rules and procedures" with the least possible legal
restrictions.40
The Employment Contracts Bill met these demands. Knowles supports the view
that the Employers Federation was pleased by the Employment Contracts Bill. She
states that it was seen as a 'positive step' by virtue of the fact that labour market
reform was necessary to complete the process of economic deregulation that had
already begun.s!
Similarly, the Business Roundtable expressed a favourable response to the
Employment Contracts Bill. Kerr publicly criticised the C.T.V. assertion that such
a law would force wages down. Rather, Kerr argued, any drop in wages would
indicate that they had been maintained at an unrealistically high level by artificial
means. There were a couple of aspects of the Bill in its original form that
disappointed the Business Roundtable. Kerr disliked the fact that personal
grievance procedures were required to be written into contracts and he opposed
the ruling that contracts could not be altered until such time as they expired.v-
Kerr himself states that the response of the Business Roundtable to the
Employment Contracts Bill was one of pleasure. It was seen as an attempt to
fundamentally alter the nature of industrial relations:
What we saw in the Employment Contracts Act was a much more
coherent framework, thinking about the issue from first principles and
seeing employment contracts as basically the same as most other kinds of
contracts. Therefore, we were really pleased that much of what we had
argued for was taken on board there. 43
A number of practical steps were taken by both the Business Roundtable and
the Employers Federation to support the proposed legislation. The Business
Roundtable had previously investigated public opinion on various industrial
relations issues and it then utilised those findings. For example, the Business
Roundtable research found that there was a high degree of public support for
voluntary unionism and so efforts were made to present that sort of information
to the government and the public. Speeches were made in favour of labour market
reform as a whole. Studies that had been done previously were used to support
40 The Peoples Voice, 11 February 1991, P: 6.
41 Interview with Anne Knowles, 17 August 1993.
42 The Peoples Voice, 11 February 1991, P: 6.
43 Interview with Roger Kerr, 16 August 1993.
Opening Salvoes Page -- 94--
the Business Roundtable argument. The Business Roundtable also made
submissions on the Employment Contracts Bill.44
Like the Business Roundtable, the Employers Federation also made
submissions to the Select Committee. The draft submissions of the Employers
Federation were sent to all of its members so that there could be some form of
consultative process. The Employers Federation also held briefing sessions around
the country to inform people of the significance of the Employment Contracts
Bill.45
The efforts of the Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation to
support the proposed legislation were coordinated in much the same way as the
campaign to promote labour market reform. There was an exchange of
information and many of the responses to certain aspects of the legislation were
very similar. Kerr states that the Employers Federation 'really came to a point
which was virtually identical to ours and so coordination has been very easy'.46
On 19 December 1990 the Employment Contracts Bill was referred to the
Labour Committee for consideration. This committee was made of five permanent
members. It was chaired by Max Bradford, a new Member of Parliament and a
former advocate for the Employers Federation. In 1983 at a seminar organised by
the Industrial Relations Centre of Victoria University of Wellington, Max
Bradford, then an employer representative, articulated the key aspects of the
position of the employer associations during the 1987 to 1991 period. Bradford
advocated:
...removing protections from unions, such as blanket coverage, state
policing of awards, statutory compulsory unionism, state funding of two
million dollars a year for mediation and arbitration services and the
existence of union bargaining rights in perpetuity once a union was
registered as a bargaining representative.f"
Thus Bradford was an interesting choice to chair the Select Committee as he could
not be presumed to approach the issues from a non-partisan viewpoint. On the
Committee with Max Bradford were Helen Clark, Bruce Cliffe, Ian Revell and
Larry Sutherland. The first Committee meeting was held on 20 December when it
was agreed that submissions would be received until the 11 February 1991. All the
44 Ibid.
45 Interview with Anne Knowles, 17 August 1993.
46 Interview with Roger Kerr, 16 August 1993.
47 E. Dannin in New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law, Volume 13,
No.l,1992, pp. 4-5.
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main daily newspapers carried notices of the Bill's referral to the Labour
Committee and an invitation to make submissions was also published.48
4.3 The Initial Trade Union Response
Union Responses to Employer Militancy
A significant proportion of union activity during 1990 occurred as a direct
result of the increase in employer militancy described earlier in this chapter. There
was an attempt by various unions to increase their membership coverage. In
January of 1990 the Performance and Entertainment Workers Union began a
campaign to unionise health and fitness workers.e? This campaign gained
momentum in July 1990 after complaints of poor wages and conditions and other
grievances, among them sexual harassment. The Post Office Union expressed a
willingness to cover newspaper and pamphlet deliverers for a minimal payment
of one dollar a month (for at least a six month period). The Food and Textile
Workers Union were eager to cover milk deliverers and held discussions with the
CT.U. to this end. The CT.U. expressed its concerns in 1990 over unions poaching
each other's members. Ken Douglas advised unions to sign, agreements
stipulating that they would not attempt to steal members. The P.S.A., however
were already involved in a number of demarcation disputes which probably gave
the Minister of Labour some ammunition for the fight against union demarcation.
Douglas also warned of possible competition for representation rights from
outside the union movement.e?
During 1990 the union movement was involved in various actions aimed at
protecting its members. The Second Sweating Commission was established by the
distribution workers unions. Although the findings of the commission were
shocking for those who had been involved with it, its impact was minimised by
the refusal of the government to take any action based on the findings contained
within the report.U Furthermore, the commission was unable to delay the
introduction of Sunday trading although it is possible that the inclusion of certain
worker protection clauses were the result of lobbying by the Second Sweating
Commission.52
48 Report of the Labour Committee on the Employment Contracts Bill, New Zealand House of
Representatives, 1991.
49R Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, January 1990,
50 Ibid" July 1990.
51 Ibid. February 1990,
52 Ibid" March 1990,
Opening Salvoes Page --96-
As a result of agitation by the Northern Hotel Workers Union the Human
Rights Commission investigated the pay and conditions of migrant workers. The
Commission called for a government inquiry into the matter and the Prime
Minister responded by announcing that the matter was urgent enough to warrant
a review of the Government's immigration policy.
Another significant action undertaken by the union movement during 1990
was the first nationwide strike by prison officers. This was successful in forcing
the Government to reconsider its superannuation proposal.P Various other strikes
and forms of industrial action occurred during 1990. As has already been stated a
high proportion of these were over redundancy agreements or proposals. The
union movement, especially the C.T.V., were generally fighting a rearguard
action. This contention is supported by the fact that the CT.U. was in a relatively
weak position during 1990.
The weak position of the union movement was highlighted in June 1990 when
the figures for average gross income were released. According to Roth the
"average gross income of full-time wage and salary earners rose by 6.2 percent in
the year to March but, taking account of income tax and inflation, this amounted
to a drop of 1.5 percent in purchasing power".54 This indicates an inability on the
part of the union movement to protect the wages and disposable incomes of its
members.
The union movement was also ineffective in protecting many of the conditions
of its members. On July 19 1990 delegates at the Auckland C.T.V. regional
conference unanimously voted to oppose the Nissan Way and similar work team
proposals. It is, therefore, surprising that on September 14 Auckland City
Councillors were told of the benefits of the Nissan Way at a meeting with unions.
The talk was the responsibility of officials of the council's combined unions and
they were supported in this by Peter Harris, the C.T.U.'s technical services
director.55
In October, the Metal Trades Award was settled - one of the lowest ever
settlements of the award. This was decided without the input of the members of
the Engineers Union. Rather, it was the result of negotiations between a group
53 Ibid., April 1990.
54 Ibid., June 1990.
55 ThePeoples Voice., 23 July 1990, p. 1 and 17th September 1990, p. 11.
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from the Engineers Union led by Rex [ones and the employers advocate Paul
Weaver. In a press conference [ones presented his new agenda which included
four key points:
The union's starting claim in the key metal trades award would be
limited to the accord's two percent core movement plus two percent for
increased productivity in the future.
Flexibility in hours, shifts and conditions is to be part of the productivity
deal.
Multi-skilling is to be introduced in a big way and the Government will
be asked to foot the bill for much of the multi-skill training.
Enterprise agreements are to be included in an increasing number of
industry awards.56
The signing of the growth agreement between the C.T.U. and the Labour
Government had weakened the union movement still further as there was
considerable conflict over whether the agreement in its ultimate form should have
been concluded. Many unions (among them the Northern Labourers Union, the
Timber Workers Union, the Printing Trades Union and the Police Association)
believed a two percent core increase was unrealistically low. At the C.T.U. special
conference on 21 September 1990 the agreement was endorsed by a voice vote.
According to Roth, those opposing the agreement included the distribution,
clerical workers and post office unions and those supporting the agreement
included the engineers, service workers and meat workers unions and the PS.A.57
Despite the conclusion of the accord, a month later the union movement was still
waiting for a significant drop in interest rates - supposedly the trade-off for a cut
in real wages.58
During 1990 the C.T.U. was continually expressing its willingness to work
with either a National or a Labour Government. In August 1990, Douglas publicly
expressed his willingness to work with a National government.59 The following
month, Ken Douglas and Pat Kelly, chairman of the Labour Party's union affiliates
council announced their faith in Mike Moore, the new Prime Minister, although
Douglas did state that a change of policy direction would be necessary.s?
The CT.U. made certain internal structural changes during 1990 which would
impact upon the ability of the union movement to respond effectively to its
56 Ibid., 15 October 1990, p. 3.
57 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, September 1990.
58 ThePeoples Voice, 15 October 1990,p. 8.
59 Ibid., 6 August 1990, p. 2.
60 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, September 1990.
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members needs. A special conference was held by the CT.U. on the 14th and 15th
of November at which the CT.U. organisation was changed. The national council
was abolished and replaced with a national executive. The six regional
coordination positions were also abolished. These two changes represent a
significant centralisation of power within the C.T.U.. The large unions were given
more influence within the C.T.U. as all unions with twenty thousand or more
members were automatically entitled to a representative on the National
Executive. The other unions would then have to combine to reach that twenty
thousand figure in order to have representation on the National Executive.s!
Union Responses to the Employment Contracts Bill
The trade unions interviewed all stated that their immediate response to the
Employment Contracts Bill was to condemn it. Other than this, the various
responses did tend to differ quite widely according to the considerations of each
particular union at the time.
The leadership of both the Nurses Union and the Engineers Union believed
that they were better placed that many unions to deal with the immediate impact
of the Employment Contracts Bill. Steph Breen states that the Nurses Union
responded quite well as they were flexible and were able to adapt quickly to the
changes embodied in the new legislation. The Engineers Union, however, was
actually prepared for legislation of the nature of the Employment Contracts Act.
McKeefry states that two or three months before the election the Engineers Union
was prepared for a National government. Although surprised by the speed with
which the Employment Contracts Act was introduced, the Engineers Union acted
quickly to prepare a response. This was done by the union's lawyer, one of its
national advocates and national and district officers in conjunction with the
National Secretariat. McKeefry indicates that the Engineers Union had a general
idea of what the nature of the National Government's labour market changes
would be. He points to compulsory unionism, the abolition of national awards
and the deregulation of the labour market.
The response of both the Building Trades Union and the Seafarers Union
involved strike action. The Building Trades Union took a decision to hold a three
day strike decision. At the time that the Employment Contracts Bill was
introduced the Seafarers Union was on strike over the renewal of awards. Dave
61 The Peoples Voice, 26 November 1990, p. 18.
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Morgan states that the Seafarers Union rolled that particular strike into the
campaign against the Employment Contracts Bill.
The Communication and Energy Workers Union responded to the
introduction of the Employment Contracts Billby trying to show what was wrong
with the Bill and, hence, the reasons why it should be changed. Malcolm Blair
states that the Communication and Energy Workers Union did not vigorously
oppose voluntary unionism but that they did oppose the new bargaining
framework and the changes to the various institutions which governed
bargaining. The Communication and Energy Workers Union were also successful
in persuading Telecom and New Zealand Post that the difficulties which the
union identified with the bargaining aspects of the Employment Contracts Bill
would also be to their detriment. It is interesting to note that both Telecom and
New Zealand Post made submissions to the Labour Committee which was
considering the Employment Contracts BilL
The P.5.A. identify a call for industrial action against the Employment
Contracts Bill as being part of the initial response within that organisation. Colin
Davies states that the P.5.A. was in a different position from the private sector
when considering the Bill as it was not concerned about the voluntary unionism
provisions that were contained in the BilL He argues that this was because the
P.5.A. "had already restructured its organisation to make it flexible enough to
meet those needs and changes". Thus, the P.5.A. waited to see what would be the
impact on the union of such legislation.
A call for industrial action was also the initial response of the Service Workers
Federation to the Employment Contracts BilL Ryall states that the Federation
campaigned both within and outside the union movement for opposition to the
Bill. The union also advocated the use of whatever political action was possible to
help oppose the Bill.
Four of the unions interviewed were asked about the response of the rank-
and-file to the introduction of the Employment Contracts Bill and, again, the
results were very similar. Dave Morgan of the Seafarers Union states that the
rank-and-file of his union "reacted quite strongly against it for all of the reasons.
They rejected it in principle". Davies of the P.S.A. also identifies the distaste of the
rank-and-file of his organisation for the Bill.However, he attributes this, at least in
part, to 'propaganda' put out by the P.5.A. about how bad the Bill would be and
as a result he believes there would be a lot of trepidation about the Bill passing
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into law. He does say of his members that "they certainly didn't like the idea of
what was behind it and I think that subsequent events have shown that to be a
very good attitude to take".
The Communication and Energy Workers Union also devoted a' considerable
amount of time to explaining the consequences of the proposed legislation to the
rank-and-file of the union. Blair states that initially there was a considerable
amount of confusion among the rank-and-file and so the union had to make an
effort to educate its membership.
Steph Breen of the Nurses Union states that many of their members did not
believe the effects of the proposed legislation would be especially bad. So, she
argues, the implications of the Employment Contracts Bill took time to register
with the members of the Nurses Union. Breen believes that the membership
became more aware of the possibilities of the Employment Contracts Act when
their award system broke down and they were forced to negotiate on an
enterprise leveL As a result "it came home pretty quickly to our members how bad
it was. They saw it pretty quickly".62
It is clear that whilst the various unions were unsure of the exact effects of the
bill, they were concerned about the changes that were proposed. A key concern
was the creation of a new bargaining framework. This necessitated both the
abolition of the national award system and changes to bargaining institutions.
Thus the Employment Contracts Bill represented an attack on the ability of
workers to organise collectively. The other key concern was the abolition of
compulsory unionism which esentially placed unions in a more vulnerable
position.
The C.T.U. states that prior to the introduction of the Employment Contracts
Act they had conceded that there was a need for changes to the award system
which dominated industrial relations in New Zealand. Furthermore, the C.T.U.
state that they had "clearly advocated the need for change and flexibility".63 The
changes embodied in the Employment Contracts Bill were not, however, received
favourably by the CT.U.. The eT.U. had two broad complaints against the Bill.
62 Interviews with Colin Davies, P.S.A., 16 August 1993;John Ryle, Service Workers Federation, 16
August 1993. Steph Breen, Nurses Organisation 17 August 1993; Malcolm Blair, Communication
and Energy Workers Union, 18 August 1993; John McKeefry, Engineers Union, 19 August 1993;
Ashley Russ, Building Trades Union, 17 August 1993.
63 New Zealand Council of Trade Unions, Complaint against the Government of New Zealand by
the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions, p. 4.
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First that it did not "provide an adequate legislative framework for the exercise of
the right to bargain collectively and the right to organise". The C.T.V. also
suggested that "change of this magnitude should be fully considered by all three
social partners [government, employers and unions] and implemented so as to
lessen its social and economic impact on workers".64 Hence when the National
Government released the Employment Contracts Bill the initial C.T.V. response
was to condemn the Bill on the grounds that it was "massively anti-union and
anti-worker."65
Conclusion
1990 was undoubtedly a time of increased employer militancy both
industrially and politically. Furthermore, the New Zealand Business Roundtable
and the Employers Federation were aggressively pursuing a campaign promoting
their labour market policies. It has been shown that there were considerable
similarities between these policies and the National Government's programme for
change in industrial relations. Many of the demands of the Business Roundtable
and the Employers Federation were met by the Employment Contracts Bill. This is
a fundamentally anti-union document. As such, it attacks the rights of workers
and serves to further weaken the union movement.
That the union movement was in a weak position in 1990 is evidenced by its
inability to protect the wages and conditions of many of its members. The C.T.V.
continued to court both the National and Labour parties in an attempt to gain a
consultative role for the organisation. With the advent of the Employment
Contracts Act it should have been clear to unionist officials that the government
was not interested in providing them with a consultative role. While some unions
took a decisive stance against the proposed legislation others vacillated - a telling
indication of the way in which union officials were to betray their members in the
early months of 1991.
64 Ibid., p. 5.
65 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, December 1990.
Chapter Five
Class War? Trade Union Struggle Against the
Employment Contracts Bill During 1991
This chapter charts the intensification of the conflict surrounding the
Employment Contracts Bill during the first half of 1991. During this period there
was a continuance and a deepening of the empoyer militancy that had
characterised the previous three-and-a-half years. This was both a direct response
to the bill and an attempt to support the bill in the face of ongoing opposition
from workers and their dependents who constitute the majority of New
Zealanders. The groundswell of opposition to the bill is shown through the
campaigns against the legislation and through the actions of many delegates who
were representing their members wishes. The stakes were high. For' workers, the
minimum conditions for which they had fought fifty years and more previously
were under threat. For employers, the Employment Contracts Bill, if passed
would provide them with an opportunity to smash the unions whose continued
existence was an obstacle to increased profitability. For the Government, the
deregulation of the labour market was an essential aspect of the New Right
economic policies to which they had pledged themselves. The scene was set,
therefore, for the possibility of a prolonged and bitter class war.
In hindsight, many people, including top-level union bureaucrats, have
claimed that the introduction of the bill was inevitable and, indeed, that the
unions could never win. This suggests that the outcome of a campaign against the
Employment Contracts Bill was predetermined. However, this wasnot the case.
Like all events in human history, the campaign against the Employment Contracts
Bill was shaped by a variety of social forces, including class, ideology and
personalities. Thus, this chapter and the following one show that the Employment
Contracts Bill could have been defeated. Furthermore, the actions of the
Government detailed in this chapter show that it was well aware that this was a
distinct possibility.
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5.1. Publicising the Expected Effects of the Bill - Government,
Unions and Employers.
The Government, unions and employers all ventured opmlOns on the
Employment Contracts Bill in January 1991. On 21 January, Minister of Labour,
Bill Birch told the New Zealand Herald that the Employment Contracts Bill would
raise wages and productivity and create new jobs. The Minister of Employment
argued that there should be a difference between what people could earn and
what they could get on benefits. He supported his argument with a reference to
twenty-nine industrial awards which provided for a base take-home pay lower
than the unemployment benefit rate for a married couple with two children. Thus,
the Minister argued for a further cut in benefits rather than an increase in the
minimum award rates. Angela Foulkes, of the CT.U., responded that few people
would be receiving the minimum award rates quoted as they were "entry level
rates for appointees without experience and qualifications". She also argued that
groups such as farm workers, who had the lowest award rates, were commonly
young and single and thus eligible for a benefit rate of only $108.17 after tax
which was well below the minimum award rate.'
Unionists were eager to have their views on the Employment Contracts Bill
heard. On 3 January the New Zealand Herald reported the fear of unionists that
employers would hand-pick "pliable wage-bargaining agents to negotiate on
behalf of their staff". This fear was partly due to advice given by the Auckland
Employers Association to its members. The Association suggested that employers
educate their workers to make 'sensible choices' of bargaining agents. Employers
were warned by the supervising advocate of the Auckland Employers Association
that a lack of involvement on their part would result in a vacuum for somebody
else to fill. Spokesman for the Northern Hotel, Hospital and Restaurant Workers
Union, Mr Dave Tolich argued that the lack of any statutory right of entry to a
workplace for unions would make it easier for employers to control the
appointment of bargaining agents. This aspect of the proposed legislation was
obviously clearly understood by employers. The Auckland Employers Association
general manager, Peter Carroll, told employers at a briefing session: "If you want
to keep unions away from your premises, away from your wages and records you
don't have to agree to their right of entry't.?
1 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal ofIndustrial Relations, January 1991.
2 New Zealand Herald, January 3 1991, p. 5.
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The C.T.D. expressed an awareness of the difficulties which the proposed
legislation would pose for the union movement. Douglas stated that such
legislation would have the effect of "paving the way for a low-wage economy of
third world status''.» Late in January the CT.D. held a special briefing on the
Employment Contracts Bill at which the proposed legislation was condemned as
unworkable. Douglas stated that the CT.D. was working with affiliates to prepare
joint responses to the Bill. He said that the refusal of the Government to introduce
a workable industrial relations policy would lead the C.T.D. to organise, with
affiliated unions, a "campaign of political and industrial activity against the
legislation". Ron Burgess, CT.D. secretary, announced that industrial activity
would probably start in February. The response of the Government to the C.T.D.
complaints was unequivocal. Birch stated that the CT.D. pronounce,ments on the
Employment Contracts Bill were the result of its desire to preserve its monopoly.
Birch also said that whilst the Government would listen to submissions on the
Bill, it did not intend to alter any of the principles upon which it was based."
Employers were also involved in the debate over industrial relations in
January 1991. In its draft submission on the Employment Contracts Bill, the
Employers Federation largely supported the legislation. The Bill left unresolved
the matter of the Labour Court and mediation service and the Employers
Federation took up this challenge. Whilst, unlike the Business Roundtable, the
Employers Federation favoured the retention of the Labour Court they argued
that its jurisdiction should be restricted solely to the law. Thus they advocated the
removal of personal grievance procedures and equity issues from the scope of the
Court.> The Employers Federation also criticised the Employment Contracts Bill
on the grounds that it did not go far enough. In the draft submission to the Labour
Select Committee the Employers Federation argued for the abolition of paid
. .
educational leave for trade unionists. On the issue of strikes and lockouts the
Employers Federation wanted special provisions relating to essential services
(torts, compliance orders, injunctions and suspensions) to be retained. The
Employers Federation argued for strikes and lockouts to be made unlawful whilst
a contract is in force. They wanted this also to include any strikes over
redundancy. It is stated in the draft submission that: 'The Bill has a major defect in
3 Ibid., January 4 1991,p. 4.
4 The Dominion, January 29 1991,p. 5.
5 B. van Beusekom, 'The Employment Court: A Critical Assessment', BA (Hons) dissertation,
University of Otago, 1993,p. 25.
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not providing for suspension of striking workers and non-striking workers where
work is not available during a strike'."
Many employers demonstrated their willingness to use the prospect of the
Employment Contracts Act to attack wages and conditions as early as January
1991. The strike by chemical process workers in Auckland continued (they had
been on strike in December over company attempts to reduce wages by twenty-
five percent). The workers' award had expired and staff were refusing to return to
work until a new document had been negotiated. The company expressed its
willingness to endure prolonged industrial action." University caretakers and
cleaners also faced cuts, of about twenty percent, by means of overtime, penal
rates and allowances.f On January 31 they voted to strike unless the government
withdrew its claims for big cuts.? The Northern Laundry, Dryers and Drycleaners
Awards were adjourned indefinitely when employers attempted to extend the
definition of an ordinary working day (where no overtime is payable) by five
hours. They also wanted to reduce penal rates from double time to time and a half
after eleven hours work or after midday on Saturday.10
Attempts by the Northern Distribution Union to secure an assurance by
employers that they would not introduce individual contracts during the term of
the northern ancillary drivers award were unsuccessfuL Earlier in the month, the
Auckland readymix concrete drivers were successful in achieving this objective.
In return, they agreed to start work half an hour earlier at ordinary pay rates.
Efforts to obtain employer undertakings not to introduce collective contracts
matches the campaign by the C.T.V. aimed at persuading employers to retain
collective contracts. 11
By the closing date for submissions on the Employment Contracts Bill the
Labour Select Committee had received more than four hundred submissions.l?
The committee had agreed that the final date of 11 February 1991 would be a
flexible one and they also decided to hear all those who wished to speak to the
committee regarding the proposed legislation. Hearings began in Christchurch on
27 February 1991. There were more than three hundred letters sent out by the
6 The Dominion, January 9 1991, p. 13.
7 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal ofIndustrial Relations, January 1991.
8 Ibid., January 1991.
9 New Zealand Herald, January 311991, p. 5.
10 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, January 1991.
11 New Zealand Herald, January 31 1991, p. 4.
12 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations. February 1991.
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committee to groups and individuals whom it considered would have a particular
interest in the Bill, inviting them to make submissions. The Minister of Labour
sent a submission to the committee on 27 February 1991. This submission became
known as the 'options paper'. It listed various possible options on institutional
arrangements and personal grievances procedures and so was forwarded for
comment to all the individuals and groups that had made submissions on the
Bill.13
Roth states that most submissions opposed the Bill.!" Many of these
submissions were drawn up by trade unions which argued that the "Employment
Contracts Bill represented an attack on both unions and on workers. They stated
that the Bill was a step backwards for New Zealand's industrial relations. The
Dairy Food and Textile Workers Union suggested that the Bill would set things
back by two hundred and fifty years. 15
Employer submissions were generally favourable to the proposed legislation,
arguing in favour of flexibility, freedom and efficiency. However, Gerry Hunt, a
Manufacturers Association councillor and general manager of a Christchurch firm
told the Labour select Committee that the Employment Contracts Bill did not go
far enough. He argued that, in fact, industrial relations was biased against
employers who could not lay-off workers without having to spend money on
redundancy payments and who were often subject to lengthy court actions
regarding personal grievance procedures. He also opposed the retention of the
Trade Union Education Authority, minimum paid leave holidays, Accident
Compensation Corporation levies, sickness and maternity leave, long leave
services plus 'bad attitudes' to employers.ts He complained of having to deal with
'political' trade unionists because he felt they bore him considerable animosity.l?
This lends credence to the theory that employers had become increasingly militant
prior to the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act both in their actions
and in their demands. Whilst Hurt most likely represents an extreme view amonst
employers it is evident from his statements that by 1991 the parameters of debate
had shifted significantly in employers' favour.
13 Report of theLabour Select Committee on theEmployment Contracts Bill, pp. 4-5.
14 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, February 1991.
15 New Zealand Monthly Review, April/May 1991, pp. 10-11.
16 New Zealand Herald, February 28 1991, p. 5.
17 New Zealand Monthly Review, April/May 1991, p. 11.
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In The Employer, the Employers Federation both praised the Employment
Contracts Bill and attacked trade unions. The 'highlights' of an address by the
Director General of the Employers Federation, Steve Marshall to the Council of
the Wellington Chamber of Commerce, published in the February edition of The
Employer includes an attack on the union movement. Marshall argues that the
union movement's approach is to say that "workers need the existing system to
protect themselves from themselves, as employees may make arrangements with
their employers that don't fit the traditional norm",18The Employer is unequivocal
in its support of the Bill, describing it as "the biggest opportunity New Zealanders
have been given to remove the dead weight of compulsory unionism and
outmoded bargaining structures from the affairs of business". It states that the Bill
is an indication that people have realised the need for cooperation to replace
conflict in industrial relations and that New Zealand has moved past the stage
where unions are necessary to help workers develop their relationship with their
employers. 19
The Government also took the opportunity to attack trade unions and hence,
indirectly, support the Employment Contracts Bill. In Te Kuiti on 22 February [im
Bolger blamed the poor state of New Zealand's economy on trade unions. Bolger
said that "years of featherbedding, overmanning, resistance to new technology,
poor work practices and union demarcation disputes have inflicted huge
additional costs on producers". Thus, he argued, union leaders had helped to
cause the huge unemployment which New Zealand faced. 2o Bolger also said that
the trade unions would not be successful in their battle against the Employment
Contracts Bill.21
A few days earlier, the Business Roundtable released a report which contained
its own prescription for solving the problem of unemployment. The Business
Roundtable advocated changes both in attitude and in government policy. The
report attacked policies of high inflation and high taxation which, it was argued,
obstruct job creation. A further obstacle to job creation according to the Business
Roundtable report was legislation which guaranteed uncompetitive wage levels
and redundancy payments coupled with inefficient education and training.22
18 The Employer, February 1991, p. 7.
19 Ib'dl ., p. 1.
20 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, February 1991.
21 New Zealand Herald, February 25 1991, p. 10.
22 Ibid., February 18 1991,p. 3.
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The union movement did respond to the various employer and Government
statements in favour of the Bill and attacking the union movement. At a seminar
on the Employment Contracts Bill in Wellington on 15 February union leaders
said that Bill Birch had revealed the true agenda of the Government's industrial
relations law reform - to attack the rights and status of unions. During a question
and answer session at the seminar Birch had acknowledged existing flexibility in
the workplace. The union response was to argue that in the light of this assertion
there was no need to change the system. Douglas argued that productivity and
flexible working arrangements had increased under the existing award system. A
spokesman for Mr Birch responded that whilst this flexibility did exist it was
insufficient and unions were motivated by their desire to retain their monopoly
right to represent workers.P
Later in the month, Dave Arthur, an organiser for the Canterbury-Westland
Stores and General Workers Union pointed out a number of difficulties with the
proposed legislation in his submission to the Labour Select Committee. He stated
that under the Employment Contracts Bill, unions would have no legal
recognition, adding that this was unusual even in totalitarian regimes. He
predicted a collapse in small businesses as employers competed to lower their
only variable cost, that of wages. Corporate monopolies would be able to increase
their control of the economy and inevitably prices would rise. This would occur at
the same time as workers wages were being forced down.24
5.2. The Campaign Begins
The union movement was involved in a number of activities with regard to
publicising the potential effects of the Employment Contracts Bill among its
membership and with regards to attempting to organise a coherent campaign
against the Bill. In mid-February 1991 a series of delegates meetings were held in
Auckland aimed at educating workers as to the dangers of the proposed
legislation. The meetings were addressed by union leaders such as Angela
Foulkes, vice-president of the Council of Trade Unions and attendance levels were
high.25
There was considerable confusion and disagreement within the trade union
movement over what would be appropriate action to take against the Bill. In early
23 Ibid., February 16 1991, p. 5.
24 Ibid., February 28 1991, p. 5.
25 Ibid., February 16 1991, p. 5.
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February the C.T.D. national officers released a statement to the effect that district
councils should coordinate the efforts of affiliates to inform their members about
the Bill and to organise opposition campaigns. This statement was accompanied
by an information kit detailing how to lobby Members of Parliament (M.P.s), how
to write letters to M.P.s, how to make submissions on the Bill and how to educate
other groups in the community about the Bill.26
The president of the Auckland branch of the C.T.D., Bill Andersen, addressed
various delegates meetings regarding the action that could be taken against the
Bill. Two hundred South Auckland delegates were told by Andersen on 14
February that it would not be possible to totally defeat the BilL Therefore,
Andersen called for the union movement to oppose the Bill and to attempt merely
to change its worst provisions. Andersen did not permit any challenges to this
proposal. Delegates were allowed only to put proposals which conformed to
C.T.D. policy. The effect of this was to ensure that delegates followed the position
of the C.T.D. National Executive as the National Executive was in control between
conferences and between special meetings of affiliates. At four union meetings
delegates were prevented from putting forward resolutions in favour of mass
action to defeat the Employment Contracts Bill. All four meetings were chaired by
Bill Andersen who ruled that attempts by delegates to put their own resolutions
or to amend his resolution were out of order. The resolution that Bill Andersen
put to these meetings called for 'strong opposition' to the Bill rather than the
defeat of the Bill.s? On February 19, Andersen told the People's Voice, that "the
official position of the C.T.D. is to oppose the Bill because we don't think it can be
defeated".28
Bill Andersen took formal action against Anna Lee, a delegate of the New
Zealand Education Institute. The West Auckland management committee of NZEI
voted in favour of the defeat of the Bill and Anna Lee attempted to present this
view at the Auckland C.T.D. officials and delegates stopwork meeting on 18
February. Lee raised a point of order which challenged Andersen's previous
ruling that no resolutions would be accepted from the floor of the meeting.
Andersen ignored this point of order and later refused to put to the vote Lee's
resolution calling for a campaign to defeat the Bill.
26 The People's Voice, 11 February 1991, p. 7.
27 Ibid., 25 February 1991, p. 3
28 Ibid., 25 February 1991, p. 3.
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Lee was called to a meeting of the Auckland NZEI Committee of Branches
shortly after the stopwork meeting. She was told by the Committee of Branches
meeting that because she was a delegate to the C.T.V., representing the
Committee of Branches she should only state NZEI national policy and only put
forward suggestions of action which had been passed by the Committee of
Branches. She was not to speak either for her own school or for the West
Auckland management committee. A few hours after this meeting the West
Auckland Management Committee passed a resolution supporting Anna Lee as a
delegate to the CT.V.29
A similar incident occurred within the Auckland Tramways Union. Bus driver
Ally Dworniak proposed a resolution to defeat the Bill at a South Auckland
delegates meeting on 14 February. The Tramway Union's management committee
responded with a request by union secretary Bob Masefield that she appear before
the committee to 'answer questions' about the resolution that she proposed. It is
clear that not only did many union leaders themselves not support the call for a general
strike but they also attempted to sabotage theefforts of those who did.3o
The CT.V. organised a special conference, held on 21 and 22 February, to plan
the tactics for a campaign of opposition to the Employment Contracts Bill. Angela
Foulkes described the Bill as a 'nightmare'A! The meeting endorsed a
recommendation made by the CT.V. national executive to mount a protest
campaign aimed at achieving major modification to the Bill. It is significant that
such action would serve to both preserve and promote the self-imposed role of the
CT.V. as an intermediary between capital (in the form of the Government and
employer organisations) and labour (in the form of the various unions affiliated to
the C.T.V.). Douglas announced that the CT.V. was seeking only to change the
Bill, not to defeat it. The proposal that action over the Employment Contracts Bill
be decided regionally was supported by the conference. Douglas stated that, thus,
the nature of protest activity would be determined by the individual decision of
each affiliate and each region. He promised that the campaign would cause only
minor disruptions to work. This statement elicited a favourable response from
Minister of Labour Bill Birch who praised the C.T.V. leadership for the 'realism'
with which they were "positioning themselves to work with the new legislation".
The C.T.V. did, however, make a decision to take some action. The
29 Ibid., 6 May 1991, p. 26.
30 Ibid., 17 April 1991, pp. 20-23.
31 New Zealand Herald, 22 February 1991.
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recommendations of the C.T.U. National Executive that there be one hundred and
fifty thousand dollar advertising campaign in the mass media and a week of
protest action was endorsed by the affiliates. The protest activity was to include
industrial stoppages, stopwork meetings and membership rallies.V Douglas
acknowledged that there had been calls from within the union movement for the
C.T.U to organise a general strike. He claimed that organising a general strike was
not the role of the C.T.U. Rather, such decisions should come from the C.T.U.
affiliates.P
Employers also mobilised in response to the Employment Contracts Bill. The
Employers Federation organised various organisational seminars for employers
regarding the Employment Contracts Bill. On 27 February more than one hundred
employers converged on the Ellerslie Racecourse in Auckland for advice about the
Employment Contracts BilL This turnout exceeded the expectations of the
Auckland Employers Association. As a result, they had to arrange an extra
seminar for the following month in order to keep up with the demand.v'
It is apparent that some employers had sufficient understanding of the -
proposed legislation to be able to attack the wages and conditions of their
employees, confident of victory. In Fielding, prospective employees of the
Weddel's beef processing plant were
...required to sign a twenty-three page contract accompanied by a forty-
three page code of conduct. The documents listed twenty-five separate
conditions for warnings and thirty-three misdemeanours which could
lead to dismissals. Employees, for instance, were not to discuss the
company with any unauthorised person during their employment or at
any time afterwards.35
This was not an isolated attempt to attack the wages and conditions of workers.
On 8 February laundry workers at the Kingsland laundry depot of the New
Zealand Towel Service went on strike over the efforts of their employers to
change their conditions of work. The employers had sought a five-hour extension
to the working day.36By mid February 1991 Auckland builder's labourers were
advised by their union to abandon hopes of renewing their award before the
Employment Contracts Bill became law. Their union was urging them instead to
attempt to obtain collective agreements from individual employers. Ray Bianchi,
32 ThePeople's Voice, 25 February 1991,p. 3.
33 Ibid., 25 February 1991,p. 13.
34 New Zealand Herald, 28 February 1991,P: 6.
35 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal ofIndustrial Relations, February 1991.
36 New Zealand Herald., 9 February 1991,p. 5.
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secretary of the union's northern branch stated that since the award had expired
in December there had been no indication of a serious intention to renew it on the
part of employers. Paul Weaver, the employer's advocate said that the union had
rejected all the attempts by employers to make the award more flexible.F
Hoteliers were attempting to alter the conditions contained in the award
covering their employees - the national Hotel and Tavern Award. They wanted
the removal of weekend penal rates for new employees and they also wanted to
introduce youth rates for workers under eighteen. In Dunedin, hotel and tavern
workers voted to accept the demands of employers in return for the continuation
of award coverage. The industrial secretary of the Otago-Southland Service
Workers Union, Phillip de Watner said that "people accepted that they were
saying good-bye to penalty rates for weekend work and accepting wage cuts for
part-rime workers". However, Rick Barker the national union advocate said that
the removal of penal rates was not a foregone conclusion. Steve Marshall of the
Employers Federation did think that the decision in Dunedin was an indication of
the industrial climate and believed that it would be seen by employers as a
positive sign.38
Penal rates in the non-food retail industry were also under threat. Despite the
agreement of employers to a two percent pay rise in December, the award itself
was not renewed as employers wished to negotiate over penal rates. The
executive director of the Retail and Wholesale Merchants Association, Mr. Barry
Purdy said that from any employer's point of view there was no need to settle the
award as things were going smoothly.s?
An attempt by members of the National Distribution Union to persuade
employers to guarantee their employees collective contracts was unsuccessful.
Negotiations for the Northern Kerbside Refuse Collection Award were suspended
when employers refused to sign a clause which prevented them from entering
into individual contracts during the term of the new award.I'' Thus, these
particular tactics, advocated by the eT.U. were generally unsuccessful in January
and February 1991.
37 Ibid., 16 February 1991, p. 5.
38 Ibid., 26 February 1991, p. 1.
39 Ibid., 26 February 1991, p. 1.
40 Ibid., 4 February 1991, p. 4.
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During March 1991, the Labour Select Committee continued to travel around
the country hearing submissions on the Employment Contracts Bill. Roth states
that the interest groups which made submissions, other than employers and
unions, included the Auckland Council of Civil Liberties, the Unemployed
Workers Rights Centre and the Maori Council's legislation subcommittee. An
interesting incident occurred when an Auckland driver who gave evidence in
support of the Owner Operators Association was dismissed two days later by his
employer, Alexandra Couriers, for taking action which "may jeopardise or
otherwise adversely affect the reputation of the company". Max Bradford later
stated that there had been no connection between the man's dismissal and the
submission that he gave to the Labour Select Committee.e!
The Secretary of the Service Workers Federation, Rick Barker, told the Select
Committee that the threat of the Bill was being used by employers to obtain
changes to wages and conditions.F Lianne Dalziel, one of the Select Committee
members, questioned employers regarding their desire to alter wages and
conditions. Peter Tritt, chief executive of the Contractors Federation was told that
his proposal that civil engineering firms be able to make the most of favourable
weather conditions amounted to placing workers on a seven-day-a-week
standby.P
Representatives of the Wellington Unemployed Workers Union criticised the
Select Committee process in their submission to the Labour Select Committee.
They referred to the Finance Bill which had legislated for cuts to benefits. It was
stated that there had been approximately five submissions in favour of the
Finance Bill and about three hundred against. However, the Bill had been passed
largely unchanged.ss
Peter Brosnan, of Victoria University, in his submission to the Labour Select
Committee said that the Bill made no provision for two of the fundamental
requirements of a democratic society. These were the "protection of workers and
trade unions and the provision of a basic floor of employment rights".45 Like Rick
Barker, union secretary Graeme Clark told the Select Committee that he believed
some employers intended to attack wages and conditions under the proposed
41 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal ofIndustrial Relations, March 1991.
42 The People's Voice, 27 March 1991, p. 15.
43 The Dominion, 6 March 1991, p. 2.
44 Ibid., 7 March 1991, p. 2.
45 Ibid., 7 March 1991, p. 2.
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legislation. The Public Service Association, in its submission expressed concern
that the Government planned to remove the Monday to Friday working week
from New Zealand law. Colin Clark, general secretary of the PS.A., stated that the
proposed legislation appeared to provide for the five-day working week to
include Saturday and Sunday. Not only did this have implications for working
parents, it would also make it easier to remove penal rates.46
5.3. Union Action Intensifies
March was a busy month for the CT.U.. A large number of public statements
were made and a week of action was also organised. The C.T.U. launched a
television advertising campaign aimed at publicising its view on the Employment
Contracts Bill.47 The C.T.U. argued that the passing of the legislation may violate
labour law conventions. They told the Select Committee that New Zealand might
have to withdraw from international conventions which set maximum working
hours. They also presented a paper on the Bill from the legal advisory
committee.e"
The Nurses Association issued a warning regarding the Employment
Contracts BilL They stated that the proposed legislation would have the likely
effect of lowering standards of patient care. Helen MacKenzie, Association
president, argued that the Bill enabled employers to "reduce costs by lowering
wages and staffing levels rather than increasing productivity'v'?
The Council of Trade Unions took measures aimed at publicising the effects
that the Employment Contracts Act would have on women. Angela Foulkes said
that "most business people are conservative men, and little change has been made
in equality issues without the support of unions". This view was supported by
other women unionists such as Irena Brorens of the Distribution Union and Carol
Parker of NZEI. Foulkes also pointed out that the Employment Contracts Bill,
benefit cuts and the increased stand-down periods had a cumulative effect.
Women unionists stated that such issues as the "clerical workers ten-year battle to
have sexual harassment treated as an industrial issue, the lack of progress on pay
equity, the fact that after nineteen years of equal pay women's average weekly
earnings are seventy-seven percent of mens' and unemployment of two hundred
46 Ibid., 8 March 1991, p. 2.
47 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, March 1991.
48 The Dominion., 20 March 1991, p. 2.
49 Ibid., 17 March 1991, P: 2.
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thousand" were reasons why they were pessimistic about the way in which
women workers would fare under the Employment Contracts Bill.5o
Further concerns regarding women workers were expressed' by Waikato
University law Dean and former Labour Party president, Margaret Wilson, at the
biennial women's conference. Margaret Wilson described the Bill as regressive,
oppressive, reactionary and anti-women. Foulkes stated that women unionists
must fight against the changes in all sectors whilst always offering workable
alternatives.51
The CT.V. abandoned its stance on voluntary unionism in March 1991 but did
argue that the Employment Contracts Act went beyond merel?providing for
voluntary unionism. Rather, Douglas said that the Bill would create a state of
'anarchy' and 'uncivilised behaviour'. Foulkes added that the new legislation
would make national awards impossible because of the requirement that each
worker must individually consent to the agreement which covers them.V Yet
despite its continued public pronouncements against the Bill the CT.V.leadership
avoided issuing a call for strike action.
On 21 March the Auckland Delegates Meeting on the Employment Contracts
Bill was held. This meeting was chaired by Bill Andersen who refused to accept
any motion other than the 'official' resolution proposed by the Auckland CT.V.
executive. This 'official' resolution supported the CT.V.'s week of action on the 3-
10 April and also supported the actions of the health and education sector unions
and the unemployed.53
Various rallies and marches against the Employment Contracts Bill were held
around New Zealand during March. On 11 March, 2,200 people attended a rally
in Whangarei and four days later over 1,000 people marched to Parliament in
protest at the actions of the National Government.54
Many unions organised various types of industrial action during March 1991,
even without the overt support of the CT.V.. Groups of workers attempted to
introduce closed shops in their workplaces. By 7 March 1991, at least five sites,
50 Ibid., 11 March 1991, p. 11.
51 Ibid, 8 March 1991, p. 2.
52 New Zealand Herald, 9 March 1991, p. 1.
53 ThePeople's Voice, 27 March 1991, P: 6.
54 Ibid., pp. 25-27.
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mainly in the dairy industry had already voted for closed shops. These actions
drew an angry response from Bill Birch who said that for unions to threaten to
sabotage a proposed law in such a manner brought the union movement into
disrepute.55
A number of unions passed resolutions favouring industrial action both as
individual organisations and as part of a union movement. On 22 March, the
Northern Distribution Union held a morning stopwork meeting which was
attended by approximately 5,500 Auckland drivers, store workers and boiler
attendants. They voted not to return to work that day and also voted in favour of
further industrial action during the C.T.U.'s national week of action and to
support a national stoppage if the CT.U. called for one.56
The Seafarers Union held stopwork meetings in Auckland, Wellington and
Lyttleton on the 11 March. The union executive recommended that notice be
issued of an open-ended strike beginning on 3 April 1991. Such action would be
lawful as it was to occur within sixty days of the expiry of the Seafarers national
award. Other unions had already issued notice of strike action. Watersiders gave
notice of a national strike to take place between 18 March and 30 March which
they would be legally entitled to extend if an agreement was not reached.>? On 15
March, Polytechnic tutors held a national strike after the breakdown of their
award talks. Air New Zealand were successful in preventing strike action planned
for the same day by clerical staff employed by them and by eight other airlines.
However, this strike finally went ahead on 30 March. School caretakers and
cleaners decided not to strike when the State Services Commission retracted its
intention to demand clawbacks.V
The secretary of the Harbour Workers Union, Ross Wilson said that harbour
workers were willing to take industrial action if their employers used the
Employment Contracts Bill to attack working conditions. In a response to the
Lyttleton Port Company's submission to the Labour Select Committee, Ross
Wilson said that it was apparent that some port companies were getting ready to
use the Bill to attack wages and working conditions. Changes to the Bill sought by
the Lyttleton Port Company included the abolition of penal rates on Sundays and
public holidays, the abolition of personal grievance procedures for unjustifiable
55 New Zealand Herald, 7 March 1991,p. 5.
56 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, March 1991.
57 New Zealand Herald, 11 March 1991,p. 3.
58 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, March 1991.
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dismissal, employer discretion regarding whether a worker is covered by a
collective or an individual contract and the abolition of work coverage,
redundancy rights and compensation, the right of union officials to workplace
access and stopwork meeting clauses.59
Public hospital doctors announced that they would join other workers in
industrial action during the CT.Do's week of action. This would be the first time
New Zealand's health unions had mounted a combined campaign of industrial
action. 60
The National Government continued its campaign to publicly defend the
Employment Contracts Bill. The Government mailed pamphlets to every
householder regarding the Employment Contracts Bill. The cost of this action was
more than a quarter of a million dollars.v! This move was attacked by the
Opposition who claimed that its timing was insulting as the chairman of the
Labour Select Committee was stating publicly that the Bill was still open to
change. Bill Birch responded that the pamphlets were an attempt to address the
misleading literature about the Employment Contracts Act which had been
distributed through workplaces. The pamphlets were a cheap and effective way of
solving this problem. The pamphlet contained answers to questions which had
been addressed to the Minister's office and the Labour Department, concerning
the Bill's content. In response to claims that the timing of the distribution of the
pamphlet was unsuitable Birch said: "this in no way preempts the work of the
Select Committee. The pamphlet answers questions about the Bill as it was
drafted."62
Bill Birch also responded publicly to claims that the Employment Contracts
Bill would impact negatively on women. He said that the proposed legislation
would create a situation in which an employer would have no option but to
confront those issues affecting women workers. Furthermore, women who do not
feel that they have the skills, information, experience or confidence to negotiate on
their own behalf should not feel that they are forced to as the Bill does provide for
collective bargaining. Good employers would become known and thus would
attract the best staff. Good employers would pass their productivity gains onto
their employees in terms of higher wages and favourable conditions of
59 TheDominion, 9 March 1991, p. 2.
60 Ibid, 7 March 1991.
61 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, March 1991.
62 TheDomnion, 21 March 1991, p. 2.
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employment. In addition, Birch stated that equality issues were being addressed
by the Government which had received the report of the working party on equity
in employment.63
Employers continued to publicly support the Employment Contracts Bill. In a
speech to the Labour Select Committee, Steve Marshall, director-general of the
Employers Federation said that a draft submission distributed to ten thousand
employers had received overwhelming support. The Employers Federation did,
however, advocate a number of changes to the proposed legislation. These
included calls for:
The axing of paid education leave for courses with groups like the Trade
Union Education Authority.
Parties having the legal right to amend contracts at any time rather than
having third parties like the Labour Court intervening.
Parties agreeing to quit an existing award for a contract agreement at any
time rather than waiting for the award to expire.
Employers to be able to suspend non-striking employees when work is
not available during a strike.64
The Newspaper Publishers Association also stated its support for the Bill. The
Association argued that certain newspapers could become more viable when the
Employment Contracts Bill became law. It also stated that the existing system of
industrial relations was inappropriate as it made no provision for diversity within
industries and between workers in terms of performance. Phil O'Reilly, advocate
for the Newspaper Publishers Association said that the legislation would allow
more efficient work practices. The response of the New Zealand Journalists and
Graphic Process Union was to urge the Government to consider the 'potential
costs of the industrial conflict implicit in the Bill'.65
While supporting the proposals of the Employers Federation, the Business
Roundtable argued in favour of even more radical changes to the Employment
Contracts Bill. The Business Roundtable announced that whilst the direction of the
Bill was, in general, sound it still contained provisions which would hamper the
attainment of an efficient and effective labour market. The submission of the
Business Roundtable favoured the abolition of the minimum wage and the
abolition of penal rates for Sunday work. It was argued that the retention of
minimum wages and conditions acted as a barrier to job creation. The Business
Roundtable also advocated the option to dismiss 'at will' being a "legally
63 Ibid., 11 March 1991, p. 11.
64 IbidI ,9 March 1991, p. 2.
65 Ibid., 21 March 1991, p. 2.
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sustainable option for all employment contracts'se. Employers should be able to
specify non-union membership as a condition of a contract. The Business
Roundtable also favoured the abolition of the Labour Court, the Mediation Service
and the Trade Union Education Authority. Instead, disputes should be dealt with
through the civil court system.
Not all employer groups were as supportive of the Employment Contracts Act
as the Employers Federation and the Business Roundtable. The society of Master
Plumbers and Gasfitters told the Labour Select Committee that the proposed
legislation was impractical. They argued that little consideration had been given
to the effects of the Bill on "small-scale, multi-site, itinerant workforces". They also
stated that:
We see now a situation arising where an award covering a substantial
number of employers and employees will be impossible to implement or
even negotiate and this will be detrimental to both employers and
employees alike.67
Most of the members of the Society of Master Plumbers and Gasfitters wanted to
continue with award-style bargaining. Progressive Enterprises (Foodtown,
K.Mart, Three Guys) had similar concerns and expressed dissatisfaction with the
prospect of workers "seeking individual negotiations or joining with whatever
grouping of employees is decided upon for whatever reason". Similarly, the New
Zealand Pulp and Paper Employers Association, Goodman Fielder Wattie (NZ)
and Fisher and Paykel did not favour the replacement of awards with individual
contracts. These employers groups were, however, in the minority. This is
evidenced by the fact that they can be exhaustively named. It is likely that these
employers did not favour the replacment of awards with individual contracts
simply because their industries were more suited to operation under the award
system rather than on the basis of individual contracts. Furthermore, the
opposition of these groups to this particular aspect of the Employment Contracts
Act did not encompass opposition to the Employment Contracts Act in its
entirety. Indeed, many of these employers have since taken advantage of certain
provisions contained within the Employment Contracts Act such as flexible
working hours and the abolition of penal rates.
The Employers Federation suggested possible ways to avoid the potential
difficulties expressed by these groups. These methods included:
66 Ibid., 21 March 1991,p. 2.
67 The New Zealand Herald, 8 March 1991,p. 4.
Union Struggle Against the ECA Page -120--
Granting to the employer an absolute right to decide the number, if any,
of collective employment contracts to be applicable in any workplace.
Excluding from the definition of 'undue influence' action by any party to
maintain or advance a particular bargaining framework.68 ,
Employer clawbacks continued during March with employers becoming more
confident with the prospect of new industrial legislation to support them. Hence
during March attacks on both wages and conditions were evident. Unions
representing polytechnic tutors and airline clerks stated that their employers were
using the implicit threat of the removal of award coverage to push for changes to
conditions. The two groups expressed a willingness to forgo pay rises in return for
continued award coverage. This offer was rejected by employers who urged the
unions to resume negotiations. The employers of the airline clerks demanded
changes to rosters and work classifications and the removal of part-time workers.
Meanwhile, the State Services Commission wished to reduce the annual leave
entitlement of polytechnic staff and to cut the maximum career salary for new
staff. Also under threat was the five-yearly industry refresher leave and there
were plans to introduce unqualified staff to be paid below the current minimum
salary.s?
Talks over the hotels award resumed during March with negotiations taking
place over penal rates, youth rates and the reduction of minimum shift periods for
part-timers. Mark Gosche, secretary of the Northern Hotel, Hospital and
Restaurant Workers Union stated that the decision to negotiate was based on an
executive recommendation and did not necessarily mean an end to weekend
penal rates.?? However, after an adjournment in the award talks the employers'
demands were accepted. The People's Voice states that the leaders of the Service
Workers Federation, Rick Barker and Mark Gosche, consulted with Ken Douglas
during this period of adjournment."
At a stopwork meeting on 25 March, employees of New Zealand Steel voted to
accept a two percent pay rise. This was in return for the introduction of a clause
providing for the variation of ordinary hours provided the workers and the union
68 The Dominion, 21 March 1991,p. 12.
69 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, March 1991 and New Zealand
Herald, 8 March 1991,p. 4.
70 New Zealand Herald, 8 March 1991,p. 4.
71 The People's Voice, 27 March 1991,p. 18.
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were in agreement. It was also decided that the staff would make 'token'
payments for previously free bus services to the mill.72
In April, the Labour Select Committee heard the last of the submissions on the
Employment Contracts Bill. It received just over eight hundred submissions and
sixty-two petitions. On 23 April the Labour Select Committee reported back to
Parliament. The amended Bill contained only minor changes to the nature of the
original Employment Contracts Bill. The Bill was then debated by Parliament
under urgency.73
5.4. The Week of Action
April saw the continuation of the campaign against the Bill which began in
earnest with the CT.U.'s week of action from 3 April to 10 April. The People's
Voice estimate that two hundred and fifty thousand people protested against the
Employment Contracts Bill during the C.T.U.'s week of action.?" Roth estimates
that on Thursday 4 April over 100,000 protestors marched against the proposed
legislation. In some of the smaller areas these were the largest demonstrations
ever seen. Newspaper production was temporarily halted, with The Dominion not
being published on 3 April, The Evening Post on 4 April and The Press on 6 ApriL75
The New Zealand Herald prepared the nation for the 'week of action' . In its 2 April
edition it was written that widespread industrial disruption was expected. A
spokesperson for the education sector unions, Shona Hearn, said that more than
fifty thousand workers were expected to join the protest on Thursday 4 April.
These workers included childcare workers, kindergarten, primary, secondary and
area school teachers, school office staff, cleaners and caretakers, teacher aides and
library assistants, staff from community education colleges, colleges of education
and non-teaching staff, members of the Association of University Teachers and
school secretaries. Health sector workers also planned action which included
stopwork meetings and participation in protest rallies. Among the health workers
participating were members of the Nurses Association, Hospital Workers Union,
Public Service Association, Local Government Officers Association and the trades
group. Also taking action was the Railway Trades Association in Dunedin which
72 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, March 1991.
73 Report of the Labour Committee on the Employment Contracts Bill, New Zealand House of
Representatives 1991 and H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, April 1991.
74 The People's Voice, 17 April 1991, p. 3.
75 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, April 1991.
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was coordinating a day of action which would combine both affiliated and non-
affiliated unions.76
In Auckland six thousand education workers participated in the march on 4
April and they were joined by four thousand protestors.T'Tse People's Voice put
these figures closer to a fifteen thousand strong protest march. As well as the
education workers, among those groups prominent were unions such as the
Seafarers, Watersiders, Carpenters, Labourers and Distribution Workers.78 In
Hamilton, the rally was one of the biggest there since the Springbok rugby tour a
decade earlier. In Whakatane, fifteen hundred people protested the Employment
Contracts Bill and the benefit cuts in a march which organisers say was the largest
ever in the eastern Bay of Plenty. For many people in Pukekohe the three hundred
and fifty strong march was the first political demonstration in the town they could
remember.I?
In a speech to protestors in Auckland, Bill Andersen of the Auckland C.T.V.
said that workers had to stay united and "do our best in the present situation. We
are making agreements with many employers to take the teeth out of the Bill".
Andersen stated that if the protests were not powerful enough to force the
Government to withdraw the Bill then the union movement would have to go for
the "best possible agreement".80 This statement illustrates the C.T.V.'s perception
of itself as a mediating body rather than as primarily the representative of labour.
On 3 April the Government was also busy - promoting rather than protesting
against the Employment Contracts Bill.The Minister of Labour gave two briefings
to the press, one to condemn the teachers strike and the other to explain the
changes to industrial relations contained in the Bill.81 However, it appeared that
Birch was trying to placate the teachers and health workers who he knew would
be prominent in the march the following day. He claimed that the Bill would have
'very little' impact on the public service and education sectors. He also said of
teachers that "the reality is that if they want to bargain collectively they can, and if
they want to use their present union they can".82 Birch described the protest
actions as being an understandable reaction by union officials and argued that
their concern was a result of the legislation being a threat to their monopoly
76 New Zealand Herald, 2 April 1991, p. 5.
77 Ibid., 5 April 1991, p. i.
78 ThePeople's Voice, 17 April 1991, p. 26.
79 New Zealand Herald,SApril 1991, P: 1.
80YhePeople's Voice, 17 April 1991, p. 26.
81 New Zealand Herald, 4 April 1991, p. 1.
82 ThePeople's Voice 17 April 1991, p. 5.
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rights. 83 Regarding the effectiveness of the protests during the week of action,
Birch described them as "a very crude instrument" and said that the government
did not pay much attention to them. Rather, it was submissions to the Labour
Select Committee and dialogue between Government and union representatives
such as the C.T.D. that were more effective.v'
Public statements by the Minister of Labour suggest that the government was
concerned by the level of support for action against the Bill. On 3 April Birch
criticised industrial action against the Bill and argued that people had lost sight of
the benefits which would emerge as a result of the enactment of the proposed
legislation. By the time that the week of action had been concluded, thet fears of
the government regarding the strength of opposition to the Bill were clear. Max
Bradford publicly stated that changes to the Bill could be considered, particularly
in the areas of bargaining procedures and bargaining agents. Bradford would
have been well aware that it was these two aspects of the legislation which had
been the primary targets of protests aganist the Bill. As well as these two key areas
Bradford also indicated that the Labour Select Committee would consider changes
to:
A minimum code of employment conditions.
The extension of personal grievance procedures to cover individual
contracts.
The future role of the mediation service and labour courts.
Coverage of new workers by collective contracts.85
Both Anne Knowles and Roger Kerr deny that that their organisations were
overly concerned by the union campaign against the Employment Contracts Bill.86
It is important to note that both these statements were made with the benefit of
hindsight. Statements or correspondence by these organisations at the time of the
protest activity might be more accurate in determining the reaction of the
Employers Federation and the Business Roundtable to the gr6undswell of
opposition to the Bill.Similarly, information regarding the response of Cabinet to
the Week of Action, located within this time frame would be useful in ascertaining
the effectiveness of this protest activity.
83 New Zealand Herald, 4 April 1991, p.l.
84 Ibid., 6 April 1991, p. 3.
85 Otago Daily Times, Thursday April 11, p. i.
86 Interview with Roger Kerr, New Zealand Business Roundtable, 16 August 1993 and Interview
with Anne Knowles, New Zealand Employers Federation, 17 August 1993.
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The Employers Federation stepped up its campaign to promote the Bill. Early
in April, it announced its plans to take out newspaper advertisements in some
daily newspapers stating its support for the Bill. Several hundred of the
Federation's members were approached to endorse the Bill by having their
company name printed on the advertisement. Peter Carroll, general manager of
the Auckland Employers Association said that the advertisements were an
attempt to counter-act the impression created by the media that most employers
opposed the Bill. However, Bill Andersen did not accept this explanation and
suggested, instead, that the Employers Federation was running the advertisement
because it lacked employer support.87
Pressure for a general strike was building up early in April 1991. Early in the
month up to 1,000 members of the Northern Drug and Chemical Union held a
stopwork meeting at which they called for a national twenty-four hour strike on
May Day.880n 5 April the New Zealand Herald had stated that the calls for a
general strike would be discussed at the next CT.U. national conference. Among
the groups that had called for a national strike, according to the Herald, were the
distribution workers, clerical workers and cleaners. The response of the CT.U.
industrial officer was to say that the Council was unsure of the extent of the
support for a national strike.s?
Agitation for a general strike is reflected in the debate over whether to oppose
the Bill (try to make changes to the proposed legislation) or whether to defeat the
Bill (take action designed to make the Government retract the proposed
legislation). In Christchurch, union officials decided that their 9 April meeting
would be organised around the aim of defeating the Bill. The response of the
PS.A. was to put pressure on those Christchurch officials to make them change
their goals. At a closed meeting PS.A. assistant general secretary, [oris de Bres,
told the Christchurch officials that there was a need for a compromise in order to
prevent the split of views becoming publicly apparent. The Christchurch
Tramways Union president Maurice Ward said that a clash of views at the
meeting was unavoidable.
The objections of the C.T.U. and PS.A. leaders to the proposals for the 9 April
meeting centred around the Christchurch resolutions. The union leaders wanted
87 New Zealand Herald,S April 1991, p. 3.
88 H. Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, April 1991.
89 New Zealand Herald, 5 April 1991, p. 1.
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the resolutions to use the word 'oppose' rather than 'defeat'. They also disliked the
resolution calling for a strike fund to be established so that any workers who were
involved in strike action had access to some financial assistance. The objections of
the P.S.A. and CT.U. leaders to the measures proposed by the Christchurch
officials directly contravened the motion passed at the 21 February C.T.U.
affiliates meeting that action was to be decided upon on a region by region basis.
This indicates that the C.T.U. leadership was willing to actively sabotage any
attempts by its members to intensify thestruggle against the Employment Contracts Bill -
even if takingsuchaction meant contravening theveryrules that it hadenacted.
On 2 April, the proposed agenda, resolutions and guidelines were sent to the
invited speakers on behalf of the eight Christchurch unions who were organising
the meeting. These unions were the Clerical Workers Union, South Island
Clothing Union, Christchurch Tramways Union, Canterbury Hotel and Hospital
Union, Nurses Association, Railway Trades Association, Stores and General
Workers Union and the P.s.A.
On 5 April, the Christchurch unions and officials were told that Sue Piper,
national president of the P.S.A. and Angela Foulkes opposed the resolutions and
would speak against them at the meeting. The response of the meeting's
organisers was to tell Piper and Foulkes that if they intended taking such action
then they should not attend the meeting. [oris de Bres again approached the
organisers, advocating a compromise. He suggested that the meeting should call
for a 'fundamental change' to the Bill rather than its 'withdrawal or repeal'. The
delegates responded that there was no room for compromise. Finally, it was
decided that the words 'withdrawal or repeal' would be replaced with 'defeated'
and the call for a strike fund was dropped.??
The P.S.A. leadership attempted to put pressure on those union officials
responsible for organising the 9 April meeting. On the morning of 8 April, the
chairperson for the 9 April meeting, Val McClimont, was called to meeting with
John McKenzie, regional secretary for the Canterbury branch of the P.s.A. and
[oris de Bres. McClimont was questioned on the Canterbury resolution. That
afternoon, the unionists who were part of the central committee running the 9
April meeting held a conference. McKenzie and de Bres told the unionists that the
services of McClimont as chairperson of the meeting were no longer required and
that they would replace him with somebody else. The other members of the
90 ThePeople's Voice, 17 April 1991, p. 16.
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meeting, however, said that they were quite happy for McClimont to chair the
meeting and so de Bres had to back down.P!
In her speech to the meeting of 9 April, Piper reiterated the concern of the
trade union leadership that the Bill be opposed rather than defeated. Piper said
"we oppose the Bill. The Bill must be changed to protect workers and their
unions". The speech by Angela Foulkes echoed these concerns. She criticised those
people who thought that change could be achieved by "coming to the meeting
today or by voting for a day of industrial action or by voting for a continual
protest, especially one that others have to coordinate. You will not get the sort of
change you require". Furthermore, Foulkes stated that the C.T.V. had an
alternative to the Government's proposed legislation which was an offer to work
cooperatively with the National Government. Despite the speeches of both
Foulkes and Piper, a resolution was passed which called on the CT.V. District
Council and National Executive to "coordinate a mass action campaign to defeat
the Bill". In response to a question regarding the role that the C.T.V. could play in
supporting the resolution that was passed, Foulkes failed to give an assurance that
the C.T.V. would organise a general strike if that was what the members
wanted.92
Elsewhere in the country calls for effective leadership continued. On 21 April,
at a special branch meeting, Nelson P.S.A. members passed a unanimous vote of
no confidence in the PS.A. president, Sue Piper. This was in response to the
inaction of the P.S.A. on resolutions sent to it by the Nelson branch and by the
unwillingness of the P.S.A. to provide effective leadership for those who wished
to defeat the Bill. The PS.A. told the Nelson branch that they would only sanction
a one-day strike and cautioned their members regarding patient welfare - a
reference to PS.A. members who were employed at Ngawhatu psychiatric
hospital.P> On 15 April, members of the Canterbury branch of the P.S.A. also
passed a motion of no confidence in the PS.A. president. Again, this was a result
of the failure of the PS.A. to respond positively to calls from the membership for a
general strike.v-
91 Interview with Val McClimont, Chairperson, Canterbury P.s.A. and National Councillor,
Canterbury Branch of the P.s.A., 10 November 1993.
92 The People's Voice, 17 April 1991, pp. 16-17. Confirmed by Gerry Cotterell, Member of the
Canterbury Branch Committee p.s.A. 10 November 1993 and Val McClimont, Chairperson of the
Canterbury Branch of the p.s.A. 10 November 1993.
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Union Struggle Against the ECA Page -- 127 --
The P.S.A. national executive was not the only body of trade union leaders to
have upset its members. On 4 April, members of the Engineers Union at the
Arnotts biscuit factory in Auckland passed a vote of no confidence in Engineers
Union national secretary, Rex [ones, The reason given for this vote was [ones'
"lack of leadership in the fight against the Employment Contracts Bill and his
apparent acceptance of the Bill". They were also disappointed by the failure of the
Engineers Union leadership to join them in a march on 10 April against the
Employment Contracts Act. Furthermore, dislike was expressed for the part that
Rex [ones had played in the signing of the wage accord between the Labour
Government and the CT.U. national executive.95
In Hokitika on 15 April Ken Douglas was questioned as to why the C.T.U.
leadership had declined to lead a general strike in response to the Employment
Contracts Bill. Douglas said that they would be 'waiting forever' for him to give
the call for a general strike. He continued, "there has to be an answer other than
just leading a protest parade".96 This remark was widely reported in the national
media, providing further evidence of the C.T.U.'s reluctance to lead a general
strike.
Support for a general strike continued to build steadily. On 12 April the
executive director of the Nurses Association, Gay Williams, announced that
nurses in the public sector had voted in favour of a strike. This strike was to be a
one day strike, to occur on 29 Apri1.97 On April 14, Pat Kelly, secretary of the
Cleaners, Caretakers and Security Officers Union speculated that there was a sixty
percent chance of their being a general strike. Kelly said that whilst a number of
unions had not decided upon a definite policy position they have stated that "if
such a call is made they guarantee their members will support it". Kelly added
that if the outcome of the special affiliates meeting on 18 April was a call for a
general strike then he was confident of an overwhelming response from the
country.98
The speculation of Mr. Kelly regarding support for a general strike was echoed
by Peter Monteith, retail secretary of the Northern Distribution Union. Monteith
based his estimate of support on the high attendance at stopwork meetings by his
members. He said that meetings of shop workers held throughout the northern
95 Ibid., 17 June 1991, p. 10.
96 Ibid., 6 May 1991, p. 24.
97 New Zealand Herald, 13 April 1991, p. 1.
98 Ibid., 15 April 1991, p. 4.
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industrial district were attracting approximately two or three times the normal
attendance and that the overall theme was one of overwhelming support for
action against the Employment Contracts Bill. According to the New Zealand
Herald, support for a strike had also come from "delegates from other unions
whose management have not publicly backed the idea". However, statements
made by Ken Douglas appear to contradict the assertions made by various union
leaders and delegates regarding the support for a strike. Douglas stated that
whilst some unions were keen to take strike action against the Employment
Contracts Bill few had given their unreserved support for a twenty-four hour or a
forty-eight hour stoppage. In describing the CT.V. role in such an action Douglas
said that the CT.V. did not have the power to call a strike and instead was
looking at ways of changing public attitudes to the legislation.v?
5.5. The C.T.D. Special Affiliates Conference (18 April)
At the special CT.V. affiliates conference on 18 April initial debate centred
around the CT.Vo's national executive's resolution, particularly clause C Clause C
called for affiliates to "participate in a national day of activity on April 30, ranging
from lunchtime meetings to a duration of twenty-four hours". Speaking in favour
of the national executive resolution, Douglas said:
we need to be clear about what the resolution is for. It needs to be
demonstrably achievable, both nationally and in the regions. Members
come from different positions. What's important is what they are
prepared to do not what they can be conscripted to do.
In response to the call for a general strike Douglas said that "we must not confuse
uniformity with unity". Pat Kelly answered Douglas's statement with the assertion
the "there have been calls for a general stoppage, calls coming from the floor. I
believe it is being sought by working people now. We can't ignore those calls".
After various arguments both for and against a general strike; Rick Barker
moved an amendment calling for a twenty-four hour national stoppage on 30
April. Barker said that:
It is quite clear from all our stopwork meetings that there is support for
a one-day stoppage. Each affiliate to the Sevice Workers Federation has
had unanimous calls for a twenty-four hour strike. There must be a
specific response to that firm call from workers.
He continued, saying that members of the Service Workers Federation have said
that "when they do it they want to do it together. They want a collective veil
drawn over them because their employers can see when they are acting alone".
99 Ibid., 18 April 1991, p. 2.
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Maurice Ward had earlier moved an amendment to the resolution of the
CT.U. which called for the CT.U. national executive to "organise a campaign of
mass action to oppose the Employment Contracts Bill until it is withdrawn or
defeated". Tony Wilton of the Journalists and Graphic Process Union supported
this resolution. Thus, debate later in the conference centred around the calls for a
general strike.
Card voting occured on the Service Workers Federation amendment and the
amendment was defeated by 250,122 to 190,910. According to The People's Voice,
those unions which voted against a general strike included the Engineers Union,
The Public Service Association, Post Primary Teachers Association, Nurses
Association, Post Office Union, Education Institute and the Financial Sector
Union.lw This is supported by evidence collected in interviews. Malcolm Blair of
the Communication and Energy Workers Union confirmed that the Post Office
Union voted against the amendment and that most of the major unions were not
in favour of the amendment. Steph Breen of the Nurses Organisation (previously
the Nurses Union and Nurses Association) said that there was never a call for a
national strike by the C.T.U. and so the union could not say whether or not the
members supported a national strike. However, it is likely that the members of the
Nurses Union did indeed support a national strike. For example, in Dunedin
alone on 10 April 600 votes out of 650 cast by health workers favoured a one day
strike from 3pm April 29 to 3pm April 30. 10 1 It is plausible that such figures
reflected a nationwide trend. At the special C.T.U. affiliates conference the Nurses
Union voted against the Service Workers Federation Amendment. John Ryall said
that it was mostly the state unions that voted against the amendment and the
private sector unions that voted for the amendment. McKeefry of the Engineers
Union said that the P.S.A., the Nurses Union, the education unions, the Post office
Union and the Engineers Union all voted against the amendment. Colin Davies of
the P.S.A. confirmed that the P.S.A. voted against the amendment as did the
Engineers Union. The call for a general strike was also supported by some of the
unions outside the CT.U.. These included the Seafarers Union and the Building
Trades Union.102
100 The People's Voice, 6 May 1991, pp. 3-7.
101 Otago Daily Times, Thursday April 11 1991, p. 1
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Many of the trade union officials who voted against a general strike were also
voting contrary to the wishes of their members. For example, 87% of Nurses
Association members had voted for a twenty-four hour stoppage.P'' Similarly,
even where workers were not balloted, high attendences at stop-work meetings
should have indicated to union officials that the issue of a general strike should, at
least, have been discussed with their members. This negligence can be explained
by the thesis of bureaucratic conservatism.104 Trade union officials have a vested
interest in the negotiation process. In this situation, therefore, the trade union
bureaucracy sacrificed its members wishes in exchange for minimising the risks of
destruction or disturbance to the CT.V. structure and capabilities.
The result of the C.T.V. affiliates conference immediately caused division
within the union movement. At the 2 May meeting of the Canterbury C.T.V.
delegates from various unions reported that the failure to call for a general strike
had divided their members. Dion Martin, organiser for the Distribution and
General Workers Union also believed that people felt very strongly about the
result of the CT.V. affiliates conference. Furthermore, he stated that if the decision
had been made on the basis of one union one vote then the general strike
amendment would have been carried.l'"
It is likely that Sue Piper of the PS.A., at least voted against the wishes of her
members. Piper actually had no mandate to vote at the meeting. The meeting
began in the afternoon of 18 April and that morning the National Council of the
PS.A. had been at Piper's disposal. However, she declined to use this opportunity
to conduct a straw poll, and hence find out how the membership wanted the
P.S.A. to vote. Afterwards, Piper chose not to tell the P.S.A. National-Council how
she had used their vote stating instead that the CT.V. had voted for a day of
action and that this meant that there would not be a general strike.
The following day it was moved that the P.S.A. hold a national strike. Before
the vote was taken, Graeme Curtis asked the chairperson whether there was
anyone present who could give a reason as to why there should not be a general
strike. The vote was passed unanimously. [oris de Bres, however, asked of the
council that they embargo the announcement until the following week as the
P.S.A. was involved in negotiations with the State Services Commission. De Bres
103 See A. Wilson, "The History, Structure and Role of the CT.V.", B.A.(Hons) dissertation, P: 48
104 For an exposition of this theory see Chapters One and Six.
105 ThePeople's Voice, 6th May 1991, pp. 6-7.
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stated that the P.S.A. was negotiating for a roll-over of wages and conditions for
the next twelve months and that the State Services Commission would stop
negotiating if they learnt that the P.s.A. were taking strike action.
It is unlikely that de Bres' comments were entirely true. McClimont says that
the State Services Commission would not have stopped negotiating if they had
found out that there was going to be a strike in the future (in May). Furthermore,
if there was a general strike, the State Services Commission would be unable to
target anyone group of employees.
Contrary to protocol, which dictates that for an issue to be voted on a second
time there must be one hundred percent agreement, Piper again raised the issue of
a general strike. Most members were unaware of the protocol. On this second vote
only Canterbury, Wellington and Nelson voted for a natonal strike and so the
motion to hold a national strike was defeated.106
Douglas stated, after the meeting, that the decision not to hold a twenty-four
hour general strike did not indicate that there was any division or dissent within
the union movement. Mr Birch gave a positive response to the decision of the
CT.U. not to hold a general strike. Birch said that it was "obvious to all New
Zealanders that strike action could not be justified'U''?
5.6. The Nationwide Day of Action
Around the country, various unions decided that their contribution to the 30
April day of action would be to take strike action of some form. The Auckland
CT.U. called for a five-hour regional strike from midday Tuesday 30 April.
District president Bill Andersen predicted that the march in Auckland on the day
of action would be one of the biggest ever seen in the city. He said that the reason
for only calling for a half-day regional strike was to obtain the maximum number
of people on the march for a minimum stoppage of work. However, he conceded
that some unions were recommending to their members that strike action be taken
for a whole day.108
The Building Trades Union voted for a three-day strike to be held on the 29
and 30 April and on 1 May. The action would be in protest both at the collapse of
106 Interview with Val McClimont, Chairperson of the Canterbury Branch of the PS.A., 10
November 1993.
107 New Zealand Herald, 19 April 1991, P: 2.
108 tu«, 24 April 1991, p. 3.
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their award and against the Employment Contracts Bill. Ashley Russ, secretary of
the Building Trades Union stated that "in continuing their demands for the
abolition of travelling time and an extension of the ordinary hours of work
beyond an eight-hour day, the employers are signalling their intention to end the
national award system".!09 The decision to hold a three-day strike was supported
by over ninety percent of the Building Trade Union's members. Support for a
general strike, if the C.T.U. called for one, was almost 100 percent of the Building
Trade Union's members.U"
Health workers were unable to take the twenty-four hour strike that their
members had favoured because the Labour Court granted injunctions to the
Auckland and Otago area health boards to prevent certain workers from
withdrawing their labour.! 11
At Kinleith, pulp and paper workers decided against a twenty-four hour
stoppage after New Zealand Forest Products began legal action. Instead, they
voted for a three hour strike. In Kawerau, workers at the Tasman Pulp and Paper
Mill voted to hold a twenty-four hour strike and the Hawkes Bay pulp mill
workers voted for similar action. Meatworkers voted to strike for twenty-four
hours. Government department staff participated in various actions ranging from
a twenty-four hour strike to work bans.U-
At various stopwork meetings feelings among teachers were running high
regarding appropriate action for 30 April. The Auckland branch of the Post
Primary Teachers Association passed an amendment which called for a twenty-
four hour strike. This was despite a proposal by the executive that the teachers
limit themselves to a five-hour stoppage. Len Richards of Nga Tapuwae College
accused C.T.U. president Ken Douglas of "working for the Government in
resisting the pressure for a general strike". He stated that "national delegates of his
own union had no right to vote against a general strike along with other state
sector unions" at the special C.T.U. affiliates conference on 18 April. A national
negotiator for the P.P.T.A., Mark Barrow responded that a strike which received
seventy percent support would be seen as a failure by the media and the
109 Ibid., 26 April 1991, p. 3.
110 Interview with Ashley Russ, Building Trades Union, 19 August 1993.
III New Zealand Herald, 27 April 1991, p. 3.
112 Ibid., 30 April 1991. p. 3.
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government but a national day of action with similar support would be seen as
successful.U>
The day of action was a huge success with sixty thousand people marching
against the Employment Contracts Bill. Many marchers took up chants in favour
of a general strike. In Auckland a rally was held at Aotea Square, chaired by Bill
Andersen. The efforts of Peter Hughes, chairman of the Auckland branch of the
Communist Party, to put forward a resolution for a general strike were
unsuccessful as union officials physically prevented him from reaching the
microphone. Andersen put forward a resolution which 'condemned' the Bill and
welfare cuts and called for future union action.114
On 1 May a huge May Day rally occurred despite the efforts of the C.T.D. The
leaders of the Auckland C.T.D. and the C.T.D. national office wanted the May Day
committee to hold their march on 30 April and have a celebration on 1 May to
commemorate May Day. 115
Two days later, on 3 May Parliament passed the Employment Contracts Bill by
a forty-three to twenty-four majority.Us
Conclusion
March and April 1991 were tumultous months in New Zealand politics. It is
clear that there was a lot of energy and resources within the country, willing to
fight the Employment Contracts Bill. This chapter has detailed the build-up of
workers' awareness of and anger at this anti-union legislation. It has also detailed
the duplicity of those union leaders charged with directing the fight against the
Employment Contracts Bill. It has been shown that the constant efforts of the
union officialdom to sabotage the movement for a general strike were successful.
The next chapter addresses the twin issues of the role played by the union
bureaucracy in the struggle against the Employment Contracts Bill and thus it also
considers why the government was able to successfully introduce the
Employment Contracts Act despite masssive opposition.
113 Ibid., 26 April 1991, p. 3.
114 The People's Voice, 6 May 1991, p. 10.
115 Ibid., 6 May 1991, p. 21.
116 H.Roth, Chronicle, New Zealand Journal ofIndustrial Relations, May 1991.
Chapter Six
Conclusion:
The Failure to Call for a General Strike
Introduction
This chapter discusses the reasons why the union movement failed to lead
a general strike against the Employment Contracts Bill. It is firstly necessary to
establish that strike action could have forced the National Government to
capitulate to the wishes of workers and their dependents who constitute the
majority of New Zealanders. This is done both with reference to the
theoretical framework outlined in Chapter One and with reference to various
international and historical examples. Attention then turns to the New
Zealand experience.
It is important to realise that there are some broad explanations for the fact
that there was a failure to hold a general strike in opposition to the
Employment Contracts Act. At the time of the introduction of this anti-union
legislation New Zealand was in the depths of a profound economic crisis.
There had been a shift in the balance of power between employers and workers
that had begun in the late 1970s.1 Employers held most of the aces. The
struggle over the Employment Contracts Act took place at a time when unions
were increasingly under threat. In the decade prior to the introduction of the
Employment Contracts Bill there had been an international downturn in
working class struggle. This was coupled with a 'new realism' within the
union bureaucracy which created a movement unwilling to become involved
in active struggle. Perhaps the most crucial reason for the absence of a general
strike was the contingent conservatism of the union bureaucracy. This chapter
investigates how the betrayal of rank-and-file interests by the union
officialdom prevented a general strike which could have crushed the
Employment Contracts Act.
1 See B.Roper, "Contested Terrain: From Arbitration and Conciliation to Company Unionism and
Enterprise Bargaining" in New Zealand Monthly Review, no. 325, June/July 1990, pp. 6-13; B.
Roper, "The Policy-Making of Business Associations from Keynesianism to Neo-Classicism",
Paper presented to the NZPSA Conference, University of Otago, May 1990 and B. Roper,
"Business Political Activism and the Emergence of the New Right in New Zealand 1975-1987" in
Political Science, Vol. 40, No. 2, 1993.
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In considering whether a general strike would have been successful in New
Zealand in 1991 it is necessary to return to the more general question of the
relationship between capital and labour. Chapter One demonstrates that the
commodification of labour is an essential prerequisite of capitalist production.
Labour power is distinct from other commodities in that it is inseparable from
its producer. It is necessary for the capitalist to use labour power in order to
increase the value of his or her capital. Without labour power capital cannot
produce and thus the profit of the capitalist is threatened. By withdrawing
labour power workers therefore threaten profitability which is necessary for
survival in the long term. Thus, a general strike serves to undermine the
whole viability of the capitalist system. Furthermore, it involves a 'head to
head' clash between capital and labour which throws into doubt the legitimacy
of capitalism.
The withdrawal of labour power is more effective if it is widespread,
encompassing a wide range industries. There are three key reasons as to why
such generalised action is more effective than single industry actions or,
indeed, other forms of protest activity. Firstly, it raises the costs for capitalists
of refusing to concede to the demands of those on strike. In order for a strike to
be successful it is important that alternative sources of labour or of raw
materials (if applicable) are unavailable. This prevents or, at least, impedes
capitalists from obtaining substitutes for the missing commodities. In many
cases, therefore, production is halted or reduced, resulting in a loss of profits.
For example, one of the reasons for the eventual collapse of' the 1984-85
Miners' Strike in Great Britain was the failure to prevent coal importing and
indeed to maintain the absence of coal through ensuring total non-production
amongst all British' pits rather than merely a decrease in production as
occurred in some areas. Similarly, there was a failure on the part of other key
unions to adequately demonstrate their solidarity with the miners, a notable
case being that of the steel workers' union. Thus a crisis of the magnitude that
was feared by the Thatcher government was averted by these factors.?
2 For a more detailed discussion of the Miners Strike see A. Callinicos, The Great Strike; The
Miners Strike of 1984-1985 and its lessons.; M. Adeney & J. Lloyd, The Miners Strike 1984-85: Loss
without Limit and R. Ottey, The Strike: An Insiders 'Story.
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A general strike also decreases the period of time necessary for the action to
be sustained in order to be successful. If key industries are subject to strike
action, a country can be plunged into chaos in a matter of days. Furthermore, a
general strike will often lessen the costs for those involved in the action. The
sooner employers capitulate, the sooner strikers and their families are no
longer reliant upon donations and savings in order to survive.
Finally, generalised strike action can also go some way towards preventing
the victimisation of those involved. It is difficult for employers to isolate
individuals in cases where both strike action and, hence, public support is
widespread. Furthermore, to attempt victimisation within such a climate
often jeopardises chances of an agreement being reached
In New Zealand, therefore, it was important that any strike action over the
Employment Contracts Act be generalised among the various industries. For
example, strike action was taken by some groups, among them builders and
teachers, but this action was not coordinated and not universalised.
Furthermore, since it was known that the Employment Contracts Act would
give greater power to employers, many workers were unwilling to take
individual action or even action with the support of their union if more
widespread action did not occur. Many were anxious to avoid victimisation
particularly those whose position in the workforce was vulnerable. It was
made clear by Rick Barker of the Service Workers Federation on 18 April 1991,
at the Special Affiliates Conference, that whilst members of the Service
Workers Federation were eager to undertake strike action they wished to have
a "collective veil drawn over them".
A general strike would therefore have had a better chance of success and
would, indeed, have produced swifter success than a series of isolated strikes. It
may also have helped prevent the victimisation of individuals. There are a
number of historical examples of such actions being successful because of their
generalised nature.
One notable example occurred in France in May 1968. In the previous
eighteen months all strikes and lockouts had ended in success for employers.
The government had made use of the police force to defeat those groups of
workers that had refused to submit. In May 1968 the use of police to attack a
student protest escalated into a chain of events that the French government
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simply could not hope to control. On 13 May 1968 a demonstration was held in
Paris in which workers and students combined to form the biggest March in
the city since its liberation from the Nazis in 1944.
In Western France, the following Tuesday, workers in one section at the
Sud Aviation plant extended their regular 15 minute strike by refusing to
return to work and, indeed, "marched around the plant getting support from
other workers and blockaded the manager in his office. "3 News of this action
travelled fast.
The following day, workers at the Renault gearbox plant near Rouen
brought production to a halt when they extended a planned one and a half
hour strike by an extra half hour. Harman states that "the next day dozens
more factories were occupied - Lockheed at Beauvais and Orleans, Renault at
Flins and Le Mans". By Monday, white collar workers had joined the strike
wave, shutting down large shops, insurance companies and banks.
France ground to a halt. There were no trains, no buses, no banks open
and no postal services. There was soon an acute petrol shortage.
Everywhere factories were occupied or shut down with pickets on the
gates. The strike movement was not confined to traditional industries:
hospitals, museums, film studios, theatres and even the Folies Bergeres
were affected.4
For two weeks the government waited, unable to control France. When, on 25
May, the French government offered a 35 percent increase in the minimum
wage and a seven percent increase in other wages "this proposal was defeated
in the factories".
The announcement by de Gaulle, on 30 May, that he was calling a general
election brought the disruption to an end. The leading unions and the
Communist Party put their efforts into diffusing the situation so that time and
energy could be spent preparing for the upcoming election. Three days later
France returned to work with the key public sector industries of electricity and
gas, the post office and the railways once again in operation.f
3 C. Harman, The Fire Last Time: 1968 and After, p. 96.
4 Ibid., p. 98.
S For a fuller account of May 1968 see C. Harman, The Fire Last Time pp. 92-111; P. Armstrong
et.al., Capitalism since 1945, pp. 200-207 and 1. Birchall, "France 1968: All power to the
imagination" in C. Barker (ed.), Revolutionary Rehearsals, pp. 5-41.
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The general strike in France in May 1968 thus plunged France into turmoil.
The normal operations of the country were suspended, forcing de Gaulle to
consider resigning. Control of the nation effectively passed from the hands of
an elite minority into the hands of the mass of the people-. The French
experience shows how workers acting collectively have a momentous source
of power.
In Britain four years later workers were able to bring this collective muscle
to bear to oust an unpopular government and to 'persuade' the new
government to repeal a major piece of anti-union legislation, the Industrial
Relations Act. From the election of the conservatives in June 1970 and the
introduction. of their Industrial Relations Bill, Britain was rocked by strikes
and industrial conflict. The new legislation provided for the imposition of
harsh fines as a penalty for strike action. On 11 November a one-day protest
strike over the legislation was held in the west of Scotland. Approximately a
month later half a million workers held a one-day strike. On 12 January a
further one-day strike was held. Harman reports that "in Coventry 40,000
struck and 15,000 demonstrated; in Oxford all the car plants were shut; on
Merseyside 50,000 struck"."
This action was overtaken by a successful strike action by miners over pay.
Ultimately the government had to give in to the miners' demands. An
inquiry established by the government recommended that the miners be
offered a 20 percent wage increase over a sixteen month period. This was
rejected and further concessions had to be made before the miners' leadership
put it to their members. The reason for such overwhelming success is to be
found in the amount of active support provided to the miners:
In South Wales dockers refused to unload coal and train drivers to move
it. In Staffordshire 50 lorry drivers were threatened with the sack for
refusing to cross picket lines. Not one of 38 power stations in the
northwest accepted any more coal. In Fife, haulage contractors were
forced to layoff 200 drivers. In the midlands 90 percent of drivers
respected picket lines. Coal and coke were prevented from entering the
Shelton iron and steel works in South Wales. Soon it was not just coal
that was being stopped, but also oil and hydrogen supplies to power
stations?
6 C. Harman, The Fire Last Time, p. 240.
7 Ibid., p. 245.
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The seeds of the downfall of the Heath government are to be found in the
action of the miners but this time in action which took place a year later. In
November 1973, buoyed by the increase in oil prices, which would cause the
government to use its coal stockpiles, British miners began an overtime ban.
The response of Heath was to announce the compulsory shortening of the
working week - down to three days - and the compulsory shut-down of all
industry for ten days over Christmas.
These measures were insufficient to deal with the action by the miners
who managed to stop production in every pit. Again, the success of the miners
was due in large part to the solidarity shown by other workers: "Support for
the miners in other workplaces was virtually automatic: typical of the
solidarity were the coal trains which would stop the moment they saw a picket
sign - even if no picket was in sight. The police and troops trained for picket
breaking would not have helped the government at all".8
The response of the conservatives was to hold an election on the question
of "who runs the country, the Government or the unions?", which they lost
overwhelmingly. Attempts by Heath to keep power for an extra four days were
attacked by big business who felt that the conservatives had been paralysed by
the unions. The new Labour Government adopted a more. conciliatory
approach both to the unions and to the problem of rising unemployment. The
new Minister of Employment Michael Foot repealed most of the provisions of
the Industrial Relations Act.?
Closer to home, the Muldoon Government's attempts to introduce a wage
freeze in 1976 and 1977 were defeated by the actions of the union movement.
The wage freeze policy which was officially launched on 14 May 1976 already
incorporated significant concessions to the union movement in an attempt to
prevent industrial unrest. However, these concessions were not sufficient to
contain union dissatisfaction. Stop-work meetings swept the country and the
F.O.L. held an emergency national conference for the first time. The
conference "recommended that affiliated unions organise one-day stoppages
in the main centres and authorised Trades Councils to mount campaigns of
direct action.t'l"
8 Ibid., p. 270.
9 For a fuller account see D. Sherry, "The Fight that Blasted Heath" inSocialist Review,
January 1994, pp. 24-25 and C.Harman, The Fire Last Time.
10 J. Boston, Incomes Policy in New Zealand, p. 170.
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The response of the Government was to agree to some modification of its
policy. This concession not being sufficient to quell the wave of unrest, the
Government held top-level talks in their search for a solution. The
Government took two measures designed to restore industrial harmony:
...firstly, by encouraging the F.O.L. to take a case for a G.W.O. to the
soon to be appointed Wage Hearing Tribunal and secondly by imposing
a 136-day freeze on prices and rents on 17 August 1976. The price freeze
was implemented against the advice of officials and appears to have
had no effect on the level of industrial unrest)l
It became evident to the Government that the union movement would
not accept an extension of the wage freeze for another year. Consequently
Muldoon decided that free wage bargaining of some sort would have to be
reintroduced before spring 1977. Union action was significant therefore in
inducing the Government to return to free wage bargaining. Boston states that:
...it was clear that any attempt to maintain statutory wage controls
would be met with trenchant union opposition. Not only would this
mean continuing high levels of industrial unrest, but it would also
strengthen the role of more militant elements within the F.O.L.
Neither outcome was considered desirable by Muldoon.12
The above examples show that generalised strike action can be successful in
forcing policy changes upon a government. It is now necessary to discuss why
such action was not taken in the struggle over the Employment Contracts Act.
6.2. Union Officials and the Call for a General Strike
In considering the role played by the union bureaucracy in averting a
general strike it is important to keep in mind some general points about trade
unions in capitalist society and about the distinctive role of trade union
officials. Trade unionism is itself contradictory in that whilst it provides a
means for workers to resist the demands of capital it also provides capitalists
with the means for managing the demands of workers. Thus struggle tends to
take place in arenas where compromise is possible. In other words, disputes
over wages are more likely to occur than disputes over workplace control.
Hyman argues that conflict between rank-and-file union members and
union officials has been a "persistent theme in the history of trade
11 Ibid., p. 173.
12 Ibid., p. 181.
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unionismv.t> There are a number of reasons why union officials may not act
in the best interests of their members. Union officials will tend to stress their
own areas of competence when conflict arises and give legitimacy to their own
position by advocating negotiation and compromise as a means of achieving
the goals of the union. This shifts the emphasis of a conflict away from
collective strike action.H The commitment of union officials to the security
and survival of their organisation may also lead them to advocate methods
which are often contradictory to the wishes of the majority of the union
members. Their approach to conflict resolution will, of necessity, be a cautious
one.
The ong~ns of union officials may also be important in explaining the
nature of trade union officialdom. Union officials are likely to be those
workers who are white, male and in higher paid and higher skilled jobs. Their
material interests therefore differ from those of their members. They enjoy
greater affluence and a greater level of job security. Union officials may also
find it difficult to represent the issues of their members because they are
isolated from them. Union officials tend to spend more time in talks with
employer representatives than they do with their rank-and-file members.
They place importance upon the maintenance of channels of negotiation
which leads to a common bureaucratic hostility to strike action. Furthermore,
union officials are rarely subject to any accountability, a fact which serves to
emphasise their perceived role as independent negotiators rather than as the
direct representatives of the rank-and-file.
Trade union officials acquire certain levels of experience and expertise.
Hyman argues that those who are regularly involved in bargaining processes
often come to "take for granted the 'rules of the game' which such
relationships presuppose't.lf The union membership can become dependent
upon the experience and expertise built up by their officials. This can often
make it difficult for rank-and-file members to challenge decisions made by
their representatives.lf
13 R Hyman, The Political Economy of Industrial Relations, p. 230
14 R Hyman, The Political Economy of Industrial Relations, P: 230 and see also RHyman,
Marxism and the Sociology of Trade Unions.
15 Ibid., p. 248.
16 For a more detailed discussion of the conservatism of trade union officials see Chapter One.
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There are a number of ways in which the nature of trade union officialdom
is reflected in the New Zealand experience over the Employment Contracts
Act. A number of trade union officials emphasised the importance of the
continuity and credibility of their trade union at the expense of mass struggle.
For example, in defending the decision of the Nurses Union to oppose strike
action, Steph Breen stated that:
There's a difference between idealism and pragmatism and realism;
about who's got their feet on the ground and who's just standing up
waving the banner. If you're going to say we're going to do this you've
got to be able to deliver or otherwise your credibility goes down the
tubes.17
Similarly, John McKeefry, of the Engineers' Union, in discussing the strategy
that his union adopted in response to the Employment Contracts Bill states
that:
They (National) were going to do it, we'd best not enrage them further,
we'd best not take that option and what we'd best do is to prepare a
very well-researched submission arguing for the alternative which is
the high wage, high skill economy and arguing that we needed to have
a coordinated labour relations policy across the country to ensure that
standards are kept up and that the emphasis is not on short-term wage
cutting solutions but investing in training and skills and things like that
and we'd best educate our own employees.18
The leadership of the CT.U. in particular placed considerable emphasis on
compromise and upon their negotiating ability. This is evidenced in the
decision of the C.T.U. to mount a protest campaign aimed at achieving major
modifications to the bill rather than the abolition of the bill entirely.l ?
Similarly, in his speech to protesters in Auckland in April 1991, Bill Anderson
stressed that if the protest activities were not sufficient to persuade the
government to withdraw the bill then the unions would have to try for the
"best possible agreement".20 Finally, the fact that the C.T.U. adopted the
'oppose the bill' line rather than the 'defeat the bill' line favoured by many is
an indication that they were more interested in negotiation than in struggle.
There were three specific ways in which union leaders contributed to the
government's ability to pass the Employment Contracts Act with very little
17 Interview with Steph Breen, Nurses Orgainsation, 17 August 1993.
18 Interview with John McKeefry, Engineers Union, 19 August 1993.
19 This campaign is discussed in detail in Chapter Five.
20 See Chaper Five for a more detailed account of the circumstances in which this comment was
made.
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difficulty. Firstly, the C.T.U. failed to call for a general strike. This was despite
the overwhelming support for a general strike from rank-and-file unionists
and, indeed, from many branch organisations affiliated to the C.T.U., for
example, the Canterbury branch of the P.S.A. Indeed, Ken Douglas indicated,
in his speech to protestors at Hokitika on 15 April, (before the Special Affiliates
Conference of 18 April) that the C.T.U. was unwilling to lead a general strike.
The leadership of many unions were out of step with their members'
wishes when they voted against a general strike at the C.T.U. Special Affiliates
Conference on 18 April. These unions included the PS.A., the Nurses Union,
the Engineers Union and the P.P.T.A. Some have defended their actions on
the grounds that they did not ballot their members and so they were unsure of
the support for strike action - for example, the Engineers Union and the
Nurses Organisation. The level of support for strike action both on the streets
and at regional meetings indicate that such union leaders would have been
well aware of the general feeling regarding strike action and that In fact it was
this awareness that prevented them from balloting members because they
knew what the result would be.
Finally, the C.T.U. acted negligently when it refused to provide any
centralised leadership. It was decided that action should be organised on a
region by region basis. As the umbrella body for unions, the C.T.U. abdicated
its responsibility when it refused to coordinate regional activities.
Furthermore, when regional action contradicted the official stance, as it did in
Canterbury, the CT.U. took measures designed to sabotage this action thus
contravening its own stated decision regarding regional autonomy.
The various protest activities and meetings described in Chapter Five
indicates that there was an overwhelming support for strike action among
working class New Zealanders. That there was widespread support for strike
action is shown by the vast numbers of people who were involved in protest
marches in early 1991. Similarly the high attendances at stopwork meetings
illustrate the depth of feeling in the country at large. Opinion polls conducted
at the time, as well as ballots, show overwhelming support for strike action.
Statements by government ministers indicate that there was an awareness of
this among those people pivotal to the introduction of the Bill. For example,
Bolger publicly attacked the union movement and Birch responded angrily to
the introduction of some closed shops. Finally, Max Bradford even indicated
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that some changes to the legislation might be necessary in the face of such
strong opposition (see Chapter Five). The blame for the absence of a general
strike should therefore be laid at the feet of the union leaders who declined to
organise an action which their membership wanted. A general strike could
have defeated the Bill - protest activities alone were never going to achieve
that goal.
6.3. Conclusion
In the previous sections the strength of the central argument of the thesis
was evaluated and conclusions were drawn from the synthesis of the
empirical evidence and the theoretical framework. This section is therefore, an
attempt to assess the soundness of the thesis as a whole and to highlight some
of its strengths and weaknesses.
The value of the study is to be found in two key areas. Firstly it should be of
use to labour historians. It constructs a historical narrative of the struggle over,
arguably, the most controversial piece of legislation enacted by the Bolger
Government. Furthermore, it also attempts to provide an analysis of why
events unfolded in the way that they did. This is done by applying Classical
Marxist theory in general and the theory of bureaucratic conservatism
specifically to the information obtained. The struggle over the Employment
Contracts Act has not been documented in this much depth anywhere else.
Secondly, on a more abstract level, this thesis represents an attempt to
articulate lessons which many have already learnt. It is hoped that this account
of how and why the union leadership sold out provides an opportunity to
reflect upon the mistakes of the past and ways of avoiding these mistakes in
the future.
There are a number of areas in which the research is particularly strong.
The empirical evidence includes interviews with many people who had first-
hand knowledge of the events that are discussed in the narrative. Some of
them provided information which was not available elsewhere. -Others have
confirmed existing information, verified the statements of others or provided
a more detailed analysis of events than is available from other sources. Such
information supports and extends the narrative constructed. Similarly, the
empirical evidence includes the collation of many newspaper accounts written
at the time that the events occurred. Again, there has been extensive cross-
referencing of information to ensure that the facts are correct and that they are
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as detailed as possible. The official documents obtained serve to confirm many
aspects of the information and provide an insight into the goals and
arguments of those who wielded power in the struggle over the Employment
Contracts Act.
There are, however, several weaknesses in the empirical research. Firstly,
there is the obvious absence of an interview with a spokesperson from the
CT.V. This was because no-one from the C.T.V. was available when I went to
Wellington to conduct interviews for this thesis. However, some C.T.V.
documents were provided which compensated, in part, for the lack of
interview material. Another omission is that of the minutes of the C.T.V.
Special Affiliates Meeting of 18 April. Thus it was impossible to construct a
complete picture of the events that occurred at the Special Affiliates Meeting.
Whilst these would have been invaluable, difficulties were encountered in
obtaining them. However, I was able to talk to people who had attended the
meeting. The discussion of the meeting therefore was based primarily upon
interviews and upon the reports of the Peoples Voice. A final omission which
is apparent is that of detailed information regarding the various government
ministries and the struggle over the Employment Contracts Act. Again, the
difficulty here was one of availability of information.
A further weakness in the research is the question of the validity of
information conveyed with the benefit of hindsight. With the substantial
reliance within the thesis upon interviews, this question should be kept in
mind when reading the various individual accounts of the ·struggle. In
addition, those interviewed were bureaucrats rather than rank-and-file
activists. The perspectives on the struggle were therefore provided by those
who have a vested interest in justifying their own action or, indeed, inaction.
The thesis answers some questions about this period in New Zealand's
labour history but also indicates a need for many others to be asked. One
potential area for further research is an in depth analysis of the government
concerns about the struggle over the Employment Contracts Act. This would
require access to the appropriate ministerial documents. Similarly, it would be
interesting to examine the concerns of the New Zealand Employers Federation
and the New Zealand Business Roundtable about the struggle over the
Employment Contracts Act. A further potential area of research could be a
comparison of the influence of the C.T.V. leadership within the union
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movement both before and after the Employment Contracts Act. This could
incorporate an analysis of the effect upon the C.T.V. of its failure to lead a
general strike. Finally, it could be valuable to compare the introduction of the
Employment Contracts Act with efforts to introduce enterprise bargaining in
Australia and, indeed, in other advanced capitalist countries.
Classical Marxist theory and the industrial relations history of New
Zealand enabled an analysis of this particular event in New Zealand's labour
history to be provided. Chapter One discussed the nature of industrial
relations in capitalist society. It explained why industrial relations are
characterised by conflict between employers and workers. It examined the
specific role of trade unions in capitalist society and drew distinctions between
the interests of trade union officials and those of their rank-and-file members
It also explained the role played by the state in capitalist society. These
discussions enabled explanations to be provided as to why the Employment
Contracts Act was introduced, why it was supported both by employers and by
the National Government and why, in the majority of cases, the trade union
leadership failed to support the wishes of their rank-and-file membership.
Chapter Two enabled the unique aspects of New Zealand's labour history to
be taken into account in the analysis. It identified the key actors in industrial
relations in New Zealand. This facilitated the identification of the various
parties who were involved in the campaign over the Employment Contracts
Bill and often provided some insight into their motivations. Chapter Two, by
providing a context within which to view the Employment Contracts Act
made it possible to demonstrate that the Act was the product of a specific set of
economic, social and historical circumstances. Thus conclusions could be
drawn as to the issues that were of importance to the key actors and as to their
relative strengths and weaknesses. The theoretical framework was, therefore,
invaluable in enabling the empirical evidence discussed in the case study to be
explained and analysed.
There are a number of political conclusions that can be drawn from the
information contained in this thesis. Firstly, it is vital that a rank-and-file
perspective be incorporated into labour history. It has been explained that the
experience of trade union bureaucrats in struggles differs greatly from that of
their rank-and-file members. Therefore, history described or written by those
in a privileged class position will reflect a corresponding inherent bias.
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Secondly, this thesis highlights the need for more democratic unions. This
entails the election rather than the appointment of all paid trade union
officials. It requires that rank-and-file members have access to information
regarding policy-making decisions - there should be no 'back-room deals'. It
also requires that trade union officials be fully accountable to their members
for the decisions that they make. This entails making union officials subject to
recall. More democratic unions may also require that the pay of officials be
similar, if not identical to, that of their members.
Finally, this thesis highlights the need to recognise the collective potential
of workers. It is important to realise that when workers are united they can
bring about real and lasting change. Often all that is required is a determined
leadership. In the case of the proposed general strike over the Employment
Contracts Act it was clear that there were enough supporters and that this
support was sufficiently widespread for the Employment Contracts Act to be
defeated. All that was absent was a strong and united leadership. For their part
in refusing to fight, therefore, many union officials share in the guilt of the
introduction of the Employment Contracts Act.
Appendix
Interview Transcripts
Communication and Energy Workers Union - Malcolm Blair. 18/08/93
Q. What is the current membership of the C.E.W.U.?
A. About 23,000, maybe a few more.
Q. How has the size of membership changed between 1987 and 1993?
A. Dramatically. In 1987, the union was in fact two unions - it was the post office union
and the electrical and electronic workers union. Now what happened in 1992, last year,
both unions amalgamated and so this brought the membership together. Now if you go
back to 1987 of course the old Post Office Union had a membership of some 40,000 there
the Electrical Workers Union probably had a membership of about 12,000. Now, of
course, if you look at the amalgamated union saying that we've got 23,000 maybe just a
little more than that there has really been a loss from about 52,000 back to that which is
just over half the membership. Now certainly if you take Telecom and New Zealand Post
which were the two big companies we represented if you go back to 1987 we had
membership in Te1ecom of some 20,000 workers and membership in New Zealand Post of
some 12,000 workers. Now both those two companies have substantially reduced their
numbers - down to 10,000 in Telecom now and down to 7500 in New Zealand Post. Now,
of course, all that has been through redundancies, efficiency drives and contracting out
work. So overall we have had a big reduction in membership.
Q. What sectors of the economy does the union draw its membership from?
A. As the C.E.W.U. we draw it from the communications sector which primarily is
Telecom and the other telecommunications providers which are the small operators and the
providers in that area. They cater for contracting work in buildings, those sorts of things.
The postal sector which is primarily from New Zealand Post - there are not too many other
companies which operate postal businesses. From the banking sector we still have some
2600 members who are in Postbank which is part of the ANZ group. We only have those
primarily because of historical reasons rather than the fact that we have been recruiting in
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that area because Postbank came from the old Post Office. It was the old Post Office
Savings Bank. The other area is in the energy and primarily the area there is the power
supply companies which is the old power boards. We don't have many people in
generation and then from electronic manufacturing, electronic repair like Tisco - those
sorts of companies, some of the electronic manufacturing companies and
telecommunications manufacturing companies. And then from maintenance electricians
who work in various industries.
Q. How is the union organised?
A. The union consists of six branches and a national office. Now we have a branch which
is the Auckland branch, the Hamilton branch, the Palmerston North branch, the Wellington
branch, the Christchurch branch, the Dunedin branch. The branches primarily are charged
with recruiting ne members, organising current members within their areas, dealing with
disputes within their areas and negotiating contracts for their members within the area
where the employer is located. So the branches are structured that way. each branch has its
own membership committee which helps run the branch. Then the national office really
provides a service function for the branches. The national branch has the responsibility for
negotiating all the major contracts which we have - the big national ones. Telecom we
have one collective contract [New Zealand] Post we have one collective contract which
covers all the workers. They are negotiated through the national office as likewise the
contracts for the tradespeople within the meat industry. We've got maintenance
electricians and that, the Engineers have got fitters and that. We negotiate the combined
contract there between the two unions for the meat industry so there's those sort of things
which are done through the national office. The national office also provides back-up
support through research for the branches. It also provides a focus on industry training
through industry training organisations. The two major ones there are the
electrotechnology one which is the electrical one and the telecommunications one which is
called TESSA. Also the national office provides legal services and back-up in that area.
We get driven more to using the courts these days to resolve our differences. Also the
union at branch level we have a management committee, we have an executive council at
the national level which is drawn from the branches. The branch representatives are on the
executive council and also what we call sector representatives because the union is divided
into five sectors, there is an electrical sector, an energy sector, a postal sector, a
communications sector, a commercial sector. So each of these sectors have representation.
Why we have sectors is to ensure that each group of members .... the groups of members
have widely different concerns. What is of concern to a maintenance electrician will be
quite different to what the concerns are of a Postbank worker who is a teller. So we have
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our sectors so that we can take care of looking after the specific things of concern to the
members of our groups and that is basically what our structure is.
Q. Is the council elected?
A. Yes, the executive council is elected. The branch presidents, of course, are elected from
within their branch and they sit on it and then, of course, the sectoral representatives are
elected at our annual conference from the members.
Q. How is policy determined?
A. Policy is determined by the annual conference. It is the highest authority within the
union. We have representatives there from all over the country.
Q. What resources does the union have to engage in lobbying activity?
A. Very few these days. We used to have a lot of time to do those sorts of things. Unions
are stretched these days like everyone else. Particularly so our union as we are being
driven towards having to try and achieve collective contracts or employment contracts with
various employers so there is far greater emphasis now on negotiating than there is on
lobbying. We still try to divert some of our resources towards lobbying, Particularly when
pieces of legislation come up that are of real concern to us. The Select Committee just had
a review or went out and sought views from interested parties on the effect and how the
Employment Contracts Act was actually working. We put in some comment to make sure
we put our views across. You know, like the question of the deregulation of New
Zealand Post which is whether the postal service should be regulated or deregulated, a
debate that has been going on for a number of years because that has a serious outcome. If
it was to be deregulated this would seriously affect the number of jobs in New Zealand
Post or the jobs that would remain. We put the effort into lobbying but in the main we
don't do as much as we used to.
Q. How did you carry out lobbying in the past?
A. Primarily through the general secretary and people like myself. That was through our
contacts that we had with politicians or with business leaders. Just the normal way of
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lobbying, we knew, well certainly in the days of Labour, quite a few of the Cabinet
ministers and we used those sorts of contacts to our best advantage to make sure our views
got heard in the right quarters.
Q. Does the union have a good working relationship with any government departments?
A. Well we have very little dealings with government departments. We don't represent any
government departments so I would say yes and no.
Q. What were the major advantages for your union of the Labour Relations Act?
A. I'll tell you what was not a major advantage for us - the unqualified preference clause
for union membership. That was never a major advantage for us. We were always well
organised in those particular areas and as such, particularly if you take places like Telecom
and New Zealand Post we've still got a membership of 90-95% in those areas. The major
advantage of the old Labour Relations Act was the bargaining framework which existed
which allowed us to work effectively and efficiently in terms of being able to bargain and
the employers liked the arrangement too. When you get very large employers that are
employing thousands of workers rather than one or two their view of the world is that they
do not want a multitude of bargaining agents, they want a union they can deal with, a
union which has got the interests of the company at heart as well as the interests of the
workers and, of course the legislation gave us a bargaining framework which gave security
to both sides. It gave us the security that [the company]wasn't going to let anyone else in
so we could make the changes that were necessary for its survival and ensure that there
would be job security and in some cases future job growth, of course, all that was taken
away. From the old Post Office union side we had never been involved in negotiating
awards we had always negotiated enterprise agreements so when that came along in did
not make a lot of difference. Whereas in the electrical side we have had a lot of difficulties
there because of the old awards that have gone and we've had to put in a whole framework
to ensure that we can negotiate agreements with employers.
Q. What were the disadvantages for the union of the Labour Relations Act?
A. At the time none. It is my personal view that the unions should have allowed for a
voluntary membership base a lot sooner than having it forced on us by the Employment
Contracts Act and I think that having the unqualified preference clause in the old Labour
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Relations Act may have been a disadvantage. Maybe it should have been removed a lot
earlier and made us more responsive to the members needs.
Q. Did the policies of the union change at all as a result of the Labour Relations Act?
A. No I don't think so. We'd always had some very broad policies. We had some social
policies in general which had been established. We were looking to how we could keep
improving the social wage through education, health, those sorts of things. We were
always fairly flexible on our bargaining policies. We had policies like all workers should
have superannuation, we should always have a shorter working week and leave provisions
should be improved. We had those types of policies. I don't think those policies really
changed a lot. You must remember that prior to 1987 we operated within the state
framework because of the old Post Office Union side and were governed by the Act. Then..
when we moved into the L.R.A. as SOEs we were not permitted to move into the use of .
awards. In the first instance we had to negotiate agreements so we were placed into
negotiating enterprise agreements, of course, they were very big enterprises in Telecom in
those days they had 20000 workers. There were a lot of awards that didn't cover anywhere
near that many workers, consequently our policies just flowed across. Certainly the way
we bargained changed a lot from how we bargained under the state to how we were to
bargain under the L.R.A. It was quite a culture shock for us all because we had to adjust
ourselves from a very safe and known framework in which to operate where really
bargaining was more over technical issues because the state always just followed what was
happening in the private sector but, of course, we got thrown over the other side. After
1987 we had the Labour Relations Act where you had to face the employer straight across
the table and we were free to do anything we wanted whereas before we were always
constrained by the State Services Commission in terms of what we could do so that was a
big change.
Q. What were the major objectives of your union between 1987 and 1991?
A. I think the major objective was to secure agreements for our workers or awards. The
second major objective was to ensure that as the two major employers restructured that as
they restructured they restructured in a way that was going to be better for the future. I
suppose that one of the other objectives was to ensure that the State -Owned Enterprises,
Telecom and Post, the social aspects of their business that the government did not lose
sight of that. In '87 and '88 we ran extensive campaigns on 'save the post office' or save
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post offices' as they closed post offices and made changes which we said were going to
destroy the social objectives of the organisation.
Q. What position did the union adopt with regard to the Compact?
A. I think we supported it . We did in the end support it. For a start we actually opposed it
and then we turned around and we supported it. It was a bit strange that because again one
of the things is that one of the difficulties in either settling awards or getting pay increases
and improved conditions, all those sorts of things where employers were trying to squeeze
that out, you know, squeeze pay increases right down to the minimum and not agree to
new conditions or try and change current conditions and push unions towards concession
bargaining that was going on where the awards existed is that because we had enterprise
agreements that weren't awards is that we had found that we were able to negotiate with
people like New Zealand Post and Telecom and get better conditions and get better wages
than what was happening in other areas. This was because we had always strongly focused
our bargaining on productivity gains within the company so as new technologies were
introduced we always wanted something for it. It's not like that today - they've become
too hardened those employers. What we were seeing was each time we were settling we
were going in opposite directions to the way other industries were going with their awards.
So as things tightened down in there we were getting improvements. So we weren't quite
sure the Compact was going to deliver to us what we wanted but then in the interests of
unity we supported it. I think we got reasonably good increases that year because we did
better than what the Compact guidelines were because we had always argued about
productivity anyway.
Q. How did the union respond to the introduction of the E.c.B.?
A. Well we fought it like everyone else. We opposed it, we showed outright what was
going to be wrong with it and why it should be changed. We didn't so vigorously oppose
the aspects of voluntary unionism but we did strongly oppose the bargaining aspects - the
bargaining framework, changes to the institutions. Strangely enough we convinced
Telecom and New Zealand Post that the position that we took about what would happen in
the bargaining area is that they supported us. They were two large employers who only
ever wanted to deal with one union. They did not want a multitude of unions or a
multitude of agents. They didn't want workers, they really wanted to deal with the union
and make deals with the union rather than this ratification process which delays a lot of
times how quickly you can settle changes to contracts.
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Q. Could you describe briefly the involvement of this union in the campaign against the
Employment Contracts Bill?
A. I suppose our involvement was through the C.T.U.. We ran meetings with members up
and down the country to explain to them what it would mean . We lobbied hard not just
with the government, with politicians to try to get them to change their minds but also with
employers like New Zealand Post and Telecom. We convinced them that a number of
aspects of the bargaining arrangements would work to their detriment and convinced them
to make submissions to the Select Committee. We made submissions to the Select
Committee. Those sorts of things. We didn't take any strike action. We didn't support a
protest action. We ran lunchtime meetings.
Q. What was the response of the rank-and-file of the union?
A. I think for a start there was a lot of confusion. It meant trying to educate them about just
what it actually meant. It was alright for a number of union officials to say: "we've sat
down and know what it means" you had to sort of get that across to the rank-and-file. For a
start they were being quite confused about what it all meant, where it was going to take
them but after a while I think they grasped what were the points that were really at issue
within it, which were really going to affect them. We used a lot of publicity amongst the
membership about what had happened - various aspects of it.
Q. Did the majority of the membership support a national strike in opposition to the
Employment Contracts Bill?
A. I didn't know. We never balloted our members. There were certain officials internally
within the union who supported it and certain officials who didn't. What were the exact
views of our rank-and-file I don't think we'll ever know now. Some of us. held the view
that the membership wasn't strongly in favour of that. There were others who didn't. The
only way I think we would ever have settled our difference was either to have called a one-
day national stoppage and see how many members joined in or went out and took a ballot.
Unfortunately neither happened so neither of us will know who was right or wrong now.
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Q. At the special C.T.V. affiliates conference held on the 18th of April did the
representative of this union vote for or against the Service Workers Amendment calling for
a general strike?
A. I think we voted against it
Q. Do you know which other major unions also voted against?
A. I can't recall now but certainly most of the major unions weren't in favour of it. They
thought it wasn't going to achieve what the Service Workers were saying at that stage.
Q. With the benefit of hindsight do you think that was the correct position to adopt?
A. I've thought a lot about it, particularly so in seeing what has happened in Melbourne
with Australia. They took protest action, took to the streets. I don't know. I don't think
that had we had the one day stoppage because that was all that was called for that we may
have in fact got all the members out or certainly a good proportion of the members out on
the street protesting for the day but I think the government was absolutely hell-bent on
passing that piece of legislation. The country could have stopped for a week and they
would still have passed that piece of legislation. Certainly a one-day stoppage, whilst it
may have allowed a lot of people to vent their frustrations and let off a bit of steam it was
certainly not going to change or to affect what was going to be the outcome of the E.C.A.
And so it just seems to me, in hindsight, that it just would have been a days wasted money
which it was better to have kept for another day, whenever that day is, I don't know. I
think Ken Douglas summed it up when he said it was an ongoing fight. He said it was
going to be a long, hard fight to, in fact, clawback rights for workers. The government
would make the changes and we had to fight the E.C.A. on an ongoing basis and that was
going to take a long time. I think that this year is now the opportunity to try and get those
changes through defeating the National Government at the polls and that's where our fight
will lie.
Q. How has the Employment Contracts Act affected your union?
A. It has affected us maybe not to the full extent that it has affected some of the other
unions particularly like the Service Workers who have been badly hit by it and a lot of the
smaller unions too even the P.S.A.. Since the introduction of the Employment Contracts
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Act we have successfully settled new collectives in places like Telecom, Post, ANZ. ;
successfully settled collectives in all of the energy areas that we have got members, that's
the supply companies, to some degree. We have not been as successful in the electrical
side. We haven't settled as many collectives in there as we'd like to , we've got a lot of
members on collective contracts. The companies have from time to time threatened us with
negotiations or alluded to what they could do under the E.C.A. if we were not reasonable
but none of them have actually done it, none of them have taken us on. If you take the
Telecom and New Zealand Post contracts which were probably amongst the biggest single
enterprise contracts around because Telecom covers 10,000 workers is that we haven't
suffered a reduction in pay rates or allowances or had to give up things. We've still got our
very good provisions there. They keep telling us we're very good and we're top of the
market now. We're going to have to pay the price for that one day. We haven't felt the full
thrust of it. Places that we've probably felt the full thrust of the E.C.A. is in places like the
electrical maintenance area where a lot of our workers were pushed onto individual
contracts. There were big changes there, in the electronics area too. But the rest we've
struggled through and we've maintained collective contracts. At the moment about 85% of
our total membership is covered by collective contracts.
Q. Have there been any major advantages for the union of the RC.A.?
A. None that I've seen that's for sure. I wish there was.
Q. Have there been any major disadvantages for the union of the RC.A.?
A. From our perspective the major disadvantage has been the bargaining area primarily
because of the bureaucracy you have to go through to now be able to bargain. As I said, in
the past we'd always bargained on an enterprise level anyway so going from the old
L.R.A. to the E.C.A. that was no different to us and we bargained across the table from our
employers in an open and free way and everything was always on the table to be discussed.
So there was nothing new in that but the sheer bureaucracy that was put in place. It was
having to go round and get everyones written authority and then having to produce that to
the employer and then going through the whole of the ratification procedure, setting a
ratification procedure and going through it. Not so much that we object, in the past the
union used to settle on behalf of workers and the workers would have a vote, that was
okay. When you've got two large employers, Telecom and New Zealand Post which
employ people from one end of the country to the other in all sorts of places you think that
going around to find 10,000 workers like there is in Telecom and finding out when each
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one works and making sure that you get there when each one is at work and not out on the
job doing something somewhere and getting them to sign something and understand why
they must sign something. It just frustrated us and it frustrated the company too because
the company were charged with keeping a record of that and they said from their point of
view and our point of view why couldn't we just count everyone in . It is a lot of these
bureaucracies which are real obstacles put in the way to being able to bargain and that has
been a huge disadvantage to us. The other thing is that the act has created a climate, it has
tried to strip away the cooperation that used to exist between unions and employers to
resolve things. And the use of places like the Employment Court to resolve issues in
dispute rather than being able to sit down like we did in the past and discuss.the debate and
come to some sort of agreement. We're forced to use the legal system which of course now
is cluttered up. Employment Tribunal - to get a hearing over there in Wellington takes
about eight months before you get a damn hearing which is really straining the system and
not making for good industrial relations.
Q. What strategies has the union devised for dealing with the E.C.A.?
A. We have developed a union business plan for what we're going to do for the year.
We've already devised industry strategies - how to deal with the industries. I suppose
we've devised strategies which say, well look the act is there you can't make it go away so
try and work within it. Try and use it to your advantage and I suppose what we've done is
try to keep saying to the employers that we deal with that we're a reasonable union, you
know we want to be responsive, we want to be involved, not only in the bargaining issues,
we want to be involved in the industry issues. We've pushed workplace reform, those
things so we've taken this road to say look the unions have got something to offer you as
an employer and something to offer the industry and it's better for the industry to have us
on board and be dealing with us rather than dealing with another agent over here and
someone over there. So we've developed these sort of strategies to keep us really involved
and that's why we've become not only involved in bargaining issues but involved in health
and safety, industry training, workplace reform, all of those other things.
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Q. What is the current membership of the Seafarers Union?
A. After an amalgamation effectively a few years ago with the Cooks and Stewards Union
we currently number about 12,000. That includes people in deep water ships and harbour
craft particularly in the Auckland area, rail ferries, coastal ships....
Q. How has the size of your membership changed between 1987 and 1993?
A. There has been a small decline, largely due to reforms that were made and attrition. We
haven't lost anybody as a result of any legislation or for reasons of leaving the union.
Q. How is the union organised?
A. It's a national union. We have very much a workplace oriented structure with monthly
stopwork meetings of members to which the executive report. There is a national office
which is my responsibility as the National President. The National Secretary is the person
who is housed where the national office is or the branch secretary but the whole authority
of the union and the supreme body of the union are the monthly stopwork meetings.
Q. How does the union determine policy/
A. By executive recommendation to the stopwork meetings in the main or
recommendations from the crews on the ships into the executive and back to the stopwork
meetings.
Q. What resources does the Seafarers Union have to engage in lobbying activity?
A. Not a great deal. We're not a rich union by any means and lobbying per se is not an
activity which we have participated greatly in for many years. Quite recently we have
lobbied our case at large in respect of the Transport Law Reform Bill and in that regard
we've gone out and a group of our members have toured the country joining with members
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in various centres and there they have propagated our case and carried out a very
successful campaign against the Government's proposal to legislate for an open coastal
shipping regime.
Q. Does the union have a good working relationship with any government departments?
A. A reasonable working relationship with the Marine Division of the Ministry of
Transport. Actually, as from today that will be called the New Zealand Maritime Safety
Authority.
Q. What were the major advantages for your union of the Labour Relations Act?
A. It took some things away but it gave us bargaining rights and gave us the ability to get
into collective bargaining and the right to strike.
Q. What were the major disadvantages for your union of the Labour Relations Act?
A. We had no real opposition to the Labour Relations Act
Q. What were the major objectives of your union between 1987 and 1991?
A. To advance the New Zealand maritime industry in the interests of the people who work
in it. To provide a good service for the members of the union, advocacy, the lot.
Q. What position did the union adopt with regard to the Compact?
A. We were outside of and remain outside of the C.T.V.. So the Compact we did not
consider affected us and so we ignored it.
Q. How did the union respond to the introduction of the Employment Contracts Bill?
A. We were on strike for about nine or ten days at the commencement of the bill primarily,
of course, for the renewal of our document at the time. We secured just prior to the to the
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enactment of the Employment Contracts Act a multi-employer document covering our
industry. We think it was probably that strike more than any other which introduced the
section where it became illegal to take action before the end of an Employment Contract.
That was a new provision which came out with the second reading of the Bill and we had a
nationwide strike at that time.
Q. Could you describe briefly the involvement of the union in the campaign against the
Employment Contracts Bill?
A. We rolled that strike into the campaign. We were active nationally in all of our branches
- Wellington, Auckland and Lyttleton. We were active in those main centres but also
within the provincial centres within the main industrial districts at that time in
campaigning against the Employment Contracts Act. We joined with the broad front
campaign that was formed and our members stopped work but also got out on the streets in
the demonstrations that took place against the Act. We advocated and had carried as policy
that there ought to be a national strike against the Employment Contracts Bill. and we were
very disappointed and bitter I suppose when one never came about. We were not affiliated
and are not affiliated to the C.T.U.
Q. What was the response of the rank-and-file of the union to the Employment Contracts
Bill?
A. They reacted quite strongly against it for all of the reasons. They rejected it in principle.
Q. Do you know who the unions were that didn't support a national strike?
A. The ones that didn't support it were the state unions or the former state unions. That
would be best asked of people who were at the c.T.U. conference. The state unions, the
Engineers and some others didn't support it.
Q. Did the majority of your membership support a national strike?
A. Yes
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Q. With the benefit of hindsight do you think that was the correct position to adopt?
A Yes and I think: the C.T.D. will suffer for years to come for not picking up the cudgels
at that time. It was in my view a very bad mistake if it was a mistake.
Q. How has the E.C.A affected your union?
A The same as it has affected every other worker in the country. It has brought about
really a decline in wages or we've been running harder than we've ever run before to stand
perfectly still. In fact we haven't really gone back in our industry. There've been a number
of smaller agreements. We've had to recognise that some cuts were necessary but generally
speaking we've held ground with the contracts that we've achieved to date but we still have
some contracts outstanding with major employers.
Q. What strategies has your union devised for dealing with the RC.A?
A To strengthen our delegate system, to strengthen our grassroots contact with the
members, to strengthen our workplace organisation. In our case we haven't been able to
cover all the bits and pieces, rats and mice that have come on stream since then. There are
some other small operators around that operate non-union now that wasn't the case before
so that's had some effect but we haven't lost a soul from the union pre 1990, 1991, 1992
and stuff to now. We've successfully held that and I believe that it will only be those
unions with strong workplace links and origins and philosophies that will survive this
period of history and if there's not a change in government this year they'll go further back.
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Building Trades Union - Ashley Russ 19/08/93
Q. What is the current membership of the Building Trades Union?
A. About 4,000
Q. How has the size of membership changed between 1987 and 1991?
A. Dramatically. In 1987 we had a huge boom the like of which had not been experienced
for a number of decades but now we're experiencing a depression of the magnitude of
1931. The level of activity in the building industry during 1991, 1992 was at the same
level as that of 1931. So that would be the worst depression for 62 years.
Q. What sectors of the economy do you draw your membership from?
A. The construction industry solely. We are solely a construction workers union but we
have membership in the ancillary industries like the plastering industry, like where they
use gibraltar board, things like that.
Q. How is the Building Trades Union organised?
A. Well
Q. What's its structure?
A. We have a national conference which is the managing body of the union that is attended
by representatives of all branches and sub-branches then we have a national executive at
the next level which manages the union between conferences. Conferences are biennial.
The national executive meets as and when it is required to do so. The branches of the
union, we used to have 25 branches and sub-branches, which would have been six main
branches supported by seventeen sub-branches but the concentration of membership is
now around the cities and for economic reasons the small operation of a sub-branch in
rural areas, the administration of that has been transferred to the cities and our organisation
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is now served, capable of employing organisers that service all those areas previously
managed by little sub-branches.
Q. Is the national executive elected?
A. Yes. freely. Triennially. Up until four years ago it was annually. Every position held by
any person in our union in administration is elected. No appointments.
Q. How does the union determine policy?
A. General meetings of the branches and sub-branches which are quarterly, used to be
monthly but the general meetings of branches send remits to the national conference and
those remits form the basis of policy of the union and the general meetings. Those remits
come through from the rank-and-file, not the branch executives. They're supposed to be
endorsed by meetings but if meetings of the members don't attain quorums the remit would
be judged on its value at the conference. Merits or value.
Q. What resources does the union have to engage in lobbying activity?
A. We didn't have people specifically designated for lobbying. Up until 1990 the House of
Parliament in New Zealand had always been open to lobbying from interest groups, the
trade union movement being one of interest groups. But since 1986, there has been a
disinclination among parliamentarians to open their doors to lobbyist and if you look at a
letterhead from the Houses of Parliament you now see Office of the Minister of Labour or
Office of the Minister of Finance, no addresses, no places to go. So you pick up a letter an
how can you get hold of this person. All that information that used to be on that letterhead
is no longer there. So there is a discouragement of parliament towards lobbying. The
central organisations like the Employers Federation and the c.T.U. do have access and
pretty free access as I understand it but they [government ministers] do not listen to the
extent that they were prior to the mid 1980s. The main lobby now is the Roundtable
because they are the government.
Q. Does the Building Trades Union have a good working relationship with any
government departments such as the Department of Labour?
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A. Yes but the Department of Labour has folded. It is no longer an organisation for labour.
The original prescription for the Labour Department has been so altered that the Labour
Department is no longer a department of labour. It is no longer an organisation protecting
apprentices. It is no longer an enforcement agency for working conditions.
Q. What do you feel were the major advantages for the union of the Labour Relations Act?
A. It doesn't matter if you call it the Labour Relations Act or the Industrial Conciliation
and Arbitration Act. What those acts did was to give recognition to trade unions and
protections to people in the workplace. It promoted and encouraged the formation of
unions. It's not true to say the Labour Relations Act, the Industrial Relations Act were the
acts of compulsory unionism. They were only compulsory because of an agreement
between the employers and the unions that workers in the industry should belong to the
union. They were not statutorially enforcing compulsory unionism as the Industrial
Conciliation and Arbitration Act did. The 1937 or 1936 Act whichever it was abolished in
1961 and compulsion to join a union was by agreement either between the union and
employers or by ballot of the members in the absence of union and employer agreement.
That was the advantage over the Employment Contracts Act. It gave us an equal playing
field.
Q. What were the major objectives of your union between 1987 and 1991?
A. [See list of objectives provided]
Q. What position did the Building Trades Union adopt with regard to the Compact?
A. We didn't participate in that because we're not part of the C.T.U.. We never ever joined
the C.T.U. I used to be a member of the EO.L.'s national executive. When the C.T.U. was
formed we took a decision not to participate in its foundation but when the Compact came
out we thought that was a good policy.
Q. Why?
A. Well if there were going to have to be these forms, if there was going to be problems
with the economy then it's better that we negotiated them than dictated them.
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Q. How did your union respond to the introduction of the Employment Contracts Bill
A. We took a national strike decision for three days that was to be followed up with other
activities of job strikes and so on. We supported the call that was upon the C.T.U. by
C.T.U. members for a general strike in opposition to the Employment Contracts Act and
strange as it may seem the members endorsed the support for the C.T.U. for a general
strike by a greater degree than it did for the national strike of three days in protest at the
Employment Contracts Act, the prospect of the Employment Contracts Act at that time and
against the employers refusal to renew our awards at that time. The strike in each case was
supported by over 90%. The support for the C.T.U.s general strike proposition was almost
100%. The Building Trades Unions conditions were under attack long before any other
union to my knowledge. In all other industries the employers gave to unions the grace that
was given under the act of twelve months. The awards and conditions were to be entered
by renewing the awards as they fell due and they were able to renew those awards right up
until, I think, one month after the Employment Contracts Act came into force. I think the
last awards were renegotiated perhaps as late as June or July. Ours never got renewed from
1990. The employers refused to although they could have renewed our award in March of
1991. They refused to and as a result of the date of the Employment Contracts Act, our
conditions just disintegrated. Our wages eventually were reduced by up to 30%. In a large
number of companies our 1990 award became the individual employment contract of our
members on the 15 May 1991 so no way did it increase whatsoever. Good employers
maintained the 1990 conditions for a considerable period beyond May of 1991 but the
crook employers taking advantage of the Employment Contracts Act and the depths of the
depression that had hit the industry by that time entered upon a wholesale destruction of
the award, abolished overtime, abolished special pay, in some cases unilaterally abolished
payment for statutory holidays and things like that. Sick pay went down the drain,
travelling time which formed a fifth of workers wages went out the door, conditions like
tool money gone and we're fighting to hold onto those in a few areas right now. The whole
effect of the act was to restructure wages and conditions to such a degree that restructuring
is entirely in the hands of the employers right now. Only a few employers negotiate and
those employers will slowly go out of business because we can't give away our members
conditions. Those employers who are not bound by protocol and the honour of industrial
relations will see to it that the good employer goes out of business and that's bad.
Q. With the benefit of hindsight do you think that the position that the c.T.U. adopted with
regard to the general strike was correct?
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A. It was totally wrong. It should have had a general strike. We've had the Prime Minister
going overseas and skiting how they introduced the Employment Contracts Act and how
easy it was to do so. In Australia it would be much harder.
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Nurses Organisation - Steph Breen 17/08/93
Q. What is the current membership of the Nurses Organisation?
A. Currently the membership is 28,000
Q. Did the membership change between 1987 and 1991?
A. Yes it probably did. I think both respective organisations probably lost a 1,000 or so
members eachfor various reason, some through attrition, some just not wishing to join the
union because compulsory unionism wasn't there any more, particularly in the private
sector and some really because we hadn't been able to to recruitment that we'd
normally like particularly in the private sector because a lot of places we don't have access
any more so that's caused some losses.
[ The Nurses Organisation is an amalgamation of the Nurse Union and the Nurses
Association]
Q. How is the Nurses Organisation organised?
A. From an internal point of view there is the staff. We have twenty organisers around the
country: Auckland, Rotorua, Hamilton, Pa1merston North, Wellington, Christchurch,
Dunedin. So they're out in the regions. We've got national office staff. We've got a total
of about sixty staff. At national office we have a lawyer, a research officer, a professional
officer, an industrial officer and on the administration side we've got a business manager
and a membership manager. We have two national eo-directors, that's myself and Gaye
Williams and a deputy national director as well. So that's internally from a staff point of
view. Regionally we have a number of regions, 11 regions where they. have regional
councils and they have meetings. That's where the membership meet and discuss the
Nurses Organisation business really and there are two aspects to that, the industrial side
and the professional side and both are interwoven with regard to ...[inaudib1e]... so we have
quite a high membership participation regionally. Then in workp1aces we have delegate
systems there and those delegates go up to regional councils in the main. And then we
have wider membership. We have an annual conference every year and that's where policy
is made. About 2,000 delegates come together for a conference that lasts two days. They
make policy there. In the interim we have a national executive which meets every two
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months to run the ongoing side of the organisation with regard to policy and any other
matters and on that we have representatives of the regional councils who come together so
they're accountable back to their region to report back etc..
Q. Are the executive elected?
A. Yes, the executive is elected as are the delegates and they're the regional presidents or
convenors at regional level.
Q. What resources does the Nurses Organisation have to engage in lobbying' activity?
A. That's mainly done through this office and we have probably two aspects to our
political lobbying - industrial and professional. so unlike most unions where it would just
be industrial we have a two-pronged attack, for example, we've got the health reforms and
a number of issues there are professional issues like standard of care, staffing levels,
whether the health system is privatised or kept public so there's all those sorts of political
lobbying activities that we do with the Minister of Health. Then there's the industrial side
like contract negotiations and conditions of work, , problems and issues of casualisation of
the work force etc. and that's the industrial side and so that's with the Minister of
Industrial Relations. We've got to cover both issues fully really and we have considerable
contact with the Beehive on those issues and the opposition.
Q. How has the Nurses Organisation attempted to influence government policy in the past?
A. The same way of lobbying from the national office. The difficulty now is, that we will
have with the Employment Contracts Act and the health reforms, is that whereas once in
the state sector it was quite central like you had the ministers of labour and the State
Services Commission now with the regionalisation and fragmentation caused by the
Employment Contracts Act and the health reforms there is not that central focus any more
and we've had to do it more regionally. It is now regional health authorities. Whereas once
you used to go to one person and one team now there are at least four Regional Health
Authorities and they're now broken down into Crown Health Authorities. So that central
focus is less now which is a problem now.
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Q. Would you say that the Nurses Organisation has a good working relationship with any
government departments?
A. Well, we're going toe to toe with the National Government at the moment with regard
to the industrial issues in the Employment Contracts Act. I don't know that there's any
union in the country that thinks this government is a good government with its track record
on industrial relations so we're fairly well toe to toe with them. You've got a National
Government that's not work orientated and they've given more power to the employers
and that's the way we see it really.
Q. What were the major advantages for the Nurses Organisation of the Labour Relations
Act?
A. Well, looking back now it was a good piece of legislation compared to what we've got
now. I mean there were lots of advantages. It was okay really, compared to what we've got
now we could certainly work with it. The balance between the employer and the
employees was much better. It was okay. I'd go back tomorrow if I could.
Q. Were there any major disadvantages?
A. Well we could always have done with more power as a union. Being able to strike -
we're an essential service so we have to give forty-eight days notice of strike action. The
ability to up wages and conditions without having to resort to strike action would have
been good. There could always be improvements in industrial relations from a union's
point of view.
Q. Did the policies of the Nurses Organisation change as a result of the Labour Relations
Act?
A. No, it was just a much easier system to work in. It wasn't much different from the Act
before that.
Q. What were the major objectives of the Nurses Organisation between 1987 and 1991?
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A. I can't recall verbatim. To bargain collectively and improve the wages and conditions of
members and to look at concessional issues.
Q. What position did the Nurses Union adopt with regard to the Compact?
A. We supported the Compact.
Q. Why?
A. It is quite clear now that workers would have benefited from another Labour
Government. Quite clearly we can look back and say that now. We supported it because if
it meant getting a Labour Government in and a Tory Government out then that was a good
enough reason. Any union that didn't support the Compact or didn't get behind the C.T.U.
on the issue must clearly see now that they took the wrong path.
Q. How did the Nurses Organisation respond to the introduction of the Employment
Contracts Bill?
A. Again, we weren't amalgamated then so I can only talk from the union point of view.
We responded quite well in that we were able to adapt pretty quickly and were fairly
flexible to what hit us really. As opposed to other organisations who've had difficulty
adapting we knew that with the Employment Contracts Act it would be a rough time, it
would be a hard time. It was even harder than we thought and we were pragmatic and
realistic and we knew we had to buckle down and work, like forever day and night to
represent our members and that's what we did. The hours and the workload that we
handled was just phenomenal. Prior to the Employment Contracts Act we had six awards
and agreements. After the Employment Contracts Act that broke down to, we're
negotiating now about seventeen and you can probably add about another thirteen or
fourteen to that if the employers would negotiate with us, so our workload just increased
phenomenally. Now, fortunately, what we had to help us at that time was accurate data
information and accurate information systems to get us through that time. We were able to
get the printed word out to our members quickly and we had accurate membership system
so that we could actually do that. We didn't actually lose contact with our members. Even
though we may not have been able to walk onto the site and talk to them we knew that we
had pretty sophisticated systems in place to cope in other ways.
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Q. Could you describe briefly the involvement of the Nurse Union in the campaign against
the Employment Contracts Bill?
A. We campaigned pretty actively around the country against the Employment Contracts
Bill, in the rallies that were held up and down the country, protests and marches and
everything but some of our member, like a lot of New Zealanders thought that what we
said could happen would not happen, they actually thought that it would not get as rough.
Now we're sustaining our credibility by our membership actually saying to us, you told us
it was going to be this bad, we didn't believe you in a million years but it's been exactly as
you said it would be and all the fishhooks and all the problems you said the Employment
Contracts Act would come to bring has come to ...[inaudible]. .... And that has sustained
our credibility in a number of areas.
Q. What was the response of the rank-and-file of the union to the Employment Contracts
Bill?
A. Again, what we told them took a while to register but as our award system broke down
and we were doing contracts on an enterprise level they quickly saw that the Employment
Contracts Bill gave all power to their employers and that the employers were going to
clawback conditions etcetera and it came home pretty quickly to our members how bad it
was. They saw it pretty quickly.
Q. Did the majority of the membership support a national strike in opposition to the
Employment Contracts Bill?
A. No. There was never a call for a national strike. The c.T.U. did not call for a national
strike and so no we couldn't say that our members supported it our not supported it
because the call was never made.
Q. At the special C.T.U. affiliates conference held on the 18th of April did the
representative of the Nurses Union vote for or against the Service Workers amendment
which called for a twenty-four hour general strike.
A. Voted against it.
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Q. Do you know which other major unions voted against?
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A. There must have been enough because the vote was lost. There were more that voted
against it than for it because the vote was lost. Who they were I can't remember off the top
of my head. There must have been enough of them.
Q. With the benefit of hindsight do you think that was the correct position to adopt?
A. Yes. There wouldn't have been a national strike. The workers of New Zealand would
not have undertaken a general strike at that time. I think it's like those who say should we
or shouldn't we have voted for the Compact, should we or shouldn't we have voted for that
national strike are dreaming. The people who stood up and said we should strike are the
very people whose members would never have taken industrial action in a million years.
They're dreaming. There's a difference between idealism and pragmatism and realism
about who's got their feet on the ground and who's just standing up waving the banner. If
you're going to say we're going to do this you've got to be able to deliver or otherwise
your credibility goes down the tube. There wouldn't have been a national strike. For a
number of unions anyway who are essentially services, and we're not the only ones, it
would have been unconstitutional and illegal for us to strike. We've got employers like
Southern Cross who would come in and wipe us off the map. They would say, that's an
illegal strike and we've lost 250,000 dollars in our hospitals by you striking and we want
that money back.
Q. How has the Employment Contracts Act affected your organisation?
A. It's nearly killed us in the past three years. We have to adapt and be flexible and adjust
to what's ahead, and that means if it's another three years of National we have to strategise
very carefully, be clear about what our core services are, stick to our mission and live
through it. Birch will bring in stage two and the only thing they won't bring in is shooting
union officials like they do in Cuba.
Q. How has the Employment Contracts Act affected your membership.
A. Okay really. Nurses have always, historically and internationally belonged to an
organisation. Even the Royal College of Nursing retained We have the professional
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and the industrial and we carry indemnity insurance for our nurses that they have to have
when they're on the job and a number of interlinking issues that make nurses stay with
their organisation. There is that binding thing that perhaps the truck drivers don't have and
shop assistants don't have and butchers don't have that nurses have and probably the
teachers might have. I don't know.
Q. Have there been any advantages for your organisation of the Employment Contracts
Bill?
A. Probably the only advantage is that the contracts now have to be ratified and that's quite
democratic. It's a helluva a lot of work but you have to take the Employment Contract
back to the membership and have it ratified and that's a good democratic process.
Q. Can you pinpoint what the major disadvantages are?
A. It goes against collective bargaining and that the whole contract system has been broken
down and fragmented into enterprise bargaining. So collective bargaining has gone really
and what that does, the fundamental principle of the Employment Contracts Act is to be
divisive, to pit worker against worker and it does that but that has caused problems as well.
Q. What strategies has your organisation come up with for dealing with the Employment
Contracts Act?
A. Well the main strategy between now and the election is to get rid of the government but
research would show that that may not happen. We've certainly been lobbying government
and saying what our positions are. The short term strategy is to get rid of the government
and after that we're looking at strategies now to adapting to a National Government
because what has appeared through all of this is whether it's the Compact, a national strike
or whatever is you've got to be pragmatic and realistic and not dream.
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Service Workers Federation - John Ryall 16/08/93
Q. What is your position in the Service Workers Federation?
A. Well, I'm a member, but I've also been involved in organising for the old Hotel and
Hospital Workers Union since 1982. In 1991 we amalgamated with a number of unions to
form the Service Workers Union a day before the Employment Contracts Act came in.
Since 1984 I've been principally involved in organising the health sector and lately in the
community services area.
Q. How was your union organised prior to the Employment Contracts Act?
A. We were the Wellington District Hotel, Hospital, Restaurant and Related Trades
Industrial Union of Workers. We were principally looking after people in the hospitality
sector and the health sector, with the bulk of our members being in hospitality which is
catering, hotels, fast food places, coffee lounges, clubs and a smaller proportion being
involved in health which is mainly domestic workers in public hospitals, private hospitals,
rest home workers including basic caregivers, some home helps and some other
community health workers.
Q. How was policy determined?
A. Policy was determined by.... we had an annual delegates conference which was a
delegate chosen on a formula of the people from each of the sectors of the union. Any
resolutions which came up from the rank and file would be discussed at the delegates
conference. If the delegates conference voted on these resolutions they would become our
policy. We had a union of about 12,000 workers at that stage and there'd probably be up to
100 delegates at the conference.
Q. What resources did your union have to engage in lobbying activity?
A. We had our organisers who were mainly employed on the basis of 1 per 1000 members
plus we had a union secretary, an assistant secretary, plus we had a lawyer, plus we had a
full time educator who was largely paid out of TUEA and was also responsible for
servicing a couple of other unions as well. The lobbying was in terms of those organisers
and our members and delegates being involved in conscious lobbying campaigns, to
politicians, to local authorities and other organisations, plus our union was also very active
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in the Labour Party. We're an affiliate to the Labour Party so a lot of our lobbying would
be done through the Labour Party structure.
Q. Does the union have a good working relationship with any government departments?
A. We had a very good relationship in the health sector with both the Health Department
and the Social Welfare Department and they were mainly in terms of the licensing of old
peoples homes which we have a lot of members in plus the licensing of private hospitals.
We didn't have a lot to do with the Labour Department. We did prior to the Labour
Relations Act because they used to take a lot of wage claims.
Q. What were the major advantages for your union of the Labour Relations Act?
A. A number of things about the Act. It gave rights to all workers for paid union meetings
which for some of the awards we didn't have prior to that. It also, with some of our
workers, gave a better access right to workplace organisers. The central part of the Labour
Relations Act was the recognition of unions really so it gave quite a strong role to the
unions.
Q. Were there any major disadvantages for the union of the Labour Relations Act?
A. Well one of the things that came in with it was the question of the loss of the right to
arbitration which for certainly workers involved in the tea rooms and restaurants sector
where you've got a lot of small employers was a major difficulty. Even with the rest
homes, they only had established a separate award in 1980 so they were quite new.
Between 1980 and 1987 they had taken three court cases under the old arbitration system
to try to establish a proper footing, basic rates for their workers in that sector. The system
was quite important to them because some of those sectors didn't have the economic clout
that some of the public hospitals and large hotels have.
Q. Did the policies of your union change as a result of the Labour Relations Act?
A. I think the union became far more sophisticated as far as their administration was
concerned. We got quite a bit of money out of the union incentives fund which wasn't a
legislative provision but before that we used to get funded to attend conciliations and after
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the Labour Relations Act that was withdrawn but the money was put into a separate fund, a
union incentives fund. If you applied you could actually get money for updating all your
equipment so during that period we computerised everything in our union and found it
much easier to target worksites and particular groups that we wanted to try and organise.
Under the old manual system it was hopeless to even know who were your members. Once
we'd computerised we could actually spit out a list of who we represent. There was far
more organising of delegates, delegates committees and far more intensive union
organisation. There was far more confidence among workers to be able to achieve
something. I don't know if that's a result of the legislation, the only thing that started
holding us back after 1987 was that, especially in the tearoom sector they didn't have a
backstop of compulsory arbitration. It was a bit risky to take a risk about taking some
action only to find out that there was no back door to hop into if your action did, in fact,
fail. The previous system you could take action and then if you weren't getting anywhere
you could revert to arbitration. By 1989/1990 with rising unemployment and the stock
market crash conditions were getting worse. There was a reluctance by workers to stick
their necks out too far. It was at the stage that employers had organised themselves to
move onto the offensive trying to attack wages and conditions whereas beforehand all they
were trying to really was to keep the status quo and what we were trying to do was
improve things. So before the Employment Contracts Act came in there was already some
movement backwards as far as peoples confidence was concerned, as far as some of the
conditions were concerned.
Q. What were the major objectives of your union between 1987 and 1991?
A. Just to bring people up to a living wage really and as much as possible to prevent
casualisation of the sectors because they felt that with casualisation went the strength of
the workforce to actually make any progress and in all our sectors and in the hospitality
sector and the health sector was the same, there was more part-time and more and more
casual workers. We weren't opposed to part-timers providing they were permanent part-
timers and providing they had set hours of work but what started to develop in the
hospitality sector is the employment of part-time workers who might be called part-timers
but they were really casuals. They could be called in for a couple of days one week, one
the next, none the next and rostered on and off like that and that was a big fault. We had to
try and wrap them up in some permanency of their work.
Q. What position did your union adopt with regard to the Compact?
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A. We supported the Compact although there was a lot of debate and it certainly wasn't a
unanimous position. I think what the majority view was, especially from the strongest
organised section of our union which was public hospital workers, is they'd really been in a
fairly regulated system for years especially under the old state linkage provisions and so
making deals with the government nationally on wage increases didn't worry them. They
also felt that the '88, ' 89, '90 period they could see the free market having its effects in
terms of lack of arbitration, left to your own resources etcetera and they didn't think there
was a helluva lot of a future for them because generally our workers didn't have the
economic clout to deliver themselves large wage increases. The majority view was that
they didn't particularly trust the government whether it be a national or a labour
government and thought that the union was selling out its independence by making deals
with them on this scale.
Q. How did your union respond to the introduction of the Employment Contracts Bill?
A. Well we campaigned in the union movement and outside it for the union movement
nationally to oppose it, to take whatever industrial action we could and political action to
stop it coming into effect. We were largely frustrated in that by forces in the trade union
movement. Our union moved the resolution at the C.T.D. conference to have a general
strike over the introduction of the Employment Contracts Bill but we didn't get a majority
vote. We joined wherever we could in stopping work, attending rallies, lobbying
politicians, doing everything we could but we found that there were some divisions within
the trade union movement over whether it should be opposed and on what basis it should
be opposed. I think that certainly we're very critical of the leadership of the trade union
movement in believing that the Employment Contracts Act wasn't going to be as bad when
it finally got to the final draft stage as it appeared at the start. We were constantly being
told by the C.T.D. national leadership not to do anything, everything is going to be okay,
trust us we know what we're doing and history will show that they didn't really.
Q. Could you tell me which major unions voted against the amendment?
A. Well it was mainly the state unions. I can't give you the names of the unions but the
C.T.D. leadership was opposed to it. In fact, the C.T.D. leadership were opposed to doing
anything. They were even opposed to, our Assistant Secretary in Auckland had this
proposal to, when Bill Birch mailed this leaflet to everyone's homes, of starting a
campaign to get people to mail them back and the C.T.D. were even opposed to that on
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the basis of what happens if we make the call and only 400 people respond to it. So they
just seemed to be struck, they had no confidence in the people they represented or anything
and they just seemed to be scared of moving in any direction. I think largely when it came
to that they were recommending that the general strike didn't take place, largely the state
unions voted with them. In fact, I think even the P.S.A. despite all the mass meetings they
held around the country endorsing it. Most of the private sector unions voted for it and
most of the state unions voted against it.
Q. With the benefit of hindsight do you think that the C.T.D. position was the correct
position to adopt?
A. No, it was the wrong one to adopt. And I think that has been the problem with their
position right through, even from the Compact, going right through from the Compact
onwards what they have tended to do rather than mobilise workers generally around the
question of struggling themselves for major issues they tended to just rely on high level
talks with politicians and other people to deliver the goods and it just hasn't done it. I think
what has happened is the loss of confidence of a major sector of the union movement in
the C.T.U. leadership has been one reason for the loss in union prestige.
Q. How has the Employment Contracts Act affected your union?
A. Financially it has devastated it. I think our union, like a lot of private sector unions its
whole financial structure is fairly marginaL In areas where we didn't have a delegate
structure operating before the Employment Contracts Act came in, by and large those have
been de unionised. In places where we did they have largely remained unionised places.
Prior to the Employment Contracts Act coming in, the hospitality sector would probably
been 50-60% of our union membership, now it's about 20-30% so that's largely the area in
which membership has disappeared. As far as the health sector is concerned what we've
found is that generally all the places where we had a delegate structure operating which
have got more than 10 workers are still unionised. They haven't all got collective
employment contracts but generally the level of unionisation has stayed fairly good. The
difficulty has been the struggle to get proper contracts in those places and the biggest
impediment to that is the right of employers to employ new workers whenever they like.
Also the tactic the employers have adopted in every single place that I visit which is both
from the well-unionised to the least unionised, from the most free-marketeer private places
to the religious institutions is to, despite people having recognised the union as a
bargaining agent, despite people having signed authorisation forms that the employer just
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ignores those at their will and just goes and deals with the workers individually just hoping
to work out I mean the purpose of negotiating effectively is to have one bargaining
position and to be able to maintain some sort of unity against an employer just as the
employer fronts up with their manager which may have been decided by a board but you
never meet the board. What the employers have done is to try to meet with each employee
to find out where the divisions are and exploit those to get the worst possible contract for
those people. Every single place that I'm involved in has tried that and in some places it
has worked and in some places our people have managed to recognise that tactic and have
refused to cooperate with it.
Q. You mentioned a loss in membership. Why do you think that is?
A. It isn't a problem with people resigning as such but in an industry like ours, particularly
in the hospitality sector there's a couple of things. The first is that a lot of employers in that
sector and also in some places in the health sector you can't get onto the job unless you
have somebody who has already authorised you and even where you have got somebody to
authorise you a lot of employers have placed all sorts of hurdles in the way of the union
organiser actually meeting with someone. Like in the case we've got against the South
Pacific Hotel Corporation which is a large employer in the hospitality industry where if an
organiser turns up with an authorisation form they say 'who do you want to see'? They go
and ask the individual do they want to see their union. They normally say to the worker,
'did you call the union in?' and the worker says "no I never called the union in' so they go
and tell them the worker doesn't want to see you. And what they'll do if the worker is brave
enough to say 'yes I do want to see the person' is they'll locate the worker and the organiser
in some room up the top stairs, somewhere miles away from anyone so that the organiser
in coming to talk to people can't talk to more than one person at a time and certainly can't
enter the premises as such apart from this one room. When you're trying to organise people
on a collective basis you want to talk to them together, you want to walk around and see
what conditions they're working under and get some idea of the things they want to put up
under the negotiations so that has become increasingly difficult and that is why we have
taken this court case against the South Pacific Hotel Corporation. The amount of time that
is required to be spent on those things has increased almost twenty-fold. Whereas before,
under the Labour Relations Act, you would go onto a site because everyone was a member
the question of recruitment wouldn't come into it and you wouldn't spend any of your time
on recruitment because they were all members you would spend the time trying to organise
them, to talk to them or to wander around the place and get them organised for their
contract talks. With the Employment Contracts Act you've first got to recruit them so if
you've got no-one in the place you've got to get in there and you can only 'get in there by
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actually finding a person with an authority and even having done that you're probably only
going to get as far as the one unless that person recruits someone else. So it requires a lot
of out of hours visiting people in their homes and recruiting people that way. So a lot of
the organisation for us now is done at the sites so I suppose the amount of organisers
required to do the work before of one organiser is probably twenty.
Q. What strategies has the union devised for dealing with the Employment Contracts Act?
A. The main strategy is in terms of trying to improve our recruitment really. We've
employed a Pacific Island organiser for one day a week and hopefully that will increase.
His job is to try and work out which sites employ Pacific Islanders and find out where they
live and go and visit them in their homes. As far as contracts are concerned what we've
largely tried to do is to pick out the key players in each sector and try and get some
contracts with them and just use the basis of their contracts to sign up others to the same
sorts of deals. In the commercial sector and education sector where we've got large
contracting firms operating we've sorted out the large contractors in the sector and got a
national multi-employer contract with them and taken that contract round to the small
contractors and got them to sign up to it.
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Q. How does the Employers Federation differ in terms of membership and organisation
from other business associations?
A. The Employers Federation is made up of three regional employers organisations -
Auckland, Wellington, Canterbury, Otago/Southland. They have between them some
14000 individual employers who are members of theirs and they belong to our
organisation as a federation of employers interests. Also in our membership we have 52
trade organisations that includes, for example, the Master Builders, the Master Plumbers,
the Hotel Association, the Meat Association, the Federated Farmers; Chambers of
Commerce - all of those that join us through our national advisory counciL On that basis
we have an input or communication ability to most employers throughout the country. It
differs from other business associations because we are not a business association, we are
an employers association and in fact we are the only employers association or organisation
in the country. Though our reason for being is to deal specifically with the employment
relationship, the labour market matters as it impinges on the employment relationship.
Obviously that brings into account, under areas such as some issues of taxation, some
issues as to tariffs and the like but predominantly we're here as an employers organisation.
Q. What is your current membership?
A. The four regional employers organisations. The 52 outside organisations who make up
the main of the New Zealand Business and Advisory CounciL They cover virtually every
form of employer because they belong to some form of trade organisation as an input
through them so we would have access to virtually every employer in the country. As far
as direct membership through the regional employers association is about 13 to 14,000.
Q. Were there any significant changes in membership of the Employers Federation
between 1987 and 1991?
A. Well again if you're using the words Employers Federation meaning Employer
Associations because that is how it would have to be seeing as we are a federation of the
associations, not dramatically, no. I couldn't answer that because they are all quite separate
and autonomous as far as their individual membership is concerned.
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Q. How does the Employers Federation determine its policy on industrial relations?
A. We have a board that comprises representatives from each of the four regional
employers associations who are our members as well as the consulting process with the
N.Z.B.I.A.C. members so it's by a variety of consultation means and measures with our
direct membership, the four regional employer associations and our wider membership.
Q. How frequently does the governing body of the Employers Federation meet?
A Every six weeks on average.
Q. What is your own role in the organisation?
A. I am the Labour Market Manager which has got direct responsibility for all matters
relating to the labour market such as industrial relations policy. It covers the legal side, it
covers occupational health and safety, Ae.e., taxation and the business forecasting that is
done. Overall general control of that side of things affecting the labour market.
Q. What resources does the Employers Federation have to engage in lobbying activity?
A That is one of our prime reasons for being here. We have a staff that engage in lobbying
to a large extent of the time, the Chief Executive, Steve Marshall, myself as Labour Market
Manager. We spend a lot of our time actually speaking with politicians, speaking with our
members, finding out what there concerns are, feeding them through. The resources we
have are a Communications Manager, particularly his contacts, whose job it is to arrange
for speakers to come both ways and so there is a continuing dialogue between politicians
and members of the employing community.
Q. Would you say that the Employers Federation has a good working relationship with
those government departments concerned with industrial relations?
AYes, we have to. It's obviously in their interests and our interests to have a good
working relationship.
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Q. What were the major advantages and limitations of the Labour Relations Act?
A. The advantages were that it had very much the sanctity of contract aspect to it that only
one contract could cover one individual at anyone time so it stopped the second tier, third
tier bargaining that happened in the past. It meant that unions had a 1,000 membership rule
so there was an amalgamation and less of splinter groups whether that was an advantage or
not it was certainly something that had an impact on the industrial relations system then.
Probably the main disadvantage in the '87 Act was that it was only the unions who could
cite out employers for, if you like, enterprise negotiation.
Q. To what extent was it consistent with the Employers Federation's position on industrial
relations reform?
A. It went some way towards achieving what the Employers Federation wanted. We set
out our first paper in 1979 that was entitled Balance in Bargaining and that is what the
Federation was moving to right over this period. It wanted to ensure that one party didn't
have the ability to make all the rules. So although we saw advantages in the '87 Act of
having one contract applying at anyone time which on the face of it got rid of second tier
bargaining as I said it supposedly had the effect of pushing things down closer to the
enterprise level. Because, however, the unions were the only ones who could cite out, in
fact, that didn't occur and there were probably no more than four or five enterprise
agreements of any significance that arose during that period. The citing out that was done,
again, wasn't very many at all and it was often as a reaction against employers who were
in national award talks and if their assessor was seen to be holding things up then either
that company was cited out or indeed a whole industry could be cited out. For example, in
the Maintenance Electrical Workers award talks they cited out all of the companies in the
meat processing industry because they were seen to be holding up the settlement they
could get with the other employer assessors. So it simply didn't work to the way that the
Labour Government had envisaged it would to the extent that in 1990 they put forward an
amendment recognising this, allowing employers with their employees once they had gone
through a balloting process to , in fact, cite themselves out of an award. So it went some
way towards recognising that there should be an ability to get to enterprise based
bargaining. By putting it solely in the hands of a union, it didn't work.




Q. Were there any significant changes in policy in the 1987 to 1991 period?
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A. Policy was being continually evolved from 1979. It was certainly during that period that
it became very much crystallised as to there being a policy that there should be as little
intervention as possible from government and which led very much towards a strong
lobbying action towards getting in the Employment Contracts Act which in fact left the
parties to the contract to negotiate the term and outcome that they actually wanted. So I
think that if anything it highlighted the problems of only doing a tinkering exercise and
meant that quite major reform, by taking away all of the prescription, had to happen to get
any significant change. It wasn't going to happen merely by letting one party make the
decisions. It had to be something that was determined at the enterprise leveL
Q. Were there any attempts made to coordinate the representational activity of the
Employers Federation with that of the Business Roundtable during the 1987-1991 period?
A. As far as coordinate, I think that probably isn't the right word. Obviously there was a
lot of, there wasn't just the Employers Federation, virtually all business, all employers that
make up business could see that that change had to happen. It wasn't just a question of
looking at the labour market in isolation. It was very much a policy of all business oriented
groups with the economy regulated to the extent that it had been right from the early
eighties was that this was at the last stage that hadn't been deregulated..If you look at
where the coordination comes in I think that the first area that has significant change was
the waterfront reform. That was actually coordinated by the Federated Farmers and a
meeting was called of all business interests that exported, particularly the meat industry,
the timber industry, the forest products industry, the kiwi fruit, the apple and pear in a
major meeting to ask the government to change the structures of employment on the
waterfront. That was a Labour Government and it happened in 1989 and that was a vert
effective coordination. The Business Roundtable, the Employers Federation were involved
in that as well but not to the extent of leading or coordinating. It was the actual company
groupings that were being told to compete in international markets and had a waterfront
that had employment practices that were 100 years out of date. So that was successful, the
Labour Government took that on board and you'll be aware of the major changes that
happened on the waterfront in 1989. I think from that it was an obvious throw on that those
groups who had worked together would continue to do so because seeing the success on
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the waterfront then it was just a matter of continuing those lobbying efforts to have the
changes, first of all the change in 1990 that the Labour Government accepted that
employers should have some rights in determining who should be cited out of awards and
then further on to the National Government's Employment Contracts Act.
Q. What role, if any, did the Employers Federation play in the formation of the National
Government's industrial relations policy?
A. Quite extensive because governments, fortunately in New Zealand, don't usually sit in
isolation and decide that they're going to do something for employers or whatever else so
it's a matter of how the government works that it listens to the constituent bodies from
throughout the country and this happened obviously with the Labour Government from
when it did its green paper and white paper when it became government in 1984. Over that
period leading up to the Labour Relations Act there was a great level of consultation and
input from the Federation and the C.T.D. so again it was an evolutionary thing. It wasn't
suddenly the Employment Contracts Act as a lot of people not involved in industrial
relations may think, that it was something traumatic that suddenly happened. It wasn't at
all, it was the evolutionary procedure that happened from the 1987 Act, from the 1989
waterfront changes, from the 1990 amendment to the Labour Relations Act and then the
Employment Contracts Act. So yes, the Employers Federation, one of its major functions
is lobbying whichever government is in power to make sure that the policies of the
Federation are put forward as clearly as possible.
Q. What was the reaction of the Employers Federation to the Employment Contracts Act?
A. It was seen as the positive step that was needed to complete the deregulation that had
happened within the rest of the economy and bringing the labour market into line with all
the other facets of a business that it had had to operate with so it was a positive reaction.
Q. Were practical steps taken to support the proposed legislation?
A. Absolutely, not necessarily to support the legislation but very much to ensure that
employers knew what their rights and responsibilities were under the legislation. Before it
became legislation, we had a system for submissions on every piece of legislation, but this
one particularly, to send out the draft submissions that the Federation made to all of our
members and this is in its widest sense. So, there was a great deal of consultation and
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ensuring that all of the points that needed to be raised to the Select Committee were raised.
There were issues of concern where it was felt that it wasn't quite right, that in a practical
instance it wouldn't work so submissions were obviously very comprehensive as to
various aspects of the Bill when it was passed or at the time it was reported back. So we
knew pretty much what the from of it was going to be. Briefing sessions were held right
throughout the country, not just the main centres but all of the small towns where
employers actually were. The turnout for those was extremely high. This was something
that the Employers Federation or the Business Roundtable or Treasury suddenly decided
we needed it was employers, very much a groundswell of saying this is not working, we
cannot continue to have centralised wage fixing when we're working very much in a
competitive international market, we have to have control of labour cost ourselves so the
turnout to the briefing sessions was a tremendous response. In Auckland, for example,
where they would usually get between 3 and 400 to their normal briefing sessions that they
have regularly they got over 2000 to the ones they had on the Employment Contracts Act.
We prepared a resource kit, we published 1,000 of those, which went out to all employers
of a significant size telling them what the Act meant, reminding them of their obligations
as far as all the other pieces of legislation, giving them an example of a draft contract,
making them familiar with the terms that were being used, what their responsibilities were
for bargaining agent recognition, ratification. That was so successful that we had to do a
reprint. We, in fact, have reproduced it completely and sent it out again in May of this year
because there is such an awareness among employers that they do need to know now., that
they responsibilities themselves, how they negotiate, what it is they need to do as their
background, what sort of communication do they need, what is a labour plan, how they
should be doing these sorts of things. As far as making sure that employers knew what
were their rights and responsibilities were under the Act we were very proactive indeed.
Q. Was your organisation concerned about the union campaign against the Employment
Contracts Bill during the first half of 1991?
A. Not unduly. It was very obvious throughout where the central union organisation lay. It
certainly did not want a return or any move to voluntary membership. They pretty much
had a closed shop and would then have to start competing for membership. So it was fairly
clear that if any organisation had such a captive audience that they would move very
strongly towards protecting that position. They had, because of the situation of registration,
it meant that they had complete ownership of any negotiation that went on so they
obviously saw that they had a lot to lose. We saw it very much as self-interest as indeed it
was and on that basis it did not unduly concern the Federation because we were putting
forward the proposition that the parties, the employees, if they still wanted to belong to a
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union they still could. There was going to be no removal of unions from the face of the
earth and on that basis it was just putting the unions on the same basis as the employer
association - voluntary membership, if you provide a service you get to have members.
Q. How did the Employers Federation publicise its position on the Employment Contracts
Bill?
A. I don't think it probably needed to publicise it tremendously. It was very clear that that
was what employers had been pushing for and the Federation, as the spokes-organiser for
the employers had for many years been pushing for the ideas that were in the legislation.
Q. What do you think the major changes were that characterised the evolution of the
Employers Federation's position on industrial relations.
A. It was quite clearly set out in 1979 and worked to very consistently over that
intervening period of some twelve years. What that period between '87 and '91 did was to
crystallise the Federation's view on behalf of employers that you couldn't do it in half
measures, nothing else had been done in half measures, they hadn't half deregulated the
finance market, they hadn't removed half the supplementary minimum prices for farmers,
they hadn't half deregulated the transport industry. In 1989 the changes to the waterfront
where the immediate benefits and cost reductions for both importers and exporters were
seen the employment relationship was put on a basis where they could be managed so
much more constructively by taking out the intervention of the Waterfront Industry
Commission. Those were just steps towards moving towards a position that the Employers
Federation always had that there should be no intervention, that the parties to the contract
should be able to negotiate whatever contract that suited them, that there should be an
underpinning of minimum legislation, as far as minimum wages, the speedy access to
dispute procedure resolutions but when it came down to determining how much people
were going to pay and how they were going to pay it and what sort of performance
appraisal and what sort of ability to pay arguments and flexibility of hours worked and
everything else that makes an employment relationship that could only be done at the
enterprise leveL
Q. In what ways do you feel the Employment Contracts Act has been beneficial for New
Zealand?
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A. To allow enterprises to be more viable. Before that it was very much a system of third
party intervention. The award system was such that there were ten representatives from
each particular site, employer representatives and union representatives. The people who
actually had to make that contract work, both the wide number of employers and certainly
employees did not have any say in the process whatsoever. On that basis the Employment
Contracts Act has given the ownership of where an enterprise is going very much to the
people who work there. It means that both the employers and the employees have some
ability to look at the concerns that each side have to make sure that they are all working for
a common purpose rather than having people outside saying this is what you should be
doing and this is what you should be doing which didn't really suit anybody when it came
right down to the nitty-gritty of employment relationship.
Q. Would you say that the companies that are represented by the Employers Federation
have benefited or lost out from the Employment Contracts Act?
A. I don't think that they have either benefited or lost out from the Employment Contracts
Act. It is a piece of enabling legislation that enables people to sort out their employment
relationships. It means that it is part of an economy that is deregulated and it means that
wherever that company or enterprise fits in with the economy as regards how well it is
going to do in being profitable or having to close down. The Employment Contracts Act
has allowed the parties to have more of an ability to respond quickly to customer or market
demands and given them the ability to not blame anything else other than their own
relationships if they haven't done well.
Q. Has it impacted on the Employers Federation in terms of membership and organisation
at all?
A. Not as far as membership because of the structure but not as far as membership of our
employer associations either. Their membership either remained steady or, in fact, is
growing. The sorts of services our organisation offers has very much changed. Previously,
of course, the Federation, through the associations basically determined who was the
employer advocate for each of the awards, organised the appointment of the negotiators or
the assessors for each side, was very much involved with the centralised system so
obviously there was very much a change of focus of what provisions of service were. That
meant that the associations changed completely to the extent of having advocates which
were ones that negotiated the awards. They all became consultants, they became very
much a provision of services to individual companies rather than industries, became very
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much more advisers than doing the actual negotiations themselves, very much more into
training people about what were negotiating skills, how to do things themselves so that the
whole focus changed from telling people what to do to assisting them in making the
decisions themselves.
Q. What are the current objectives of the Employers Federation with regard to labour
market reform?
A. To keep things as they are now. There's always room for improvement and we've been
looking at that over the last little while now that the Employment Contracts Act is pretty
much beddedin to the extent that the Labour Party is saying that it won't return to a
system that it one fully endorsed, there won't be a return to compulsory union
membership, there won't be an overriding ability for awards to be set up, there won't be
that sort of centralised system again. It's just a matter of ensuring that there are no
impediments towards either employees or employers making these sorts of arrangements
that best suit the enterprise. So our view is that the philosophy behind the Employment
Contracts Act should certainly continue.
Appendix Page -- 190 --
New Zealand Business Roundtable - Roger Kerr 16/08/93
Q. How does the Business Roundtab1e diifer in terms of membership from other business
organisations?
A. The Business Roundtable is an organisation of what is now the about fifty chief
executives of the larger business sector in New Zealand, let's say fifty out of the top
seventy or eighty companies and in some cases unlisted companies or organisations like
life offices and in that respect that's its defining characteristics - that it's an organisation of
the chief executives only. Other organisations like the Employers Federation have
completely broad membership in terms of employers of any size of business. The
Manufacturers Federation represents the manufacturing secto. The Federated Farmers
represents the farming sector obviously. All these organisations have a role to a greater or
lesser extent in the labour relations debate. Our organisation is the sort of organisation
you'd come up with if you wanted to have the chief executives of large companies
involved in national affairs. So, if you look around the world you'll find that there are a
number of organisations like ours. There's the U.S. Business Roundtable which represents
about 200 of the Fortune Top 500 list of companies. The Business Council in Australia has
about eighty of Australia's largest companies. So, it purports to be no more than that,
simply a convenient vehicle whereby chief executives who would not get involved in these
large, more dispersed organisations because they simply don't have the time to devote to it
can come together in an efficient way, a small number of meetings a year, not a lot of
demands on their time, to make a contribution to these national debates.
Q. Were there any significant changes in your membership between 1987 and 1991?
A. There's been a large turnover in membership simply because of what has been going on
in theeconomy, all the reconstruction that we have had both with respect to the companies
themselves and with respect to the chief executives who had been heading those
companies. So, from 1986, which was the time that I'd become involved in the
organisation, there wouldn't be more than half a dozen of the chief executives who were
there at that time that are still members of the organisation. Many of their companies still
are but they have turned over so that is in the nature of things. Business is a continually
moving kind of world and the additional things that have happened in New Zealand have
really added to that momentum.
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Q. How is the Business Roundtab1e organised?
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A. It operates in very much the same way as these other organisations. We have a
secretariat. I'm in charge of our small office here. I have one other professional analyst on
the staff and two administrative people. It's our job to organise the Business Roundtable's
work programme, undertake the research, put papers in front of our members at our five
meetings a year, we have five meetings a year, half a day each. They're like a board of
directors, if you like, to which an executive report and their task is to figure out our general
philosophy, our work priorities, the position that we take on issues that we decide are
worth taking up and to ratify them as we go. Also, obviously, to play their part,
particularly the chairman and the vice-chairman in representing the organisation to
politicians in terms of public statements, those kinds of roles.
Q. How is your industrial relations policy determined?
A. The organisation took up industrial relations, as it used to be called in those days, as
perhaps the first major topic that it has addressed and it was starting to think about this in
1985, I guess, before it had actually set up the small office and the research capacity that
we've got. That was against a background of the business sector really saying to itself look
past the business summit and the changes in economic direction that the Labour
Government of the time was pursuing, a very important stand-out area is labour relations.
New Zealand firms are becoming increasingly exposed to international competition was
the recognition of the time. We were going to be subject to a tight monetary policy which
was going to squeeze inflation out of the economy and there was going to be lot of
deregulation of markets going on. In order to be able to adjust our businesses flexibly in
response to all those pressures, which they were supportive of in terms of the general
direction, New Zealand having to change direction and go down that track, we have to
have a framework for our labour relations which is compatible with that and we didn't
have that with the old kind of regime that was in place. The whole system of craft-based
unions and national awards and that kind of thing that did not allow firms that were caught
between a rock and a hard place with these new pressures that were on the economy to
raise the productivity of their most important cost. Labour typically accounts for about
two-thirds of the costs of production in an economy like ours. It's hugely important. It's
vital that firms be able to use that labour resource efficiently to keep on changing
conditions of work where necessary, to give the right kind of incentives, to adjust the
workforce upwards or downwards with the needs of the business and so forth. So they had
identified that area as a crucial one and wanted to start work on it.
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Q. What resources does the Business Roundtable have to engage in lobbying activity?
A. Well, we're not really a lobbying organisation in the old fashioned sense. Again, that
was a new principle really behind the organisation when it got set up. It had taken the view
that there was a lot of old-style lobbying from the business community, lobbying for
protection of New Zealand industry for example and all sort of tax concessions and special
privileges of one sort or another that had led to New Zealand's poor performance and what
it wanted to do was to take a perspective of what's good for the economy and to address
itself around the principles in the different areas that it studied that would reflect the
national interest. It was absolutely the converse of the view that said what's good for
General Motors is good for America. It was one that said what's good for America or good
for New Zealand is what's going to be good for the business sector in the longer run. So
what it wanted to do therefore was to give itself a research capacity to address what would
constitute sound economic policies in the important areas, the big picture areas. It hasn't
wanted to go into a lot of the more detailed areas that other commercial organisations do. It
has wanted to concentrate on the things that would make a difference in terms of the
overall performance of the economy and then to be able to research them in a totally
professional kind of fashion. So, it was explicitly wanting to give itself that capacity by
setting up an office and making appointments of people who could perform that function
for it. So, our approach when we decide to take up a topic is to say okay how do we
actually do our homework on the subject satisfactorily and the answer is either we do it in
house with the expertise that we've got or, and this is very often the case, we operate on a
kind of rent a brain basis - where is somebody or some organisation with the best expertise
we can lay our hands on in New Zealand, in the academic world, in the consultancy world
or offshore and a large number of the inputs we have in the research area have been
offshore. They've been the best academics around the world or the best experts we can get
in particular areas to help us with that. It's my job in the office to oversee that research
programme, monitor it, maintain quality control and get our work to a position where I am
happy to submit it to the organisation for their endorsement.
Q. Would you say that the Business Roundtable has a good working relationship with any
government departments, for example, the Department of Labour and Treasury?
A. Yes, we try to maintain constructive relations really with all players that are relevant to
a particular public policy debate and the area of the bureaucracy is often an important
participant in the streams of advice that go to policymakers. They get them from all kinds
of sources obviously but their own official advisers are an important part of it. So, yes, in
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the course of the labour relations debate we talked a lot to Labour and Treasury as the
governments principle advisers in that area. There were others as well - the Prime
Mininsters department and some of the functional departments took a bit of interest in this
area because they were important to their sectors of the economy. I mean, Commerce was
conscious of the impact on the manufacturing sector, agriculture, forestry and so forth.
Q. What were the major advantages and limitations of the Labour Relations Act?
A. Essentially the story of the Labour Government as I would represent it to you was that
they had become conscious of the importance of labour issues and that was really
manifested by the fact that they issued, as early as 1985, because that was relatively early
in the piece, the green paper which really exposed it. What they were effectively saying is,
we want to reexamine the whole framework of labour relations in New Zealand.
Effectively they had a kind of caveat over compulsory unionism in that paper because they
had, you remember, just brought back compulsory unionism after it had been abolished by
the previous government. In a sense that was not up for grabs but that didn't prevent
people arguing the case for voluntary unionism obviously and so they had realised as I see
it that it was an important gap at that stage in their economic programme. Some recognised
it more clearly than others and I don't think even people like Rgoer Douglas were quick to
realise how important it was overalL By the time they got around to deciding which way to
go it was a high level policy issue for them and what they were trying to do was to
deregulate labour relations to a degree. I mean, they understood that that was the general
direction. They had made some important moves with respect to the public sector in fact
they did better with public sector employment relations than they did with private sector
labour relations. In the Labour Relations Act they thought that they were actually making
some reasonably significant moves towards freeing things up which was not actually the
case as a number of us argued at the time. I am getting slightly fuzzy on all the details of
the Labour Relations Act but the things that were plusses, for example, were they did
strengthen up the sanctity of contract aspects of our labour law as it applied at that time.
They did try to make it easier to move out of national awards and they provided a
mechanism for doing that which was, as we argued, too restrictive and would actually
allow very little to happen mainly because it was very much controlled by unions. On the
downside they did not really address the issue of voluntary unionism. They did not really
provide a mechanism which allowed much change from the monopoly bargaining rights
that unions had. They introduced a process of contestability, which was the language that
was used at the time, which said that if people wanted to change their union coverage here
is a procedure which you may follow to do that, once again just not offering anything in
the way of opportunities for real change. They actually increased the minimum size of
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unions to a thousand members which made that process more difficult and so what that
actually amounted to was in terms of allowing people to go where they wanted to go to ,
away from national awards and towards enterprise related contracting either on a collective
basis or an individual basis very little was achieved to speed up the traffic and that's
effectively what we saw for the next three or four years. The rate of change did not
significantly alter post the Labour Relations Act.
Q. Did the policies of the Business Roundtable change as a result of the Labour Relations
Act?
A. We had developed our thinking in the debate from 1985 to 1987 which kicked off with
the green paper exercise and as a result of this we regarded the Labour Relations Act as
very modest progress. Those that, like ourselves, had argued for reform were pleased that
the principle of it had become accepted nationally by that stage but the extent of change we
regarded as much too limited. So our basic response was to say alright, we haven't been
sufficiently persuasive at this stage, we need to go back and strengthen the argumentation,
do more work, demonstrate the limitations of the regime we've got at the moment. So, post
1987, we engaged in a series of further studies in the labour area ranging from a much
fuller treatment of the arguments for labour reform right through to case studies at the
industry leveL We got a study, for example, of the tourism industry and a case study of an
individual firm at one stage looking at the problems it had encountered in trying to get its
labour relations in a form that both the company and the workers really wanted but which
was frustrated by the policies of the union. So, effectively our position did not change,
what we carried on doing was trying to broaden and deepen the debate about the subject.
Q. Were any attempts made to coordinate the representational activity of the Business
Roundtable with that of the Employers Federation betwen 1987 and 1991?
A.We worked quite closely with the Employers Federation right through actually and they
had been in favour of labour reforms for quite a long time although they had tended to
propose more piecemeal solutions to the problems than we had. We maintained a
continuing dialogue. You've got to appreciate that there is an overlap of membership
between the two organisations. Every company that's involved with the Business
Roundtable is, I suspect, a member of the Employers Federation as well. The Employers
Federation would service their practical needs in terms of, those days under the award
sytem, advocacy services, coordination of negotaitions and that kind of thing. We do not
do that as an organisation. We are simply concerned at the policy leveL In terms of access
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to a lot of expertise we used a lot of people who were involved with Employers Federation
activities and they were often members of Business Roundtable companies, industrial
relations specialists in them and at the level of the Federation we just continued to
exchange our submissions and studies and so forth that we were making on those topics.
There were various other things, you remember, in that period that the Labour Government
was examining, like industrial democracy was one, pay equity was another, shop trading
hours was another and all of those kinds of things. Work was being done, submissions
were being prepared which we would, coordinate is not quite the right word, we didn't say
here's our piece, we want you to do the same or anything like that. We were just
exchanging material all the time. Broadly speaking we had similar policies and policies
which progressively converged as time went on. We were considered more radical in terms
of the changes we wanted to see brought about. The Employers Federation people would
have described as more conservative or gradual or something like that. Looking at the
1985/1986 period though, at the time of the change of government there were no important
differences in the changes which we were advocating.
Q. What role, if any, did the Business Roundtable play in the formation of the National
Government's industrial relations policy?
A. We were talking, as the Employer Federation was, to all the political parties all the way
throughthe exercise. We are an apolitical organisation. We always want to maintain good
lines of communication with all political parties so we were speaking both to the Labour
Government and to the National Party Opposition right through the debate from the start,
from '87 onwards lets say. So, in the period 1987 to 1990 as we were making
representations to the government on the Labour Relations Act, as we saw the need for
changes on things like shop trading hours, pay equity, independent contract laws we'd be
presenting the same material to members of the national opposition at the same time and
taking them through our analysis to make sure they understood it properly.
Q. What was the reaction of your organisation to the Employment Contracts Act?
A. We were very pleased that it was a much more fundamental set of changes to the
framework for labour relations than the previous initiatives. In many respects it was a
continuation of the same process. There was no basic argument right through from any
side, except maybe from the trade unions who didn't want change, to the directions policy
was taking. What we saw in the Employment Contracts Act was a much more coherent
framework., thinking about the issue from first principles and seeing the Employment
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Contracts as basically the same as most other kinds of contracts. Therefore, we were really
pleased that much of what we had argued for was taken on board there. So, we made
submissions on the Bill. There were a few features of it that we thought could be
improved, of course some of them were, some of them weren't. The Bill in general we saw
as a high quality piece of legislation and I guess our theorem would be that changes that
have taken place on the basis of it have been very encouraging, very positive as far as the
economy is concerned. So, we were pleased about it at the time. We remain very satisfied
with it. It has been one of the really important policy initiatives.
Q. What practical steps did you take to support the proposed legislation?
A. We had been talking about labour relations right through this period because we had
taken the view that it was a very large issue, a very controversial issue in some quarters.
There were a lot of vested interests that would oppose labour reform, particularly central
monopoly unions and therefore there had to be substantial constituency that was built up in
order to allow governments of any party to make the necessary changes. We went into
polling, for example, on industrial relations issues and we'd found that there was a very
high degree of public support, as opposed to union support, for changes, changes like
voluntary unionism - workers being allowed to join any union they wished to, enterprise
bargaining, all the sort of features that have happened in the new environment. So we
continued to present that kind of information. We continued to make a lot of speeches
arguing the general case. We made supportive submissions on the Bill. The studies that we
produced three or four or five years ago had elaborated that case in concrete
circumstances, firm level, industry level kind of things. We continued to some degree
since, although it has subsided a lot as something that engages a lot of our time now in
reinforcing the positive gains that have come out of it and demonstrating why these have
really been beneficial to firms and workers.
Q. To what extent did you coordinate these efforts with the Employers Federation?
A. Along much the same lines as I answered your earlier question. We were happy to swap
material all the time. I mean, there's much less material being produced now by us than
there was previously and probably that would be true of the Employers Federation
too.They continue to respond to criticisms of the Act and respond to particular instances
that have taken place and to a certain extent we do too so there's that sense of our relations
with the Employers Federation have been very close. In the sense that I have described to
Appendix Page -- 197 --
you they really came to a point which was virtually identical to ours in terms of their
thinking and so coordination has been very easy.
Q. Was the organisation concerned about the union campaign over the Employment
Contracts Act in the first half of 1991?
A. Concerned probably isn't the right word. It was very predictable. They were the vested
interests if you like, opposing change. Our arguments were essentially that reforming this
area is very beneficial for worker, for the unemployed - we put a lot of emphasis on the
importance of the unemployed - and the need for a more flexible labour market to deal
effectively with our unemployment problem and thirdly the interests of business and
shareholders involved in business. The union advocacy, which was often not expressed in
these terms, came from the point of view of protecting unions and unionists because that's
effectively what our old system did and so they had everything to lose really by the
changes that were being proposed. So, it was no surprise that the C.T.D. and some of the
central unions were most vocal in their opposition but there was nothing new about that.
They'd been opposing these changes from 1985 onwards so, if you like, this was their last
stand. I think that we weren't very concerned because it was our belief that the debate had
been well and truly won by that stage both in a fairly general public sense and in terms of
where the government had got to and also in terms of where the opposition had got to
because as you can see now the opposition is not proposing going backwards on the
Employment Contracts Act to an important degree. They've got a number of principles
they are advancing where they think that the Act is deficient but in terms of the big picture
they have accepted that too. So I think what we've got is broad public and political
acceptance of the basic reform framework there and we didn't really have any belief that
the campaign on the part of the unions would prevail.
Q. How did you go about publicising your position on the Employment Contracts Bill?
A. We didn't engage in a lot of special publicity at that stage. I think you've got to see
where we were there as being at the end of five years work in the area in which we'd
published a great deal of material. So, in the first few months after the Bill was introduced
in December of 1990 we made submissions on it. We made a couple of rounds of
submissions I remember because there was a paper which was put out in February which
called for additional submissions on it. So we did that and we probably continued to make
speeches on the subject from time to time but there weren't any special efforts on our part
to campaign publicly or vigourously for it. We were more concerned at that stage with
getting the details of the Bill into shape.
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Q. In what ways do you feel the Employment Contracts Bill has been beneficial to New
Zealand?
A. I think the evidence is enormous about the gains that it has achieved. I think the key
one, the most obvious one to date is productivity. It was always our belief that what this
argument was about was the better utilisation of those important labour resources that I
referred to earlier, representing two-thirds on average of costs in the economy. What
you've seen occuring under the Employment Contracts Bill has just meant a literal large
boost to New Zealand's productivity performancethrough more flexible working
arrangements, through getting rid of the old overtime penalty rates etc. a lot of the
demarcation restrictions, a lot of the hours of work restrictions, a set of very important
issues to do with employment contracts that relate to the particular needs of workers in
particular firms instead of a one size fits all regime from North Cape to Bluff, much more
particularised to local circumstances and the needs of workers, women part-timers and so
forth. All the traffic has moved from the level of occupational and industry awards to
enterprise arrangements. It has also meant much more trust and cooperation within firms.
The them and us mentality has broken down in a very big kind of way and one of the
manifestations of that is the much, much lower instance of strike activity we've seen in
that period. And you only have to go around firms to hear the good news stories in that
regard. So productivity is an early gain we've seen out of the Employment Contracts Act.
The other key gain I think is the contribution to emloyment creation. We used to dlitcribe
the old regime as a machine of job destruction because it simply could not take into
account all the factors which had to do with an individual firms circumstance, their ability
to pay, the relative balance of supply and demand for the labour skills they were wanting,
the lack of incentives for people to gain the skills and upgrade themselves in terms of their
competence as workers and their ability to raise their own income earning potential. So,
the aspect of employment creation that has come out of the Act is that you can tailor those
requirements much more now to labour market circumstances and we have seen a
substantial growth in employment now over the last twelve or eighteen months and
employment is forecast to continue to grow by something like 20,000 a year which is the
first growth in unemployment we have seen since the 84/85 period. Unemployment, of
course, is not falling proportionately and that is because other people who have simply
moved out of the workforce because they gave up any hope of ever finding a job have been
encouraged to come back and search for work now but unemployment has started to
decline slowly too. I think we're increasingly going to see the contribution of the
Employment Contracts Act as being as well as on the productivity side through the long
run employment growth of the economy and as one of the central solutions to the
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unemployment problem. So, those are what I would sum up as being the big gains of the
Employment Contracts Act.
Q. Would you say that the companies who are represented on the Business Roundtable
have benefitted or lost out from the Employment Contracts Act?
A. Undoubtedly they've benefitted overall but they haven't benefitted disproportionately
to other, smaller companies, for example. In many ways we used to feel that the large
beneficiaries of the reforms might well be smaller companies partly because larger
companies tended to have some of the more serious industrial relations problems. Looking
back into the old New Zealand industries like meat, construction, pulp and paper and so
forth those were some of the areas of hardcore industrial problems. We always felt it
would take time for some of those companies to establish new relationships of trust and
cooperation, a lot of the small companies would succeed in moving faster in that regard. I
think that that has actually been the case but nevertheless the benefits for the larger
companies have also been very strongly positive too. You should also bear in mind that
this debate was never entirely won between unions on the one hand and employers on the
other. There were quite a few people in the emplyers ranks at various times who were quite
comfortable thank-you very much with the old system because it enabled the same
working conditions to be imposed on all their competitors, the same kind of wage
increases to be imposed on all their competitors. So, if they were in a reasonably strong
position in the market they were perfectly comfortable about that. It was a good anti -
competition device and many of them also were pretty sluggish and part of the protective
old New Zealand and weren't all that concerned about changes in this area and it was all
too hard and too difficult anyway. So, some of them, in the early stages at least were not
very strong supporters of the changes but either they have fallen by the wayside or they
have woken up and realised that this has really been the way of the future for the economy.
Q. What are the current objectives of the Business Roundtable with regard to labour
market reform?
A. We still see a need for a few second level developments of the Employment Contracts
Act in order to really maximise the potential of a freed-up labour market. Basically the
Employment Contracts Act has enshrined the principle of freedom to contract in
employment relations subject to a good legal framework which is essentially the
framework of contract law which would put aside contracts based on duress,
misrepresentation , fraud , intimidation, all those kinds of principles. Beyond that there is no
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basic requirement for government interference through contracting between employers and
workers. We still see some inhibitions in that area, particularly ones coming out of the
Employment Court which has not really adapted fully to the new world of employment
contracting and continues to import into many of its decisions a lot of the old-style notions
that used to plague our industrial relations systems. So we in the Employers Federation
undertook a study which we published earlier last year which looks at the track record of
the Employment Court.
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Interyiew with Gerry Cotterell
Member - Canterbury Branch Committee P.S.A. 1991
Q. Can you tell me what your position in the union movement was at the time of the
Employment Contracts Bill?
A. At the time of the E.C.B. I was a member of the Canterbury Branch Committee of the
P.S.A. and I was also a member of the C.T.U. District Council until I left that. I am also a
delegate at work too.
Q. How accurate was the account in the People's Voice of the Canterbury meeting on April
the 9th.?
A. Is that the mass meeting in the town hall?
Q. Yes
A. There was a lot of controversy before the meeting even started, because the P.S.A.
started the ball rolling for it and other unions became involved and there was going to be a
call for a general strike to defeat the Bill and the P.S.A. official policy then was only to
oppose it. So there was a big row about whether the meeting should go ahead, who should
speak and Sue Piper was told quite clearly that unless she spoke to the motion which was a
general strike to defeat the Bill then she shouldn't speak and there was a fair bit of bloody
argy bargy about that. There was actually an organising meeing for that meeting several
days beforehand and there were lots of things said to the people present, I wasn't one of
them, about who was participating in the meeting because some members of the
Communist Party were going to speak and that sort of thing. Ken Douglas and other
people were sort of dragging this red scare tactic out so there was a fair bit of background
politiking going on as to what was going to be said and who was going to speak at the
meeting.
Q. What sort of measures did the C.T.U. leadership use to persuade people that the
'Oppose the Bill' line was the best one?
A. Basically that the strike action would be of no effect and it was really interesting that
though the C.T.U. leadership at the time always when the opportunity is right they say we
are the leadership of the trade union movement. When they don't want to do anything they
say "no, we only act on behalf of the affiliate, if the affiliate says this we will do this" and
what they said was "if you want a general strike or anything you have to go to your
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affiliate to get it organised. The C.T.U. can't call that." They have done that a couple of
times since but when they want to they will speak on behalf of the union movement. When
they don't want to do anything or they want to hold things back they just say "we are only
acting on behalf of our affiliates and until they decide something we cannot say anything"
and that is exactly what they used that time. They use it both ways. When there is
something on the news media they just jump up and down and say "we are the voice of the
union movement" but there it was a real lack of leadership in that sense. I mean obviously
they can't tell people to go out on strike but they can say "hey listen we think you should"
and that is what people waited for at that time.
Q. Did the P.S.A. membership favour a general strike?
A. In Canterbury, overwhelmingly yes. I work for quite a conservative workplace and the
people there were prepared to go out. The psychiatric nurses at Sunnyside were prepared
to take two weeks strike action. They had a meeting and decided in favour of that.
Different sections throughout the country were in favour of a general strike but Sue Piper
at the special C.T.U. conference regarding the Bill went and voted against a general strike
and my understanding is that was against the wishes of the National Council which is the
policy-making body of the P.S.A. She actually left in the middle of one of those meetings
and went and cast her vote without an instruction to do so. So the P.S.A. line came out in
early February 'Oppose the Bill' and despite the fact that it had been put forward that we
should argue to defeat the Bill the argument in the P.S.A. and the C.T.U. was that we
should be reasonable people and that we could talk the Government round and in hindsight
we couldn't.
Q. Do you think there was overwhelming support for a general strike in the Canterbury
area amongst the various unions?
A. In the meeting at the town hall we had about 5,500-6,500 people and that day we could
have gone. We had a one day stoppage and we had 8,500 people and we could have easily
called a general one. Not necessarily everyone would have come out .but we would
havehad a massive amount of support. Especially given the leadership there was. The day
we had 8,500 in the square one of the P.S.A. speakers, someone who was quite good with
oral skills deliberately talked the meeting down. He was obviously acting under
instructions from further up. This person can usually give quite good inflammatory
speeches and he was obviously operating under instructions and left people with nowhere
to go. It was like there was no leadership or where we should go next everyone was just
left up in the air. On the day of action we had here there were 8,500 people in the square.
The teachers already had a day before that and there was like several thousand of those in
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the square the day beforehand. So there was like a burst of activity. In Auckland I think
there were 300,000 people out on the streets over a period of a week and that was the
biggest we had ever seen. I've got most of the clippings from the period from all the
papers. I don't think it would have been defeated from a one-day general strike, we had to
be a bit more cunning than that, but I think it would have been a good start.
Q. Was the C.T.D. influential in determining P.S.A. policy on whether to support strike
action or not?
A. It is really hard to tell that directly. Officially speaking in the P.S.A. and the C.T.D., all
get together and as a base and the unions officially work out there position beforehand. But
they all live in Wellington, they all work together regularly so...{inaudible}. Sue Piper was
never one to stand up and fight at all so I can see how she would go along with the line that
we should just talk to the government and show that we are reasonable people. I mean the
year before the RC.A. Sue Piper was the President of the P.S.A. and she invited Bill Birch
to speak to a P.S.A. conference, I mean that's an idea of the sort of mentality. They did
have meetings on a fortnightly basis with Birch, the P.S.A. - that gives you an idea of the
sort of minds there really.
Q. What were the effects of the Canterbury and Nelson votes of no confidence in the
P.S.A.?
A. Canterbury, in particular, like theWest Coast and Nelson have always been seen as
mavericks in the P.S.A. Canterbury have always been seen as a bunch of lunatics amd they
don't tend to agree with national policy all the time and dig their heels in all over the place.
So, it is a bit hard to know how it was taken. It certainly caused a lot of demoralisation
down here. As you know I work for the statistics department and they are mostly
graduates, middle class and comfortable and they were all geared up to have a go for at
least one day. The repercussions have been really interesting, like why didn't we do
something and I hear it from all over the place now. Like the P.S.A. is having a debate
about its role in the C.T.D. at the moment and I am on the Nationa Policy Council and we
here this stuff from all over the place, like Poverty Bay, "why didn't the P.S.A. and the
C.T.D. have a go at the Employment Contracts Act" so it has had a real flow on effect.
Questions are still being asked about it so it has had a big effect.
Q. Is it your personal opinion that there would have been overwhelming support for a
general strike nationally?
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A. I think so given the right leadership. There was enough evidence that people were
prepared to have a go and I think that given enough leadership, yes we could have got the
whole country out for a day and possibly more. Yes, depending on how it was done. It
really should have been done in terms of rolling strikes and stuff like that. I think we really
could have got the whole country out for a day. The feedback where we were, definately in
Canterbury. As we sent more and more material out and talked at more and more meetings
people got angrier and angrier and so the more people were educated the more they
realised what the bill was going to do to them so there was an incredibly steep and swift
learning period where people at the start thought "oh well" but once they started finding
out what the bill would do people got really angry and said yes they were prepared to do
something so I think there was a real possibility, yes. We have paid for it since then. Even
if we had been defeated in those days, had a general strike and been defeated I think we
could have ommitted a lot of the worst aspects of it and we wouldn't have been attacked so
much. I don't think there would have been such a quick movement on penal rates and that
sort of thing, we really have paid for that scene. The interesting thing now is that the
C.T.D. is undergoing an internal review because their membership levels are just falling
like nine pins and they really are struggling financially and that is a consequence of falling
membership as a result of the act. These people are there to provide leadership so why, if
you guys are being done like a duck with a union leadership, why not same yourself $8.00
a fortnight in union dues and be done like a duck at any rate. You are just wasting your
money.
Appendix
Interview with Val McClimont
Chairperson - Canterbury Branch P.S.A. 1991
Q. How accurate is the account in the People's Voice of the April 9 meeting?
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A. The mass meeting of April 9 was preceded by a meeting on April the 8th of all the
major players inCanterbury and I was the designated chairperson for that meeting. So I
was involved. In fact, it was a pretty traumatic day for me. I recall it as I was at work on
the morning of that day - Monday - and I got a phone call from John McKenzie who was
the then regional secretary for the Canterbury region of the P.S.A. asking if I could come
into the P.S.A. office. I said to him that I was at work and that I needed to be released from
work but if that could be arranged then I was happy to come in. A few minutes later my
boss called and released me from work. I arrived at the P.S.A. at 1O.45am and for the next
hour I was grilled by Joris de Bres and John McKenzie over the Canterbury resolution.
Now the Canterbury resolution that was going to that meeting had been thrashed out by the
C.T.U. and the Combined Unions Committee for at least a month, but it was a bit different
from the C.T.U. resolution that they wanted to put nationwide, because our resolution said
that we wanted to defeat and repeal the Bill, that we were committing ourselves to the
defeat of the E.C.B. and if it were to become an act that we would continue to fight against
it. We used the word defeat in our resolution and that was apparently enough to warrant
some disturbance. I had a first inkling that something was wrong when a few days before
we had an education rally in Canterbury and the special schools also held a rally. We were
in the midst of a wage round too so we combined the two and we joined the education
rally and after this I met Angela Foulkes and she made mention of the Canterbury
resolution. I said that the people in Canterbury decided what resolution they wanted to put
before their members and if their members voted in favour of it then that was the
Canterbury resolution. She was pretty upset about it and she tried to argue about it. I told
her that there was no point in arguing with me about it because it is a resolution that is
decided by a committee of people and I am only one person on that committee and I
happen to agree with it and there is no way that by badgering me it will get changed. I
wasn't entirely surprised when I was attacked but I was surprised and devastated by the
people who were doing it. One was Joris de Bres who is the Senior Officer in the P.S.A.
and John McKenzie who up until that point I admired, but John had obviously thrown his
lot in with Joris de Bres and that surprised me quite a lot as only the week before on the
Friday night before this Monday we had a meeting to discuss this resolution and get the
words absolutely tidied up and I was the chairperson at that meeting and I said that I
wanted to be absolutely sure that we knew what it was as we had to type this thing up to
get it in front of the members and I passed it to John McKenzie personally and asekd him
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to read it and asked him if it was okay " yes,yes it's okay go for it" and then the next
Monday here he was {inaudible} me around the ears with quite a lot of vigorous
badgering. I have to say that after fifty minutes I finally gavehim a piece of my mind and I
left the room but there was a meeting scheduled for one that afternoon and I told them that
they hadn't heard the last of me and that as far as I was concerned this resolution was in
trust to me as the Chairperson by the combined meeting of all the trade unions in
Canterbury and it was a sacred trust and as far as I was concerned there was nothing they
could say or do would break it.
Q. What was your own position in the union at the time?
A. I was the Chairperson of the Canterbury Branch of the P.S.A. and the National
Councillor of the Branch. I had two roles. In these roles I represented every member of the
Canterbury Branch of the P.S.A. At that time that was close to 7,000 members. In the
afternoon all the unionists who were part of that central committee running that meeting
met and they tried to dispense of my services as chairperson, that was de Bres and
McKenzie, they said they were going to bring in somebody else to be the chairperson and
the other members of the meeting, which included Maurice Ward and some other
unionists said "no we have our chairperson and if he wants to continue then we want him
to continue" and I said "I have accepted the responsibility of being chairperson for this
meeting and I in no way want to relinquish it" they said that was fine and told McKenzie
and de Bres to butt out of it, and at one stage McKenzie got so angry and furious that he
got up from behind his desk and approached Maurice Ward with his fist raised and
Maurice to his eternal credit looked him in the eye as he came across the room and he said
"go on John do it". He dared him to hit him and McKenzie realised at the last minute in the
midst of his fury at not getting his own way that he was in danger of assaulting someone
and he knew at that point that Maurice Ward wouldn't have any hesitation about having
him on toast. The committee stuck together so much that Joris de Bres had to back down.
I had the satisfaction of seeing that man back down and it was at that point that I knew the
strength of unity among workers. All they have to do is have that kind of unity and they
can face down anybody.
Q. Did the P.S.A. favour a general strike?
A. Yes they did. What you must do if you are doing this properly is you must get the
minutes of the C.T.V. meeting of around the 18 Aprill991 Special Affiliates Conference.
My members at Canterbury had decided that they wanted a general strike. There was no
question about this, this [decision] was made at a branch meeting. Now Sue Piper wnet to
the meeting on thel8 April of the C.T.V. I remember that day very well because we were
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asked to endorse David Thorpe as the new General Secretary for the Union and there was
a lot of who har about that as we had asked to see some papers for the other candidates and
that hadn't eventuated and fmally he was voted in. It is important to underline the 18th. As
Sue went to leave the room she had to pass me and I said to her, "remember that my
members want their day of strike action". There was no question about what they wanted,
they wanted their general strike and I said that to her as she walked out of the room. She
came back, it was either very late that afternoon or the next morning, and people were
anxious to know what the C.T.U. vote had been and she didn't tell us how she had used her
vote, she simply told us that the C.T.U. had voted for a day of action.
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